Saturday, September 29, 2018

Issue 23

THE BRETON/GEROLNEWSLETTER


RUSSIA AND TURKEY ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN IDLIB PROVINCE OF SYRIA


Brushing aside, at least temporarily, the fact that Russia and Turkey support opposing sides of the Syrian conflict, presidents Putin and Erdogan met in Sochi on September 17th and agreed to establish a “demilitarized zone” in part of Idlib province to avert a potentially deadly military confrontation.

Details of the agreement between Russia and Turkey are sketchy at best. Not much has been explained, and it was not immediately clear whether Syria was willing to go along with their plan. In case this agreement will not be implemented in a fundamental way it could just serve as a way of delaying the eventual assault by Assad (with the usual backing of the Russian military) against the last major stronghold of anti-Assad opposition.

Presidents Erdogan and Putin, Sochi, September 17th
©President of Russia Website


It is important to understand that Idlib province borders Turkey and that close to 3 million Syrian civilians and up to 80,000 insurgent fighters, including 10, 000 terrorists and, among others, Al Qaeda-linked jihadists, have been re-grouped and cornered into this strip of land. This is the last significant piece of Syrian territory, other than Kurdish areas, that Assad does not control.
The agreement was welcomed by the United Nations. It clearly benefits Turkey since, in case of a major military conflict, Turkey would be flooded by waves of refugees and find itself bordering a zone of intense military action, including fierce Russian bombardments from various platforms, as seen before during the siege of Aleppo and other areas. The agreement also allows Turkey to retain a presence in Idlib and protect its local allies. Turkey also seems to have wrested the from the Russian side an end to all cooperation or coordination with the Kurds inside or outside Syria, in exchange for other military concessions to Russia and Syria in other regions of Syria.



It is less clear what benefit from creating this demilitarized zone will accrue to Russia. It is a well understood reality (for president Putin and his military) that Idlib will continue to be a hotbed of anti-Assad insurgency and it is only a matter of time (unless of course some major peace agreement involving all parties, including the US, will be signed) before Sunni rebels rearm and go on the offensive in one way or the other. One explanation maybe that in delaying the all-out assault on Idlib, Russia could be showing itself to the world, for a change, as not only a military power, but as a peacemaker capable of a more nuanced approach. As well, some analysts say it may want to present Assad to the world as the winner who should be supported as he rebuilds the country.

Another explanation might be that Russians believe that the terrorist groups can neither be convinced of giving up active combat nor trusted to abide by any agreement to do so, as it is against their jihadist thinking. The eventual military assault against them will thus look more justified to the outside world, after an ultimate failed peace attempt.

For Russia, there is also the outside chance that President Erdogan might be able to use his troops and his influence to separate the rebel opposition from the terrorists as well as to put an end to drone attacks on the Russian bases in Khmeimin and Tartus. Erdogan would also be expected to have fighters leave the city of Idlib and return it to Syrian government control.

Vladimir Putin was quoted by Russia’s news agencies as saying that he and President Erdogan had agreed to create a demilitarized buffer zone about nine to 12 miles wide by October 15th to separate Assad’s forces from their opponents.

Putin stated that all heavy weapons and “radical militants,” including the fighters with the affiliate of Al Qaeda in Syria, formerly known as Al Nusra, must “be withdrawn” from the demilitarized area by October 10th.

It is not hard to imagine what Syria and Russia intend to do if such a withdrawal does not take place. What is also certain is that there is a secret agreement between Erdogan and Putin in this regard that will not be publicised, at least not in the coming few months. On the main agreement itself, there may also differing interpretations that will surface in the meantime.

Even if Erdogan were to be successful in delivering on his commitment to Russia the question remains as to what will happen in the long-term to jihadi elements gathered in the narrow border area with Turkey. Keeping them there is not a viable solution. Would they move elsewhere of their own will or be forcibly removed? If so, where? Would that depend on their ethnicity or country of origin? Their liquidation may even be envisaged in some quarters. For now, there is no easy answer to that problem.

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ISRAELI GAMBIT: DIFFERENT REACTIONS FROM PRESIDENT PUTIN AND HIS MILITARY


Major-General Igor Konashenkov, Russia's chief military spokesman, blamed Israel, namely the Israel Air Force (IAF), as the main culprit in the September 18th downing of a Russian electronic warfare aircraft IL-20, with 15 servicemen on board, by Syrian air defenses. According to the Russian military, one of the Israeli F-16 aircrafts used the Russian IL-20 as a cover during a bombing raid on targets near the Syrian city of Latakia.

IL-20


Another Russian grievance was first that the Israeli side gave the warning of the upcoming attack only one minute before it took place giving almost no time for the slower aircraft to leave the danger zone and, second, that the Israelis were not precise about the location of their attack, only referring to a general area.

Jerusalem immediately sent its Air Force Chief General Norkin and other high ranking officers to Moscow. The Russian military, after hearing the Israeli side of the story, rejected it, and put all blame on Israeli actions. President Putin preferred to interpret the situation as "a tragic chain of events". In his second telephone conversation in a week with PM Netanyahu, Putin nevertheless confirmed that the more modern S-300 VM air defense system will be delivered to Syria shortly, but emphasized that the main reason for this was to protect the lives of Russian military servicemen in Syria.

Several military analysts around the world pointed out that Russia's probe was not so one-sided and that Israel, after hundreds of successful raids against targets in Syria, had become reckless and less attentive to Russian concerns. Some Israeli military people, even before this incident occurred, expressed concern that Israel may accidentally or otherwise come across Russians during their countless operations over Syria. This is exactly what happened.

S-300 VM System
©Wikipedia


This unfortunate incident will surely make Israel be more aware of the Russian interests and assets in Syria and significantly change the Israeli approach to future aerial operations in the area.

--o--

HEZBOLLAH FOOT-NOTE


Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese-based armed group Hezbollah stated that it has acquired precision-guided missiles despite Israeli attempts to keep high-tech weapons out of its hands. Nasrallah made the comments during his traditional televised speech on September 20th, the first day of Ashoura, an important religious celebration for Muslims.

Some Israeli experts interpreted Nasrallah's comments as a response to a series of successful air raids by the IAF on targets belonging to Iran and Hezbollah in Syria. Some of those raids were, as satellite footage showed, clearly devastating and precise and, taking into account Israeli absolute air superiority in the region, unanswered. There is no doubt, however, that some precision weapons from Iran are being delivered to Hezbollah from Iran via "other" routes, including civilian airliners.

--o--

PRESIDENT PUTIN LOSES ELECTIONS, TAKE 2


Recent gubernatorial elections in four regions of Russia produced an unusual result. In two regions (Khabarovsk and Vladimir) the opposition party candidate soundly defeated Putin’s United Russia candidate. In a third region Khakassia), the Putin-backed candidate withdrew, opening the door to the election of the leading opposition candidate who will face another opposition candidate in the upcoming runoff. In a fourth one (Primorye/Vladivostok), the election was cancelled because of widespread irregularities and such a close result that it was deemed impossible to determine a winner.

If, as the Kremlin does for many years try to run a managed democracy, what is the significance of losing an election? Is this because the current managers are less competent than their predecessors or that their methodology needs to be refined? Perhaps. Is this because the blessing of President no longer works magic? This may be closer to the truth. The president’s popular rating has been going down lately because of dissatisfaction over the controversial proposed pension reform plans. In addition, there would be in some regions specific local issues that have been feeding opposition to the federal center for a long while. Seen in that light, the protest vote that got opposition candidates elected could in some way be likened to the protest vote that can be witnessed during partial elections in our own country: the voters can feel free to express their frustration with the existing national leadership without getting rid of it outright.

President Putin receiving new governors, Moscow, September 18th
©President of Russia Website


It would be premature to present the good results of opposition candidates in a few regions as a "growing rejection of Putin” or the end of United Russia. It would also be premature to present these results as a major step in the advancement of democracy. They are, however, a small step in the direction of the creation of a possible alternance in the selection of elected leaders. It is worth noting that Ella Pamfilova, the head of the Central Election Commission has emphasised the cleanliness of the electoral process especially in the Khabarovsk region, by opposition to the neighbouring Vladivostok region where official results were not credible. She was also directly involved in the process of cancelling the flawed election in Vladivostok. The appointment of Pamfilova, a more rigorous election manager, has clearly helped creating a more transparent and reliable electoral system. It will have continuing impact on the conduct of future elections.

United Russia still controls virtually all other regional governments and was successful in most other regions this year. For instance, the city of Moscow elections just returned Mayor Sobyanin to his job with a 70% majority. For United Russia, there will be a need to refine the methodology of running elections in order to select more electable candidates. The temptation may yet exist to try to turn the clock back so as to ensure that it does not lose control of any more regions and to prevent a form of contagion. The problem is that the measures currently envisaged (abolition of the second round or altogether abolition of regional elections) could create even more discontent.

Regional governors have to work closely with the President and his Administration. For President Putin, the challenge will be to manage the co-habitation with opposition governors who owe their election to opposing his policies and who, by their relative political independence, could create a competing source of power.

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THE PATRIARCH HAS SPOKEN, THE OLIGARCHS NOT YET


All indications are that the Patriarch of Constantinople will grant the tomos of autocephaly to a Ukrainian national church. The Patriarch’s recent decision to send his legates (exarchs) to Ukraine and his own statement leave little doubt about this. The historic explanation for the Patriarch of Constantinople to exercise his authority in Ukraine is, in very simplified terms, that the Moscow Patriarchate only exercises temporary authority (since 1686) and only in some parts of modern Ukraine, and that the fundamental authority in Ukraine remains one way or another with Constantinople. A similar argument was already used in Canada for some Ukrainian churches to join with Constantinople. There is also little doubt that the church that would most benefit from this is that of the Kyiv patriarchate, headed by 89-year old Filaret, a former metropolitan bishop of the Russian Orthodox Church.

From a religious point of view, the orthodox believers belonging to the Kyiv patriarchate would thus rejoin the orthodox communion and see their status regularised. This would be an occasion for that church to recruit clergy and believers away from the church that recognizes the authority of the Moscow patriarchate. From a religious point of view, the status of the orthodox believers who would chose to remain associated with the Moscow patriarch would, in principle, not be affected. There is another smaller independent Ukrainian orthodox church whose status will probably be left unchanged. Fears have been expressed by the followers of the Moscow patriarchate about the disposition of the religious buildings that formally belong to the Ukrainian state. President Poroshenko has so far offered assurances on the respect for the freedom of religious choice. How the transition will unfold, how smooth it can be and what impact it will have on Ukrainian society remains to be seen.

The process of granting autocephaly to a Ukrainian church is also likely to create considerable tension within the Orthodox world, with the Moscow patriarchate already removing the mention of the Patriarch of Constantinople from its prayer book as well as seeking support from other national orthodox churches.

President Poroshenko meeting Ukrainian-Americans, New York City, September 26th
©President of Ukraine Website


President Poroshenko’s goal of having a national Ukrainian church that is free from Moscow influence and that has canonical status will be formally achieved. This was one of his main messages to the Ukrainian diaspora during his recent visit to the US. His reward for that may, however, not come immediately. As for his political future back home, a greater form of divine intervention may be necessary. Latest polls show him back among the top three contenders for next year’s election, but still at a rating below 10%, with Former PM Tymoshenko still leading at around 18%. Against all odds, rumours have begun to appear about the emergence of a pro-Moscow candidate that would be supported by a coalition of existing pro-Moscow factions. For Tymoshenko, who is seen by some as too close to Moscow, it would be useful to have such a candidate against whom she could stand up as the staunch defender of Ukrainian independence. In the most likely event of a second round run-off election, the emergence of an attractive new nationalist and pro-Europe candidate is probably that which is feared the most by any of the current traditional candidates. A pro-Moscow stand-in would be an ideal adversary. There are reports that some Ukrainian oligarchs may be already working on this new project. The unintended effect of giving new life to pro-Moscow political forces may not be enough to prevent this development.

--o--

PERSON OF THE MONTH: PRESIDENT OF SOUTH KOREA: MOON JAE-IN



Like many members of the South Korean political elite President Moon's ancestor hail from the North. The current president of South Korea was born in 1953, 6 months before the end of the Korean War. His parents were refugees from the North, who fled the hostilities and finally settled in the city of Busan.

The war ended 65 years ago. Nevertheless its consequences and fallout still resonate heavily not only in the region but around the world where interests of major powers intersect. Events around North and South Korea involve such players as US, China, Japan, Russia to name a few. The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most dangerous places in the world. The North already has scores of nuclear weapons and no peace agreement with most of its neighbors. It is poor, paranoid and totally closed to the world.

Three of the 11 American aircraft carriers and naval battle groups are parked within striking distance of North Korea with tens of thousands of American soldiers stationed in the South and Japan. The all-out war is always around the corner and seemed almost inevitable just a few months ago.

The South, unlike the North, is a stable democracy and has one of the most robust economies in the world. It has a lot to lose in case the war breaks out.

Moon Jae-in, former political activist and a lawyer by profession was elected president during 2017. It was his second attempt to win the presidency after he narrowly lost as a Democratic Party nominee in 2012 to Park Geun-hye.

Moon is a solidly left-of-center candidate on most (but not all) issues as he campaigned on the political platform that included higher taxation of the rich in order to create hundreds of thousands of public sector jobs and the pledge to end monopolies of major South Korean conglomerates in order to give more power to minority share-holders in electing corporate board members. President Moon also spoke strongly for more transparency and modesty among political elites. As soon as he got elected he moved from the “Blue House”, the sumptuous presidential palace, to a more modest governmental building.

Moon's foreign policy can be considered to be closely aligned with the so-called Sunshine Policy which was pioneered by his liberal predecessors. The policy consisted of openly carrying out detente with its bellicose and aggressive neighbor to the North. His liberal foreign policy stance can be summarized in a quote from his book: "I am pro-U.S., but now South Korea should adopt diplomacy in which it can discuss a U.S. request and say no to the Americans.".

President Moon played an instrumental role in convincing President Trump, and to a certain extent Japan (which is extremely skeptical of any North Korean peaceful overtures) that the young Kim Jong un can be trusted. It is unlikely that President Moon is an idealist (he knows the North well), but he played a perfect matchmaker and seriously helped Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un to get along. Dealing with Trump was probably even a harder task than talking to the Great Leader.

When, after the initial Trump-Kim summit, and all the talk about the speedy denuclearization it was becoming obvious that North Korea was stalling, President Moon again stepped in and invited Kim to South Korea where, after all the ceremonial glitter and holding hands with Kim, he managed again to make the North Korean Supremo utter promises of authentic denuclearization by 2021 and closure of their main nuclear site. While in South Korea, Kim also extended another invitation for a sit down with Mike Pompeo in Pyongyang for further talks.

We can only imagine what political skills and steely resolve, together with a deep understanding of political realities, a politician must possess to perform this balancing act with so much at stake.

--o--

 
BRIEFLY NOTED


CHINA-MONGOLIA-RUSSIA


Chinese and Mongolian military units took part for the first time in the gigantic war games staged by the Russian Armed Forces, mainly around the Siberian training range of Tsugol, but also in various other locations around Russia. The official figures are staggering: 300,000 troops and 40,000 pieces of military equipment on land, sea and in the air with around 1.000 aircraft taking part. For the first time, Chinese and Mongolian armed forces are also taking part.
Some observers have suggested the scale of the exercise might be an exaggeration, a Potemkin show of military might. In addition to providing an impressive show of military power, the Russian military command was evidently eager to emphasize the lessons they had learned from recent active military operations in Syria. This also serves to consolidate Russia’s position and reputation as a supplier of military equipment.

UNGA: TRUMP AGAINST GLOBALISM


The 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly was the first one in history of the organization where the US president emphasized that the post WW-2 world order was wrong and brought about excessive globalism and unworkable alliances. While stating that the US will not be part of agreements and alliances aimed at using the US power and money for their own purposes or often even against American interests, Trump sharply criticized even his allies and partners like the EU and particularly Germany. He asserted that Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline will put Germany in the state of dependence from Russia. The main target of his criticism was Iran. He defended his decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran and warned Iran against any aggression in the region.

Interestingly enough Trump almost omitted any mentioning of Russia in his speech.

UKRAINE


Ukraine has officially notified Russia on September 21 that it will not extend its Friendship Agreement. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said on September 19 that Kiev will notify all relevant organizations, including the United Nations, about the move. The 10-year treaty was originally signed in 1997, with an automatic extension clause. The treaty took effect in April 1999 and was extended for another 10 years in 2009. It should end in March 2019. The treaty sets out the principle of strategic partnership, the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity, and an obligation not to use one nation's territory to damage the other’s security.

CHINA


Human Rights Watch’s latest report on China suggests that the Chinese government is committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang province on a "scale unseen in the country in decades”. This campaign of repression in Xinjiang is a key test of whether the United Nations and concerned governments will sanction an increasingly powerful China in order to end this abuse."
China is carrying out a "mass, systematic campaign of human rights violations" against its mostly Muslim Uyghur minority population, Human Rights Watch says. The New York-based organization presented evidence of what it labeled the "arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment, and the increasingly pervasive controls on daily life" by the Chinese government in Xinjiang.

The report echoes earlier remarks by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, that said ethnic Uyghurs in China were being held in "counter extremism centers," with millions more forced into re-education camps, turning China's Uyghur region into "something that resembles a massive internment camp." Among the many inmates of the so-called "re-education facilities" are also citizens of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (ethnic Uyghurs), some of whom managed to escape and could offer their testimonies.


AZERBAIJAN


Baku has criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian over his latest statement concerning the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the breakaway region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesman said on September 9th that Pashinian's remarks at a meeting with ethnic Armenian businessmen in Moscow could damage international efforts to resolve the decades-old dispute over the region. Pashinian said at the meeting a day earlier that he saw Nagorno-Karabakh as "part of Armenia" in the future. Azerbaijan accused Armenia's leadership of creating tensions ahead of a scheduled meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers at the UN General Assembly in New York in late September.


RUSSIA


Russia’s Supreme Court has sharply narrowed the scope of the legal provisions under which individuals can be charged under the country’s extremism laws, saying that simply “liking” or reposting material on social media does not alone constitute a crime. The September 20th ruling follows a series of recent cases in which Russians have been charged for publishing materials, sometimes satirical, on social-media platforms such as VKontakte and Facebook. This was part of an ongoing crackdown on online speech by the government, a crackdown that free-speech advocates say is being used to stifle dissent.

The deputy chairman of the court explained to reporters that authorities must prove that there was intent to foment hatred or ethnic hostility. “Judges…should check not the actual fact of publication, not the ‘repost,’ not the ‘like,’ but they should check the actual motives,” he said. He said the court would also review earlier convictions on extremism-related charges.

A growing number of Russians have been caught up by authorities’ strict-and some say overly broad-interpretation of the country’s extremism laws. Last year, a 27-year-old man in the city of Cheboksary was found guilty of "mass distribution of extremist materials" when he reposted a news item about his earlier conviction for reposting "extremist" content.



THE AUTHORS


Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His particular area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.