THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
UKRAINE UNDER ATTACK?
The
international discussion about the movement of Russian troops within Russia
itself and how it might presage a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia has
certain elements of déjà vu. Earlier in 2021 Russia moved troops close
to the border with Ukraine, probably even closer than they are now. There was
not so much speculation then about a full-fledged Russian invasion. The
incident faded away and many of us were able to conclude that Russia had
responded to Ukrainian moves around the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine by
sending a message to Kyiv about the military reaction that could be expected
should Ukraine be tempted to follow the recent Azerbaijan example. (In the fall
of 2020 Azerbaijan used military force to regain control of a part of its internationally
recognized territory in the Karabakh region.) The early 2021 events around
Eastern Ukraine were then followed by high-level meetings including the first Biden-Putin
summit and a period of relative quiet.
Things are different
this time around. On the previous occasion, Dmitry Kozak, the Russian
presidential administration point man on Ukraine stated unequivocally that a
Ukrainian offensive on the rebel regions would lead “to the end of the Ukrainian
state in its current form.” This time the interpretation of military
movements has been that there was no pre-condition and that Russia was
considering invading the whole of Ukraine. Some commentators have speculated
that for Putin Ukraine remains the unresolved conflict of his presidency and
that as he moves along in years, he may be inclined to consider more radical
measures. There has also been some reference to Putin’s statements about Russian’s
red lines and about tensions being useful to get the attention of the other
side.
Does Russia really contemplate invading Ukraine? If one looks at the question from the point of view of Russian national interests, the answer is an obvious no in virtually every respect. Does Vladimir Putin contemplate invading Ukraine? To give that answer Putin turned to his long-term associate Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian acronym: SVR), to re-state that Russia has no intention to invade Ukraine. In the response to the claim of an unusual presence of troops near the border the Russian authorities had earlier chosen to use the SVR as the agency to rebuff the claims of an unusual presence of troops. The SVR statement even compared what it called a US propaganda exercise as something taken from Goebbels’ book, no less.
When it was
made earlier this year, the above-mentioned Kozak statement was not understood
to imply an invasion of Ukraine but rather a strong military and political
response to any attempt by Kyiv to recover through military action the rebel
territories of Eastern Ukraine. The conditional aspect was clear. What it also
made clear is that Putin would not consider ever abandoning the
Russian-speaking populations of Eastern Ukraine.
The one
leader who seems to have understood the situation clearly and said so is
President Zelenskyy. During his late November marathon press conference, he did
not deny the risk of war but criticized alarmists for predicting imminent open
armed confrontation. He nevertheless emphasised that Ukraine is now much more
ready to defend itself than it was a few years ago. “We have been at war for
eight years. And the likelihood of large-scale or continuation of a strong
escalation by Russia or militants backed by the Russian Federation may take
place any day. But I think that today there is intimidation from some sites and
media that there will be a war tomorrow.”
Zelenskky
has perfectly understood the meaning and extent of the Russian threat. He is
the person who could trigger that threat by ordering military action to retake
the rebel regions. That would be running against everything that he has said
since he became president. To this day, he keeps emphasising that he wants to
negotiate, but from a position of strength: “we will not be able to stop the
war and return the territories without our troops and without direct talks with
Russia.”
As for NATO
countries, they have no choice but to denounce the Russian threat and in turn
threaten of serious consequences, even though not extending to direct military actions. This will not put Russia on the defensive but
will justify increasing military assistance to Ukraine. The US is using the
same strong rhetoric but without going too far. Ahead of his own meeting with Foreign
Minister Lavrov, Secretary of State Blinken was edging his bets on the
likelihood of an imminent invasion, so as not to prevent the organisation of
another Biden-Putin conversation later this year.
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| Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov Stockholm, December 2nd |
As for
Russia, it has no expectation from Ukraine, but may not have given up on NATO
countries. A credible threat may have been enough to trigger the launch of
discussions on long-term security guarantees between Russia and NATO, as seems
to be suggested by Russia’s publicly expressed hopes on the agenda for the upcoming
Biden-Putin virtual meeting. This is not the same as excluding Ukraine from NATO
membership for ever. It goes back to the fundamental long-term issue of staging
and deployment of military assets. It does not imply less support for Ukraine
from the NATO side. It would imply, however, the acknowledgement that the
Ukraine conflict itself will not be resolved any time soon as well as that Ukraine has
so “separated” itself from Russia that it is no longer as crucial as it was seen during Colin Powell’s time as Secretary of State. Frustration and anger emanating
from Kyiv could be expected and did not fail to materialize. It should be understood though that this is a long-term discussion that will not alter the current US rhetoric, may run into political
obstacles and would unfold slowly in any event.
--o--
NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT NEGOTIATIONS?
Behind the discussion
about the possible Russian invasion of Russia, there have been political and
military developments that have set the stage for the current level of public
confrontation.
Politically, there has been pressure on Russia to convene another
meeting of the Normandy Four (Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia). The story
went on that President Putin had agreed to this under pressure from President
Macron and Chancellor Merkel but that, according to French and German sources,
Foreign Minister Lavrov was balking. This led Lavrov to take the highly unusual
step of publishing the full text of his correspondence with his French and
German counterparts. This was intended to clarify the Russian position that Putin
had agreed to ask Lavrov to try to organise a meeting, but that the Russian
conclusion is that there is no point in another meeting of the Normandy Four as
this time. The main reason is that there has been no progress on the
implementation of the decisions of the previous meeting, specifically Ukraine
making no progress toward the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (that
establish the principles for a settlement of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine).
After many years of Ukraine supporters parroting the line that Russia needs to
abide by the Minsk Agreements, there is now subdued recognition among diplomatic observers
that it is Ukraine that has a fundamental problem with these arrangements.
 |
| President Zelenskyy addressing the Rada December 1st, Kyiv ©President of Ukraine Website |
Things are
also different on the military front. Ukraine has begun to use its Turkish-made drones in
Eastern Ukraine, it also apparently used US-provided Javelin missiles and,
using the cover of both, it has according to Russian sources brought its troops
closer to the confrontation line. The UK sent a military ship to the Black Sea
to test the limits of what might be legally and operationally possible. The US
has also sent strategic bombers in the vicinity of Crimea. NATO countries also have
assessed the limits of Russian preparedness in the Black Sea, in the vicinity
of Ukraine. Poking the bear is the comparison that comes to mind.
There have been
indications to Ukraine that it would not be allowed to join NATO anytime soon.
There has however been increasing US and other support for the Ukrainian military
that, for its part, has been constantly improving its capacity and performance.
 |
| President Zelenskyy recognizing a Ukrainian veteran December 1st, Kyiv ©President of Ukraine Website |
Things have
also changed in Ukraine proper. The Zelenskyy administration has allowed the
passage of legislation that does not include ethnic Russians as native people
of Ukraine. It is also preparing legislation that, in Moscow’s view, is equivalent
to withdrawing from the Minsk Agreements.
More
important though is the message that Russia has essentially given up on
Zelenskky as a political leader who could resolve the Eastern Ukraine problem.
Ukrainian public opinion will not support the implementation of the Minsk
Agreements. Zelenskyy has neither really tried to change nor offered the beginning
of a workable alternative solution.
The offer
of President Erdogan of Turkey to mediate the conflict between Ukraine and
Russia was not taken seriously and was most likely seen as the product of a
mind that has an over-inflated idea of its importance. As France and Germany
have failed, others should perhaps be inspired by the offer and come forward.
As it is, there is no sign of any possibility of progress in the foreseeable
future. As noted above, Zelenskyy’s call for direct talks with Russia will elicit
no response.
--o--
LUKASHENKO, AS A PASSEUR
Alexander
Lukashenko has acted in a way that puts him in the same category as the passeurs
who take advantage of refugees and charge them large amounts of money to take
them across the English Channel. Lukashenko did not do it for money of course,
but for some eventual political advantage in the form of some sort of de
facto recognition from the EU. The most likely inspiration, though, for his
actions is that he probably wanted to seek vindication against the Polish
authorities. Lukashenko seems to have enjoyed exposing what he sees as the double
standards of the Polish government that rushed to offer political asylum to
Belarus opposition figures but would turn back asylum-seekers from the Middle
East. He would also have enjoyed the irony of the proposal to fly the
asylum-seekers directly to Germany, an idea that would throw further light on
the discrepancy between the Polish and German approaches to refugee issues. The
fact that the asylum-seekers are leaving their home countries as a result of
failed US/NATO policies would just have been an extra source of satisfaction.
Lukashenko’s
utter disregard for the life and well-being of the refugees obviously meant he
could not avoid well-founded criticism. Sacrificing a few people did not matter
to him.
Chancellor
Merkel, in her end of reign caretaker capacity agreed to speak directly to
Lukashenko to achieve a resolution of the problem. Rather than receiving due
gratitude, Merkel is now being criticized by the Polish Prime Minister for offering
recognition to an illegitimate dictator. The German side is strongly denying
this is the case.
Lukashenko’s
dumping of refugees on the border with Poland was such a blatant provocation
that the Polish side did not suffer too much reputational damage for its hard-line
refugee policy. The whole incident, however, gives comfort to other EU
countries such as Hungary that harbour policies like that of Poland. It illustrates policy
differences among European countries at a time when France and the UK are
confronted with serious challenges in this area.
Lukashenko
may not have won much in all of this other than to reinforce his image at home
and in the neighbourhood as a strong Soviet-era leader, the so-called cunning
peasant, and one who does not care much about a few lost lives.
--o--
ZELENSKYY’S PRESS CONFERENCE
From
Zelenskyy’s end of November marathon press-conference the item that got the most attention was
his allegation that a coup d’état against him was under preparation for early
December by unspecified individuals from Ukraine and Russia. He mentioned oligarch
Rinat Akhmetov as one who may have been played by the alleged conspirators. The
expected denial of any such conspiracy from all possible sources quickly
followed.
Ukrainian
oligarchs would certainly have no love for Zelenskyy and his attempts to
de-oligarchise the Ukrainian economy. Conversations they may have had about
Zelenskyy would most likely have included some rather unpleasant remarks
directed at the President. Oligarchs do however still have a lot of tools at
their disposal, including the media, to undermine Zelenskky other than a coup d’état.
Wittingly
or not, Zelenskyy’s remark about a coup briefly shifted public attention from a Russian
threat to Ukraine to a rather vaguely defined threat against himself. One of
his problems has always been the perception that he is not strong enough to
face Vladimir Putin or to reign in the oligarchs. Presenting himself as one who
can overcome attempts is always useful.
--o--
ZELENSKYY’S RECORD
As could be
expected in the case of a President who has been in power for more than two
years, a lengthy unscripted press conference will lead to the airing of alleged
mistakes, scandals, or disputes. Zelenskky now has plenty of accusations to
contend with in this respect, some of which are not warranted at all. The most
significant attack against his policies came from an unlikely source, an
article in the Atlantic Council. The title says it all: “Ukraine’s
anti-oligarch law could make President Zelenskyy too powerful.” The article essentially criticizes the
President for his continuing links with oligarchs as well as the new
legislation concentrating too much power in the presidential office. The
substance of the article may not matter so much as the fact that an entity that
is expected to be pro-Ukraine should publish an article that is critical of the
President, thus confirming a misalignment between Zelenskky and some pro-Ukraine
voices.
By
contrast, looking at presidential activity since Zelenskyy’s accession to power,
it might be equally noteworthy that the government procurement methodology
that is currently in place has been supporting the rather successful
implementation of the President’s "big construction" program. By doing away with
the level of corruption that so prevailed especially during the Yanukovych
presidency, the Ukrainian governments seems to have been able to devote
resources to infrastructure projects that will support the modernisation of the
country. The long-term impact will be significant.
The other
project that deserves mentioning is the revival of the Ukrainian aircraft
industry on the basis of the Antonov aircraft plant as well as the
modernisation of the air transport infrastructure. In the context of a
continuing pandemic, and despite the priority seemingly given to cargo
aircraft, the timing of the announcement may surprise. The long-term view is nevertheless laudable. There was yet no indication of a Canadian connection to this project.
--o--
THE TALIBAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
As the US
and the Taliban prepare for their first consultations since the US dropped out
of Afghanistan, a few observations are in order.
Many
explanations have been given for the quick takeover of Afghanistan by the
Taliban. The Taliban have received credit for their proximity to the people.
The outgoing authorities have been blamed for their corruption and in some
regions for their authoritarian conduct. Ethnic and tribal factors have been
mentioned. There has however not been a fundamental acknowledgement that the US
and NATO policies were flawed. There however has been some outside
acknowledgement of the immoral aspect of the US and NATO abandoning their
supporters and their civil society allies.
In the
discussions with the Taliban, the US will be expected to insist on the necessary
inclusiveness of new Afghanistan government if it wants to receive
international recognition and gain access to the country’s financial reserves
kept by international institutions. The question arises as to how far the US is
ready to go to withhold funds that are now needed for humanitarian purposes.
John Bolton, briefly Trump’s national security advisor and one of the supporters of the flawed US policy in Afghanistan, recently claimed that with the US departure Afghanistan would soon become the source of terrorist attacks against US interests. In this case, reiterating past assumptions implies not being even close to acknowledging mistakes.
There has also been the idea that the Taliban could be supported to squeeze out ISIS-K, considered as a distinct radical terrorist entity. That may be a way for both sides to save face, if the Taliban can be convinced to go after their Muslim brothers.
In dealing with Afghanistan, the US seems to have tried to exercise some influence over Pakistan, with little success. Other than that, the US seems to have held the view that they could deal with Afghanistan on their own. There may have been little appetite to deal with Russia, Iran or China. Relatively little attention would have been paid to Central Asian countries.
It is worth
noting that it is mostly Uzbekistan that supplies electric power to the city of
Kabul, to this day, on humanitarian grounds, even if the Afghan side is not able
to pay. The Uzbek Foreign Minister was the first foreign official to visit
Kabul. Uzbekistan and the Taliban have now already agreed on Uzbekistan
re-building the Mazar-i-Sharif airport.
For its
part, Russia has already started sending humanitarian shipments to Afghanistan and flying back to Russia Afghan students that are registered in Russian universities.
There is no
sign yet that US could acknowledge that it might achieve its own objectives in Afghanistan by cooperating with the other governments of the region.
--o--
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
It would
look as though Vladimir Putin not only managed to sit the President of
Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia in the same room on November 26th,
but also managed to achieve results on three main topics of discussion.
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| Presidents Aliev and Putin, PM Pashinyan Sochi, November 26th © President of Russia Website |
On the delimitation
of the boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it looked as though Azerbaijan
was hoping to extract further concessions from Armenia prior to agreeing to the
formal process of delimitation. Delimitation would be crucial to avoid further
armed skirmishes on the confrontation lines. The results are not immediately
visible, but the process should be launched before the end of the year.
Humanitarian
issues: this is mostly about returning home the prisoners held by both sides.
It would seem that there are more Armenians to be returned than Azerbaijanis.
There is no specific deadline but a general expectation of early movement.
Re-opening
of economic corridors: this goes beyond just stopping
the fighting. Re-establishing the functioning of land transport is a vital
long-term economic requirement that can bring changes to the region.
The general
sense is that Armenia got more on boundary delimitation and humanitarian issues
than Azerbaijan had hitherto been willing to concede. What leverage Putin was
able to use on Aliev is not entirely clear but may become evident in coming
weeks as the implementation of decision unfolds. There may have been a discrete
but decisive role for Turkey in this process.
Economic
corridors matter to all, including Russia, but Armenia would probably stand to
gain more in the short term.
--o--
GAS PRICES IN EUROPE, UPDATE
In the
seemingly endless debate around the completion and now the legal certification
of Nord Stream 2, a short mid-November news item seems to have gone largely
unnoticed. As the German authorities announced there would be delay in legal
certification, gas prices in Europe jumped by 10% in one day. That should speed
up the process of using a pipeline that is now fully completed. Yet Ukraine and
the UK, obviously not having to foot the bill, are still fighting against Nord
Stream 2, as a matter of principle. Fact that they are also driving up the
price for one of Russia’s main commodity exports also seems not to matter.
--o--
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