Thursday, December 2, 2021

ISSUE 58

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

UKRAINE UNDER ATTACK?

The international discussion about the movement of Russian troops within Russia itself and how it might presage a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia has certain elements of déjà vu. Earlier in 2021 Russia moved troops close to the border with Ukraine, probably even closer than they are now. There was not so much speculation then about a full-fledged Russian invasion. The incident faded away and many of us were able to conclude that Russia had responded to Ukrainian moves around the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine by sending a message to Kyiv about the military reaction that could be expected should Ukraine be tempted to follow the recent Azerbaijan example. (In the fall of 2020 Azerbaijan used military force to regain control of a part of its internationally recognized territory in the Karabakh region.) The early 2021 events around Eastern Ukraine were then followed by high-level meetings including the first Biden-Putin summit and a period of relative quiet.

Things are different this time around. On the previous occasion, Dmitry Kozak, the Russian presidential administration point man on Ukraine stated unequivocally that a Ukrainian offensive on the rebel regions would lead “to the end of the Ukrainian state in its current form.” This time the interpretation of military movements has been that there was no pre-condition and that Russia was considering invading the whole of Ukraine. Some commentators have speculated that for Putin Ukraine remains the unresolved conflict of his presidency and that as he moves along in years, he may be inclined to consider more radical measures. There has also been some reference to Putin’s statements about Russian’s red lines and about tensions being useful to get the attention of the other side.



Does Russia really contemplate invading Ukraine? If one looks at the question from the point of view of Russian national interests, the answer is an obvious no in virtually every respect. Does Vladimir Putin contemplate invading Ukraine? To give that answer Putin turned to his long-term associate  Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian acronym: SVR), to re-state that Russia has no intention to invade Ukraine. In the response to the claim of an unusual presence of troops near the border the Russian authorities had earlier chosen to use the SVR as the agency to rebuff the claims of an unusual presence of troops. The SVR statement even compared what it called a US propaganda exercise as something taken from Goebbels’ book, no less.

When it was made earlier this year, the above-mentioned Kozak statement was not understood to imply an invasion of Ukraine but rather a strong military and political response to any attempt by Kyiv to recover through military action the rebel territories of Eastern Ukraine. The conditional aspect was clear. What it also made clear is that Putin would not consider ever abandoning the Russian-speaking populations of Eastern Ukraine.

The one leader who seems to have understood the situation clearly and said so is President Zelenskyy. During his late November marathon press conference, he did not deny the risk of war but criticized alarmists for predicting imminent open armed confrontation. He nevertheless emphasised that Ukraine is now much more ready to defend itself than it was a few years ago. “We have been at war for eight years. And the likelihood of large-scale or continuation of a strong escalation by Russia or militants backed by the Russian Federation may take place any day. But I think that today there is intimidation from some sites and media that there will be a war tomorrow.”

Zelenskky has perfectly understood the meaning and extent of the Russian threat. He is the person who could trigger that threat by ordering military action to retake the rebel regions. That would be running against everything that he has said since he became president. To this day, he keeps emphasising that he wants to negotiate, but from a position of strength: “we will not be able to stop the war and return the territories without our troops and without direct talks with Russia.”

As for NATO countries, they have no choice but to denounce the Russian threat and in turn threaten of serious consequences, even though not extending to direct military actions. This will not put Russia on the defensive but will justify increasing military assistance to Ukraine. The US is using the same strong rhetoric but without going too far. Ahead of his own meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Secretary of State Blinken was edging his bets on the likelihood of an imminent invasion, so as not to prevent the organisation of another Biden-Putin conversation later this year.

Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov
Stockholm, December 2nd

As for Russia, it has no expectation from Ukraine, but may not have given up on NATO countries. A credible threat may have been enough to trigger the launch of discussions on long-term security guarantees between Russia and NATO, as seems to be suggested by Russia’s publicly expressed hopes on the agenda for the upcoming Biden-Putin virtual meeting. This is not the same as excluding Ukraine from NATO membership for ever. It goes back to the fundamental long-term issue of staging and deployment of military assets. It does not imply less support for Ukraine from the NATO side. It would imply, however, the acknowledgement that the Ukraine conflict itself will not be resolved any time soon as well as that Ukraine has so “separated” itself from Russia that it is no longer as crucial as it was seen during Colin Powell’s time as Secretary of State. Frustration and anger emanating from Kyiv could be expected and did not fail to materialize. It should be understood though that this is a long-term discussion that will not alter the current US rhetoric, may run into political obstacles and would unfold slowly in any event. 

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NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT NEGOTIATIONS?

Behind the discussion about the possible Russian invasion of Russia, there have been political and military developments that have set the stage for the current level of public confrontation.

Politically, there has been pressure on Russia to convene another meeting of the Normandy Four (Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia). The story went on that President Putin had agreed to this under pressure from President Macron and Chancellor Merkel but that, according to French and German sources, Foreign Minister Lavrov was balking. This led Lavrov to take the highly unusual step of publishing the full text of his correspondence with his French and German counterparts. This was intended to clarify the Russian position that Putin had agreed to ask Lavrov to try to organise a meeting, but that the Russian conclusion is that there is no point in another meeting of the Normandy Four as this time. The main reason is that there has been no progress on the implementation of the decisions of the previous meeting, specifically Ukraine making no progress toward the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (that establish the principles for a settlement of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine). After many years of Ukraine supporters parroting the line that Russia needs to abide by the Minsk Agreements, there is now subdued recognition among diplomatic observers that it is Ukraine that has a fundamental problem with these arrangements.

President Zelenskyy addressing the Rada
December 1st, Kyiv
©President of Ukraine Website


Things are also different on the military front. Ukraine has begun to use its Turkish-made drones in Eastern Ukraine, it also apparently used US-provided Javelin missiles and, using the cover of both, it has according to Russian sources brought its troops closer to the confrontation line. The UK sent a military ship to the Black Sea to test the limits of what might be legally and operationally possible. The US has also sent strategic bombers in the vicinity of Crimea. NATO countries also have assessed the limits of Russian preparedness in the Black Sea, in the vicinity of Ukraine. Poking the bear is the comparison that comes to mind.

There have been indications to Ukraine that it would not be allowed to join NATO anytime soon. There has however been increasing US and other support for the Ukrainian military that, for its part, has been constantly improving its capacity and performance.

President Zelenskyy recognizing a Ukrainian veteran
December 1st, Kyiv
©President of Ukraine Website


Things have also changed in Ukraine proper. The Zelenskyy administration has allowed the passage of legislation that does not include ethnic Russians as native people of Ukraine. It is also preparing legislation that, in Moscow’s view, is equivalent to withdrawing from the Minsk Agreements.

More important though is the message that Russia has essentially given up on Zelenskky as a political leader who could resolve the Eastern Ukraine problem. Ukrainian public opinion will not support the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. Zelenskyy has neither really tried to change nor offered the beginning of a workable alternative solution.

The offer of President Erdogan of Turkey to mediate the conflict between Ukraine and Russia was not taken seriously and was most likely seen as the product of a mind that has an over-inflated idea of its importance. As France and Germany have failed, others should perhaps be inspired by the offer and come forward. As it is, there is no sign of any possibility of progress in the foreseeable future. As noted above, Zelenskyy’s call for direct talks with Russia will elicit no response.

--o--

LUKASHENKO, AS A PASSEUR

Alexander Lukashenko has acted in a way that puts him in the same category as the passeurs who take advantage of refugees and charge them large amounts of money to take them across the English Channel. Lukashenko did not do it for money of course, but for some eventual political advantage in the form of some sort of de facto recognition from the EU. The most likely inspiration, though, for his actions is that he probably wanted to seek vindication against the Polish authorities. Lukashenko seems to have enjoyed exposing what he sees as the double standards of the Polish government that rushed to offer political asylum to Belarus opposition figures but would turn back asylum-seekers from the Middle East. He would also have enjoyed the irony of the proposal to fly the asylum-seekers directly to Germany, an idea that would throw further light on the discrepancy between the Polish and German approaches to refugee issues. The fact that the asylum-seekers are leaving their home countries as a result of failed US/NATO policies would just have been an extra source of satisfaction.

Lukashenko’s utter disregard for the life and well-being of the refugees obviously meant he could not avoid well-founded criticism. Sacrificing a few people did not matter to him.

Chancellor Merkel, in her end of reign caretaker capacity agreed to speak directly to Lukashenko to achieve a resolution of the problem. Rather than receiving due gratitude, Merkel is now being criticized by the Polish Prime Minister for offering recognition to an illegitimate dictator. The German side is strongly denying this is the case.

Lukashenko’s dumping of refugees on the border with Poland was such a blatant provocation that the Polish side did not suffer too much reputational damage for its hard-line refugee policy. The whole incident, however, gives comfort to other EU countries such as Hungary that harbour policies like that of Poland. It illustrates policy differences among European countries at a time when France and the UK are confronted with serious challenges in this area.

Lukashenko may not have won much in all of this other than to reinforce his image at home and in the neighbourhood as a strong Soviet-era leader, the so-called cunning peasant, and one who does not care much about a few lost lives. 

--o--

ZELENSKYY’S PRESS CONFERENCE 

President Zelenskyy, November 26th Press Conference, Kyiv
©President of Ukraine Website


From Zelenskyy’s end of November marathon press-conference the item that got the most attention was his allegation that a coup d’état against him was under preparation for early December by unspecified individuals from Ukraine and Russia. He mentioned oligarch Rinat Akhmetov as one who may have been played by the alleged conspirators. The expected denial of any such conspiracy from all possible sources quickly followed.

Ukrainian oligarchs would certainly have no love for Zelenskyy and his attempts to de-oligarchise the Ukrainian economy. Conversations they may have had about Zelenskyy would most likely have included some rather unpleasant remarks directed at the President. Oligarchs do however still have a lot of tools at their disposal, including the media, to undermine Zelenskky other than a coup d’état.

Wittingly or not, Zelenskyy’s remark about a coup briefly shifted public attention from a Russian threat to Ukraine to a rather vaguely defined threat against himself. One of his problems has always been the perception that he is not strong enough to face Vladimir Putin or to reign in the oligarchs. Presenting himself as one who can overcome attempts is always useful.

--o--

ZELENSKYY’S RECORD

As could be expected in the case of a President who has been in power for more than two years, a lengthy unscripted press conference will lead to the airing of alleged mistakes, scandals, or disputes. Zelenskky now has plenty of accusations to contend with in this respect, some of which are not warranted at all. The most significant attack against his policies came from an unlikely source, an article in the Atlantic Council. The title says it all: “Ukraine’s anti-oligarch law could make President Zelenskyy too powerful.”  The article essentially criticizes the President for his continuing links with oligarchs as well as the new legislation concentrating too much power in the presidential office. The substance of the article may not matter so much as the fact that an entity that is expected to be pro-Ukraine should publish an article that is critical of the President, thus confirming a misalignment between Zelenskky and some pro-Ukraine voices.

By contrast, looking at presidential activity since Zelenskyy’s accession to power, it might be equally noteworthy that the government procurement methodology that is currently in place has been supporting the rather successful implementation of the President’s "big construction" program. By doing away with the level of corruption that so prevailed especially during the Yanukovych presidency, the Ukrainian governments seems to have been able to devote resources to infrastructure projects that will support the modernisation of the country. The long-term impact will be significant.

The other project that deserves mentioning is the revival of the Ukrainian aircraft industry on the basis of the Antonov aircraft plant as well as the modernisation of the air transport infrastructure. In the context of a continuing pandemic, and despite the priority seemingly given to cargo aircraft, the timing of the announcement may surprise. The long-term view is nevertheless laudable. There was yet no indication of a Canadian connection to this project.

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THE TALIBAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

As the US and the Taliban prepare for their first consultations since the US dropped out of Afghanistan, a few observations are in order.

Many explanations have been given for the quick takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. The Taliban have received credit for their proximity to the people. The outgoing authorities have been blamed for their corruption and in some regions for their authoritarian conduct. Ethnic and tribal factors have been mentioned. There has however not been a fundamental acknowledgement that the US and NATO policies were flawed. There however has been some outside acknowledgement of the immoral aspect of the US and NATO abandoning their supporters and their civil society allies.

In the discussions with the Taliban, the US will be expected to insist on the necessary inclusiveness of new Afghanistan government if it wants to receive international recognition and gain access to the country’s financial reserves kept by international institutions. The question arises as to how far the US is ready to go to withhold funds that are now needed for humanitarian purposes.



John Bolton, briefly Trump’s national security advisor and one of the supporters of the flawed US policy in Afghanistan, recently claimed that with the US departure Afghanistan would soon become the source of terrorist attacks against US interests. In this case, reiterating past assumptions implies not being even close to acknowledging mistakes.

There has also been the idea that the Taliban could be supported to squeeze out ISIS-K, considered as a distinct radical terrorist entity. That may be a way for both sides to save face, if the Taliban can be convinced to go after their Muslim brothers.

In dealing with Afghanistan, the US seems to have tried to exercise some influence over Pakistan, with little success. Other than that, the US seems to have held the view that they could deal with Afghanistan on their own. There may have been little appetite to deal with Russia, Iran or China. Relatively little attention would have been paid to Central Asian countries.

It is worth noting that it is mostly Uzbekistan that supplies electric power to the city of Kabul, to this day, on humanitarian grounds, even if the Afghan side is not able to pay. The Uzbek Foreign Minister was the first foreign official to visit Kabul. Uzbekistan and the Taliban have now already agreed on Uzbekistan re-building the Mazar-i-Sharif airport.

For its part, Russia has already started sending humanitarian shipments to Afghanistan and flying back to Russia Afghan students that are registered in Russian universities.

There is no sign yet that US could acknowledge that it might achieve its own objectives in Afghanistan by cooperating with the other governments of the region.  

--o--

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

It would look as though Vladimir Putin not only managed to sit the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia in the same room on November 26th, but also managed to achieve results on three main topics of discussion.

Presidents Aliev and Putin, PM Pashinyan
Sochi, November 26th
© President of Russia Website


On the delimitation of the boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it looked as though Azerbaijan was hoping to extract further concessions from Armenia prior to agreeing to the formal process of delimitation. Delimitation would be crucial to avoid further armed skirmishes on the confrontation lines. The results are not immediately visible, but the process should be launched before the end of the year.

Humanitarian issues: this is mostly about returning home the prisoners held by both sides. It would seem that there are more Armenians to be returned than Azerbaijanis. There is no specific deadline but a general expectation of early movement.

Re-opening of economic corridors: this goes beyond just stopping the fighting. Re-establishing the functioning of land transport is a vital long-term economic requirement that can bring changes to the region.

The general sense is that Armenia got more on boundary delimitation and humanitarian issues than Azerbaijan had hitherto been willing to concede. What leverage Putin was able to use on Aliev is not entirely clear but may become evident in coming weeks as the implementation of decision unfolds. There may have been a discrete but decisive role for Turkey in this process.

Economic corridors matter to all, including Russia, but Armenia would probably stand to gain more in the short term.

--o--

GAS PRICES IN EUROPE, UPDATE

In the seemingly endless debate around the completion and now the legal certification of Nord Stream 2, a short mid-November news item seems to have gone largely unnoticed. As the German authorities announced there would be delay in legal certification, gas prices in Europe jumped by 10% in one day. That should speed up the process of using a pipeline that is now fully completed. Yet Ukraine and the UK, obviously not having to foot the bill, are still fighting against Nord Stream 2, as a matter of principle. Fact that they are also driving up the price for one of Russia’s main commodity exports also seems not to matter.

--o--


 

THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.

 

 

 

 

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