Friday, February 4, 2022

ISSUE 60

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR A SHADOW THEATER

For another month public discussion continues to focus on a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US and Russia also continue to blow hot and cold about the prospects of a global discussion on European security, showing no sign of satisfaction over recent exchanges, but leaving the door open to further negotiations. A lot of time is still spent trying to offer a plausible answer as to what President Putin’s real intentions may be and to what Russia will do.

Secretary of State Blinken, Foreign Minister Lavrov
Geneva, January 21st, ©RFE/RL


In simple terms, Putin’s foreign policy is essentially based on the principle of advancing Russia’s interest. Whichever way you look at it, the invasion of Ukraine would not serve these interests. Au contraire, it would seriously damage Russia’s interests. The warnings of everyone from President Joe Biden to Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly that Russia would face the heaviest consequences if it invaded Ukraine are unavoidable political statements, but they do not tell Putin anything he does not already know.

Many observers seem to have forgotten already that Putin has stated his position clearly before Russia’s foreign policy establishment on November 18th. Simply put again, Putin stated that “tensions are useful and will be maintained for as long as deemed necessary, but there will be no new conflict.”  No matter whether you are ready or not to believe Putin, this is what has happened since November. Carnegie Moscow Centre’s Alexander Baunov has coined the formula that likely best describes Russia’s position and the US/NATO response: “In its negotiations with the West, Russia is behaving not like a country preparing to wage war, but like a country that, if necessary, can afford to do so. The aim of the West, on the other hand, is to avoid war. Consequently, Russia can exploit Western fears of war—without actually using force.”  

In agreeing to have his senior officials discuss with their Russian counterparts the idea of new arrangements for European security, President Biden has also made clear his intention to engage with Russia, even though he has in public kept emphasising that he is warning Russia not to invade Ukraine or else pay a huge economic and political price for it. In one of his impromptu press events, he clarified that there were areas (missiles and deployment of troops) where negotiations would be possible and desirable. It is also clear, however, that the US position does not include a discussion about the indivisibility of security. That is essentially the idea that States will not strengthen their security at the expense of other States. This in the Russia view is what should condition the reach and possible expansion of NATO.

The fundamental incompatibility of US and Russian views over the scope of the security discussions should mean there is little point in continuing, unless the Russian side is willing to accept that the scope will be limited to disarmament and confidence-building measures. For Russia, this would still be meaningful but would imply settling for less than originally requested. That decision essentially rests with Putin. He, however, would have known very well that the US would never agree to the principle of not allowing Ukraine into NATO. He also knows from US statements that Ukraine is not expected to be a member of NATO for at least ten years.

Whereas we know pretty well Putin’s intentions and his ideal objectives, we can only speculate about his bottom line. Even though Russia initially insisted on a quick launch of the negotiating process we also know that in comparison to NATO counterparts Putin is in no rush and can live with the tensions he has created. The recent announcement of selective and relatively symbolic reinforcement of the NATO military presence in Eastern Europe was obviously not well received in Moscow, but it does not amount to a real increase in the threat level for Russia. What is not certain is what specific steps Putin might take, short of starting a new conflict.

At the right time for him and in the right circumstances, Putin could still decide to decide to take up the US/NATO offer to re-launch European security discussions. Beyond that, there are essentially two major options, The first one is to continue working at getting NATO on the road to producing some reduced version of the full security guarantees that were requested, knowing well that this is an uncertain long-term process. This would imply working directly on individual European members of NATO and especially on the weaker links in the NATO chain. It is worth noting in this respect that President Putin just hosted Prime Minister Orban of Hungary and has accepted President Erdogan’s invitation to visit Turkey in the near future.

The second option is to close the books for the foreseeable future on any accommodation with NATO and, invoking NATO’s refusal to negotiate the important issues, firm up Russia’s security position in various ways some of which may be irreversible. There is already serious speculation about this including, for instance, the recognition of the independence of the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine or upgrading the military presence in Belarus. That could also include the actual deployment of new weapons systems.

Having launched the current process, President Putin has to end it up with a win or, as a minimum, a face-saving exit. He, however, controls the timeline and in the meantime can keep the negotiation going and the other side guessing. In this case, President Zelenskky may be offering the best advice by calling on the West not to encourage panic.

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OBSERVATIONS ON BRIEFING YOUR FRIENDS, GETTING YOUR STORY STRAIGHT AND USING A CRISIS

The Biden administration’s early response to the unusual presence of Russian troops was evidently first conveyed through official channels. It did not take long for detailed information about Russian troop movements to be made public through intelligence leaks via credible entities. Whether this was intentional, and part of a plan will be evident later. What matters is the result. Once intelligence about Russian actions becomes public the administration has no choice but to adopt a very tough stance, not asking Russia to move its troops but threatening Russia with the direst consequences should it proceed with an invasion. Paradoxically, the heightened tension that Russia has vowed to create provides the US side with the right context to overcome its reluctance to engage in security discussions with Russia. What raises questions is the fact that there seems to have been a situation where the intelligence was leaked before it was properly shared with all relevant Ukrainian security officials in the early days of the crisis. Pronouncements first by Foreign Minister Kuleba and then by President Zelenskyy himself also suggest that the US did not convince all its Ukrainian interlocutors of the severity of the Russian threat in the same manner as the impression was created in Western media.




Armed personnel carriers 35 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, January 19th


The Ukrainian side can explain away its lesser concern about the Russian threat by the fact that it is already at war with Russia for many years. It remains that even the problematic discussions between the US and Russia about European security actually downgrade the priority that Ukrainians would like to give to their own question. There have already been rumours about difficult discussions recently between Presidents Biden and Zelenskyy. Zelenskky also publicly criticized the US for removing non-essential staff from its Embassy in Kyiv. Canada also removed it non-essential staff from its Embassy.

In late January, the UK authorities released intelligence suggesting that in addition to threatening war on Ukraine, Russia was planning to install a puppet régime in Kyiv. Names were named and details were given. The whole idea has so little plausibility that it soon was forgotten. Russia trying to do this now does not make a lot of sense. Ukraine accepting it is even less plausible and is close to being an insult to Ukrainian democracy. There may still be room for improvement in Ukraine, but a puppet régime would nowadays not stand a chance.

Not long after the UK story, major US networks cited senior US officials claiming Russia had moved blood supplies close to the border, indicating a potential imminent military attack. Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, Hanna Maliar, subsequently denounced the blood supply claim, calling it a provocation designed “to spread panic and fear in our society.” Maliar added: “It simply wasn’t true. We found no information to back this up, we did not see any blood supplies moved to the front or even in the civilian hospitals around the front.”

Commentators occasionally observe that unpopular leaders will resort to war to boost their rating. Reputable polls still place Vladimir Putin above the 60% mark. As noted above, he said himself “no new conflict is needed.” The threat of war can however be used as well by those who do not intend to wage war but can nevertheless illustrate themselves at preventing it.

The beleaguered UK Prime Minister attempted to present himself as the strongest NATO leader in the confrontation with Russia. For good measure, Prime Minister Johnson then added a visit to Kyiv. He eventually also put in a call to Vladimir Putin. Changing the British newspapers' headlines for a few days may ultimately not help Johnson survive a leadership crisis, but it offered a welcome reprieve.

PM Johnson and President Zelenskyy on the grounds of St.Sofia cathedral
Kyiv, February 1st
© President of Ukraine Website


French President Emmanuel Macron also tried to use the Ukraine crisis to bolster his ratings in preparation for the upcoming election in which he is seeking a second mandate. Adopting a very different approach and taking advantage of his warm relationship with Putin (he refers to him on a first name basis and seems to address him with the familiar “tu”) he called him twice in a couple of days and seems intent on maintaining an active conversation with Vladimir.

The activity of the British and French leaders makes the absence of the new German leader even more conspicuous. After one of his military commanders commented that Crimea would never return to Ukraine, he may have wanted to keep a low profile but will soon join the group of leaders calling the Kremlin. Olaf Scholtz may have to address the thorny issue of energy sanctions against Russia that others are contemplating but that would affect Germany most directly.

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MINSK PLUS?

In the US response to the Russian proposal for security guarantees the part that deals with Ukraine refers to the resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine “on the basis of” the Minsk Agreements. Around the same time a senior Ukrainian security official has openly spoken against the implementation of these agreements. The wording thus seems to confirm a slight shift of emphasis from what was said before. The US publicly continues to call on Russia to implement the Minsk Agreements, but in what was supposed to be a confidential document it uses a form of words suggesting that the Minsk Agreements are a guide rather than the final word.

Foreign Minister Kuleba later issued a statement to the effect that a special status for the Donbass area is unacceptable. Such a distinct status is a key provision of the Minsk Agreements. This essentially confirms the impossibility of implementing the Agreements in their present form.

Although some Russian observers keep asking whether the US will eventually pressure Ukraine to move along, there is little likelihood that this would ever happen. In what amounts to a constitutional matter, the US has no inclination or interest in pushing Ukraine and will not try. US Under Secretary of State Nuland even claimed on a Moscow radio station never to have heard directly from the Ukrainians that they had a problem with the Minsk Agreements. In dealing with the Minsk Agreements the key challenge remains to come up with an improved arrangement that is acceptable to the vast majority of the Ukrainian political class and that still would have some appeal to Russia and the rebel regions. This may well require focussing first on security arrangements that could bring back a form of normalcy to life in Eastern Ukraine and to relations between that region and the rest of Ukraine. Mediation by a country that is perceived as a true neutral player may be a solution. Turkish President Erdogan just visited Ukraine. He keeps offering mediation efforts. Turkey though may not be the right country and Erdogan not the right leader at this time.

Presidents Erdogan and Zelenskyy, Kyiv, February 3rd
©President of Ukraine Website


In the meantime, there is nevertheless in parallel a continuing conversation among Normandy Four officials about the way ahead in the implementation of the Minsk Peace Accords. There is still a need to firm up the cease-fire arrangements that would facilitate more global security discussions and might lead to a reduction of tensions on the Ukraine-Russia border. The telling comment from the lead Russian negotiator about the most recent meeting was “there is nothing to brag about here.”  The Ukrainian president’s office had a much more upbeat assessment. It looks as though there was progress in process more than in substance.

More significant progress on the conflict in Eastern Ukraine might allow for at least a temporary reduction of current tensions.  President Macron’s diplomatic efforts would suggest that he is hoping to deal with both broad European security matters and the Eastern Ukraine issue at the same time.  


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WEAPONS AND TROOPS FOR UKRAINE?

There has been considerable debate in Canada about the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine. The Canadian government claims it has received no such direct request from the Ukrainian government. Others claim it has, at least in Canada, and that there is an obligation to respond favourably. It would indeed be consistent with Canada’s political statements about Ukraine to respond positively. From a military point of view, the matter is more complex. Ukraine is in its own right an exporter of weapons and seems to have all that it needs to deal with the localised military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Dealing with a large-scale Russian invasion would, at least in the view of some experts, require an increase in military capacity that it is impossible to achieve in the near future. The general conclusion is that beginning such a build-up at this stage is not good tactics and could even be counter productive. In that context, the current Canadian approach of providing training rather than weapons is, all things considered, a sensible one. It is useful in any event. It may not lead to immediate threat reduction, but it also does not ratchet up the tension level.

President Zelenskyy receiving FM Joly, Kyiv, January 18th


In the same spirit and despite the strong rhetoric, the US and the UK have made clear that they wouldnot send troops to support Ukraine’s combat capacity. . Germany also made clear it would not send weapons to Ukraine.

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KAZAKHSTAN TOO

The protests that affected Kazakhstan in early January have been described at the actions of terrorists by President Tokayev. What began as a series of protests over the sudden increase of gas prices turned into unusually violent demonstrations. They even compelled the president to issue a shoot-to-kill order. He also invited troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization's to enter the country and provide assistance to Kazakhstan security forces, but, it seems, mostly outside of conflict areas. The call for outside assistance may have been  a way of securing the message that the President still had the full backing of Moscow and that protesters should have no illusion about getting any eventual support from Russia’s political or security establishment.

President Kassim-Jomart Tokayev


Foreign observers are still struggling to find the right explanation for the events. Most are still reeling from the fact that they did not see anything coming. There was evidence of some dissatisfaction with the uneven distribution of wealth and of animosity towards those who have become rich in the period since Kazakhstan became independent, especially the Nazarbayev family. The stability seemed supported by a relatively good living standard. The new President was in the process of implementing in a gradual manner a moderate political reform process.

If the causes of the protests still require clarification, the results have become evident rather quickly. President Tokayev has already taken control of the National Security Council from his predecessor during the crisis itself. He has since firmed up his control of the government apparatus. He also has taken over the leadership of the Nur Otan party that has the majority control of the Parliament. He has called on those (including the family members of the former President Nazarbayev) who have acquired considerable wealth to contribute back to society as the same as obtaining explicit support from former President Nazarbayev. He also has offered an ambitious economic reform agenda.

Now that the dust has settled, the government has also agreed to investigate human rights abuses that may have taken place during the protests. 

The general impression is that, as result of the tragic events of January, new impetus has been given to a reform and modernisation process that enjoys broad popular support. Based on the pronouncements of President Tokayev, optimism is justified. The only caveat is the required acknowledgement by foreign observers that they failed to see the protests coming and may not have a deep understanding of the many dimensions of the political landscape in Kazakhstan, including the possible obstacles to President Tokayev's plans.

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.