Sunday, February 28, 2021

Issue 50

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER


IN WITH THE NEW, FOR SURE

President Biden attending virtual G7 leaders' meeting, February 19th


President Biden’s statement that America is back could not but draw a smile from Canadians who remember PM Justin Trudeau’s “Canada is back” statement immediately after his coming to power in 2015. Biden ‘s promise may turn out to be less empty, but beyond offering a less erratic approach and reversing the Trump era disdain for consultation and cooperation with traditional allies, it is not clear that President Biden's return to the old ways will be met everywhere with the same effusive reaction as that of UK PM Boris Johnson.  China remains at the top of the list as the US main competitor on the global scene, but there is no clear policy direction yet.  Russia is still an important adversary but, paradoxically, would almost welcome a US approach that is consistent and predictable. France’s President Macron for one has already returned to his criticism of NATO and still promotes a European security approach that is not dependent on US leadership. Germany is hoping that Biden’s lesser interest in promoting US fossil fuel production will make him tolerate the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, especially as Germany is debating mitigation measures that could prevent the use of the pipeline for political reasons.

The Canadian government has to show it is upset with the cancellation of the Keystone pipeline to placate Alberta but is probably more preoccupied by Biden’s stringent new Buy America policies and their impact on bilateral industrial cooperation.

Biden-Trudeau virtual meeting, February 24th


Biden's plans to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran would obviously not go down well in Israel. Furthermore, PM Netanyahu is still awaiting his phone call from the new President. Saudi Arabia may be upset for a moment with the publication of the intelligence report on the Khashoggi murder and the blame for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, but would be more concerned about the subtle shifts on US policy about Saudi Arabia’s military activity in Yemen.

Further afield India and Japan are ignoring Biden's sanctions against Myanmar following its military coup. Armed with the identity-politics ideology Democrats might have thought that Vice President Kamala Harris's Indian heritage would make Indians love the new administration, it works out that progressive politics espoused by Indian Americans are not a recipe for warm relations. India's Hindu media have railed against the administration after Harris's niece participated in protests against the policies of India's Hindu nationalist BJP ruling party.

On the domestic front the Biden administration’s more collegial working approach seems to have helped out making the vaccination campaign more effective. The stimulus package under discussion in Congress would appear to have substantial popular approval and will be crucial in defining the success of the Biden administration. More liberal social policies have been derided by right-wing social media but have not met too strong a backlash just yet. The immediate difficulty seems to get though some of the more controversial remaining senior appointments where the Administration could meet its first defeats.

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 OUT WITH THE OLD, MAYBE

Donald Trump remains popular with his political base despite his proven misconduct, his role in the January 6th storming of the Capitol as well as his blatant lies. Even the possible criminal indictments that await the former president, now that his tax returns are available to prosecutors, will not be enough for devotees to abandon their cult hero. As he as done before, he will present himself as a victim and, if he is convicted, as a martyr. Trump’s enablers in the Republican Party will shamelessly and slavishly toe the line so as to avoid the Don’s wrath and the loss of support among right-wing Republicans. This being said a convicted felon may still control Republican forces and get some candidates elected in red states, but would unlikely expand the party’s electoral appeal outside Republican strongholds. In more closely contested races in swing states the former president’s electoral influence may no longer be so positive. If convicted, and prosecutors are hard at work to achieve this, Trump would be facing a challenge that throws unprecedented uncertainty on his political appeal and his political future.   

Trump statue at the CPAC 2021 Convention

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VACCINE TRANSACTIONS, VACCINE HOARDING AND VACCINE DIPLOMACY

On February 2nd an ultra-Orthodox Israeli woman who lived in a Northern Israeli community accidentally walked into Syria. She was promptly arrested by the Syrian army. The Israeli Government initiated first a covert and then an overt flurry of diplomatic activity. Netanyahu, using all his political skills, called the man who is really in charge of Syria. He called Vladimir Putin and asked for help. Putin, in turn, activated his defense ministry and in a matter of days a swap was arranged. Israel agreed to free two Syrian infiltrators from military prison (both, curiously refused and preferred an Israeli jail cell to free life in their native Syria), so another two - this time a couple of Syrian shepherds- were found who agreed to go home in exchange for the ultra-Orthodox cross border violator. Considering that the two countries are bitter enemies, the exchange went surprisingly smoothly. The woman was flown to Moscow and from there to Tel-Aviv. The woman was in good health, unharmed. So, what's the connection to vaccines you may ask? Well, here it is. The reason the swap went so well is that, according to the New York Times and other more or less legitimate sources, it was revealed that the secret part of the deal was that Israel would pay Russia for thousands (or more) of doses of its Sputnik V vaccine to be delivered to Syria. All involved are denying it, but the anonymous insiders are sure that the wheels of the deal were greased by the COVID-19 vaccine promise. 




So here is the bigger picture: people from poorer nations will probably be unable to get a COVID-19 vaccine this year because the world’s richest countries have bought one billion more doses than their citizens need. This huge vaccine excess is the embodiment of vaccine nationalism, with countries prioritizing their own vaccination needs at the expense of other countries and the global recovery. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres observed in late February that just 10 countries had by then administered 75 percent of all vaccinations, describing it as “wildly uneven and unfair”.

Another example of vaccine nationalism was French President Emmanuel Macron posing as an expert and casting doubts on the efficacy of the Anglo-Swedish Astra-Zeneca vaccine with older people. Macron eventually made amends and suggested he would take that vaccine himself.

Much has been made of the reversal of the Western scientific community over the efficacy and reliability of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine, many calling it a diplomatic success. It might more appropriately be called a public relations success in that it is the image of Russia that got a boost and that many of the countries that initially registered Sputnik V already had friendly relations with Russia, somehow confirming that politics matter as much as science. Besides, Russia developed a vaccine to avoid dependence on other countries and invested in it for economic reasons. It should also be borne in mind that the impact of the Sputnik V will be felt more broadly when countries like India (the largest vaccine producer in the world) will start producing large amounts of their own version of Sputnik V. India already produces its own version of the Astra-Zeneca vaccine that is currently delivered in Africa under the COVAX program run by the WHO and funded by wealthier countries.

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RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS

Using the EU’s newly created sanctions instrument (the European Magnitsky Act) to punish human rights violators EU foreign ministers on February 22nd agreed to fresh sanctions against "specific persons" over Russia's jailing of opposition politician Alexei Navalny. It looks as though the four senior individuals targeted by visa bans belong to law enforcement circles and would not be among those who would travel to Western Europe in any event.

The Russian Foreign Ministry responded by saying it was "disappointed" at the bloc's move and accusing the EU Foreign Affairs Council of invoking a "far-fetched pretext" to prepare "new unlawful restrictions on Russian citizens."

Moscow also rejected as "categorically unacceptable" outside demands for the release of a Russian national convicted by a Russian court, as Navalny has been in processes that he and Western governments have said are politically motivated.

The fact that Navalny was later on removed from Amnesty International’s list of prisoners of conscience on account of his past xenophobic statements obviously throws a negative light on Navalny, but changes little in Russia itself. It does not change the position of Amnesty or of others who view his current jailing as illegal. It is nevertheless an embarrassment for Amnesty and is bound to dent its credibility in Russia and other countries where it denounces human rights violation.

Borrell-Lavrov Joint Press Conference, February 5th, Moscow
© MID RF


Many were surprised by Foreign Minister Lavrov’s rather strong mid-February statement about Russia considering severing relations with the EU not only in light of the above-mentioned Navalny sanctions but in light of the overall negative approach of the EU. Lavrov then clarified that he was directing his wrath at the EU not at individual European countries. MFA officials also offered more nuanced interpretations of Lavrov’s statement. This follows on the recent visit to Moscow of Josep Borrell, the EU Foreign Minister. Borrell was accused by Moscow of saying positive things while in Moscow and negative ones on return to Brussels. Borrell was as well criticized by European parliamentarians for having been too soft on Russia. Borrell would not be the first foreign minister to have been “bested” by Lavrov. What the episode reveals however is the EU Foreign Minister is better disposed towards Russia than the EU policy establishment. Lavrov directing the blame at the EU in general was not an improvisation, but a way of playing on the difference and putting the Minister and the establishment on the defensive.  

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ARMENIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH

During the last week of February opposition supporters and supporters of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in turn organised in turn massive demonstration in the center of Yerevan. This follows from a direct confrontation between Pashinyan and the leadership of the Armed Forces after Pashinian rejected calls by top military officers to resign and warned of "an attempted coup," prompting world powers to urge all sides to deescalate an intensifying political crisis. The matter has now become a constitutional debate between Pashinyan and President Sarkisyan over Pashinyan’s authority to fire the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

PM Pashinyan addressing his supporters, Yerevan February 25th


Pashinyan has faced mounting protests and calls from the opposition for his resignation following a six-week conflict between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenian forces over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh last year. Pashinian, who swept to power amid nationwide protests in 2018, has come under fire since agreeing to a Moscow-brokered deal with Azerbaijan that took effect on November 10th. The deal ended six weeks of fierce fighting in and around the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh that saw ethnic Armenian forces suffer battlefield defeat against Azerbaijan's Turkish-backed military.

In the conflict between Pashinyan and the military over the conduct of the military campaign and the conclusion of the cease-fire, the explicit blame towards Pashinyan is that he did not raise to the challenge. The implicit blame is that his commitment to the protection of Nagorno-Karabakh was not as strong as that of his predecessors. Pashinyan is the first Armenian leader not linked to the Karabakh faction. 

In a sign of Moscow's growing concern about the developments in Armenia, the Kremlin on February 26th reiterated that Armenia should comply with agreements reached with Azerbaijan, Moscow’s principal objective. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov sought to calm fears, telling a briefing that he saw "no threat" of a breakdown of the Nagorno-Karabakh deal. Peskov's statement came a day after President Vladimir Putin called for calm during a phone call with Pashinian. Russia is a key ally of Armenia, has a military base in the country and plays long with Turkey a key role in the peacekeeping dimension of the current cease-fire.

Russia’s ostensible support for Pashinyan rests on the idea that he is needed to implement the agreement with Azerbaijan. Rumours have surfaced that Moscow may agree to have Pashinyan replaced by a national unity candidate, Vazgen Manukyan. He is the first Prime Minister of independent Armenia and has strong Karabakh credentials.

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UKRAINE

President Zelenskyy recently held a meeting on the strategy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories seemingly wishing to prepare for a process that, by all accounts, is unlikely to take place in the near future. It, however, might not be such a bad idea to put equal emphasis on the recovery of territories as on achieving peace. Polls had suggested that Ukrainians wanted to see the end of armed confrontation. That is generally being delivered. Polls also suggest that Ukrainians are still opposed to any kind of concession to the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine. It is important for the President to focus the attention on what would be needed to make the recovery of occupied territories possible, so as to take the conversation to another level in the hope that he may work up support for his ultimate objective.  Current plans to advance decentralisation and give more power to regions also serve to prepare the ground for what might be if not a federal state at least a less unitary regime. Ongoing discussions about the rights of national minorities in general might also be a way of avoiding an exclusive discussion of the language rights of the Russian-speaking population, an issue that has significant bearing on the possible reintegration of rebel regions.

President Zelenskyy visiting Donetsk, February 11th
© President of Ukraine Website


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy shut down three Kremlin-linked TV channels on February 2nd. The decision has sparked a heated debate in Ukraine over the correct balance between national security considerations and freedom of speech. Interestingly enough that debate did not move to the international level, Ukraine’s supporters falling in line with Zelenskyy.

Ukrainian TV channels ZIK, NewsOne, and 112 were forced off the air late on February 2nd after the official channel owner and opposition MP Taras Kozak was hit with sanctions. All three channels are widely believed to belong to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s closest ally in Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk, and have long been seen as platforms for Kremlin messaging in Ukraine’s information space.

Defending the dramatic step, Zelenskyy argued that it was justified by the need to “fight against the danger of Russian aggression in the information arena.” Speaking to Ukrainian TV executives on February 3, he offered reassurances that the closures were an isolated case and did not signify a change in Ukraine’s commitment to a free press. “Sanctions against the media are always a difficult decision for any government except an authoritarian one,” he commented. “This was not a spur of the moment decision, but one that has been in the works for a long time based on information from many Ukrainian government agencies. This is by no means an attack on freedom of speech. It is a well-founded decision to protect national security.”

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy further stressed that the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to apply restrictive measures against the owner of a number of TV channels was justified and legal, supported by Ukraine's international partners.

Zelenskky has let it be known that he is not concerned about his re-election prospects. Yet, he is expected to run for re-election. In a contest with a nationalist opponent going after pro-Russia entities might not be enough to win him many votes. It may however cost him support among those voters who voted for him precisely because he was perceived as more conciliatory.

VACCINES UPDATE

Other than Israel, possibly the UK and now the US, it is difficult to find a country where the government is not accused of failing to implement an optimal delivery of vaccines. Ukraine is no exception. By the end of February, vaccines still have to be delivered but are expected shortly. By contrast the situation is different in the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea where the Russian Sputnik V vaccine is already available.  

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RUSSIA-BELARUS

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko spent six hours together at Russia's Black Sea resort of Sochi on February 22nd for talks on their stalled integration efforts.

Lukasehnko-Putin meeting, February 22nd, Sochi


After their initial discussion the two leaders went skiing together before continuing the talks during an informal working dinner. As it did in the past, the Kremlin made sure to offer the image of a meeting between long-time personal friends

The Kremlin press service said their agenda focused on the development of Russian-Belarusian relations in terms of a "strategic partnership and alliance," economic ties, energy, and integration within the framework of a union state. The two also discussed the delivery of the Russian coronavirus vaccine to Belarus. At the start of the meeting, Putin said he was "delighted to reaffirm the level of our interaction, strategic partnership, and allied relations."

Lukashenko was always reluctant to go forward with the Russia-Belarus integration. Seven months of unprecedented street protests have, however, put the Belarusian leader on the defensive and seemingly more reliant on Putin's support.

The informal leader of the opposition in Belarus, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya recently acknowledged that the opposition had lost the battle of the street to the repressive response of the regime. She observed that democracy would be a long time coming to Belarus. Given the reprieve, Lukashenko may wish to return to his more independent-minded approach. Russia may, however, still want to take advantage of recent difficulties to press its integration objectives. It may also take more seriously the need to groom a less Soviet and more user-friendly successor to Lukashenko. 

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CANADA, RUSSIA, THE ARCTIC: A BRIEF OVERVIEW



In Canada few issues achieve positive public resonance as the importance of the Arctic and the related need to defend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. This is not to say that the concept of sovereignty in the Arctic is perfectly understood by all but that the issue has a certain unusual emotional appeal. Interestingly enough there exists a comparable thread in Russia where the development of the Arctic region provided the country with a relatively high number of heroic figures that in their time could transcend the prevailing ideology.

Yet, in the history of Canada-Russia relations in the Arctic going as far as the end of the 1950s, the driving force was not sovereignty but the idea that the two countries with the largest Arctic territories should cooperate in order to tackle the challenges inherent in the development of the region. Cooperation has mattered more than confrontation. Cooperation had a positive far-reaching impact on changes going on in Russia especially at the time of Mikhail Gorbachecv’s perestroika. Canadian objectives in the area of sustainable development and the direct involvement of First Nations were the priority in bilateral cooperation and are now actively pursued in the context of the Arctic Council. The Council is now celebrating its 25th anniversary. Even though it is not the most visible international organisation it is generally regarded as a success story.

Cooperation in the Arctic, essentially via the Arctic Council, was the only area that was exempted from the Harper government’s measures against Russia and cooperation with Russia, though Canada joined US and the EU in the prohibition of export of equipment that could serve to oil exploration or production in the Arctic.

Military confrontation was not absent from the region but was part of the global US-USSR standoff during the Cold War. The Russian side of the Arctic Ocean with its wide-open spaces provides an ideal environment for the operation of a submarine fleet. Russia has used it for that purpose. The waters of the Canadian Arctic, with their multiple islands and narrow passages have been described as a nightmare for submarine operators. There is nevertheless enough available evidence to suggest that the USSR submarine fleet has made enough visits in the area to have achieved better mapping than Canada itself.   

While very little about submarine warfare ever gets into the media, the confrontation between Russian air forces and their NATO adversaries fairly often gets some attention even though it probably has less significance that the submarine activity. Skirting the adversary’s airspace and triggering an air defence response is part of the training book on both sides. Cynical minds have observed that some countries publicize these incidents when they need additional funding for their air forces. In Canada, the occasional complaint was that scrambling military aircraft is causing budget problems.

Since Vladimir Putin came to power an eternity ago a significant re-militarisation of the Arctic territory of Russia has been observed. This of course meshes with the historical Russian narrative on the Arctic about the heroic defense of the motherland. It nevertheless raises questions about both Russia’s intentions and the threats it perceives. Yet, the Arctic might not be a place to start a war. Looking at Russia’s strategic priorities in the Arctic might help understand the stakes. Under the policy recently approved by President Putin, Russia’s priorities are to develop the mineral and hydrocarbon resources of its Arctic region as well as to operate on an exclusive basis the Northern Sea Route in the Russian economic zone. The natural adversaries and the ones that could offer a credible threat to Russia are China first, and the US second.

In terms of the control over the Northern Sea Route, Russia’s views would be close to Canada’s assertive position with respect to control of navigation in Arctic waters. By contrast China and the US, having global navigation interests would tend to favour a freedom of navigation approach.

The potential territorial dispute between Canada and Russia over the extension of their territorial zone in the Arctic is one that does not have to turn into a conflict since the two states having acceded to the Law of the Sea Convention would be expected to resolve any outstanding issue through arbitration, if necessary, after the Law of the Sea Tribunal has reached its decision on the extent of each country’s continental shelf.

The two countries will launch an expanded U.S.-Canada Arctic Dialogue to cover cross-cutting issues related to continental security, economic and social development, and Arctic governance.

 

PERSON OF THE MONTH: ALEXANDER GINTSBURG



As the director of the Gamaleya Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology in Moscow, Alexander Gintsburg presided over the work that led to the development of the Sputnik V vaccine. Previously he had successfully worked on Ebola and MERS vaccines which were introduced in Africa.

In early 2020 he assembled a team of gifted scientists who in record time developed the first effective vaccine against COVID-19. He was so convinced of the validity of his work that he injected himself with the experimental jab during early stages of vaccine trials. In one of his interviews he observed that the pace of its development was necessary under the “wartime” conditions of a pandemic, but that no corners were being cut. He added that, eventually, the Western medical establishment would recognize Sputnik V as one of the best vaccines on the market. This is exactly what happened when recently the British authoritative medical publication Lancet confirmed the high quality of the Russian vaccine (91.6% efficacy).

Gintsburg and his institute are the heirs of a long-standing Russian tradition of successful research in the area of vaccines. Nikolay Gamaleya, who gave his name to the institute, worked with Louis Pasteur and was inspired by the latter’s work in developing his own research.

At the time of writing 36 countries, representing more than1.1 billion people have approved the use of the Sputnik V vaccine.

Dr. Gintsburg recently announced that his institute is experimenting with Sputnik "light" designed for a younger population and consists of only one jab.

Aside from his contribution to this Covid-related vaccine Aleksander Gintsburg also works on anti-TB vaccines (considering that tuberculosis according to the WHO is present in almost a third of the world population)-this project is also of great importance.

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BRIEFLY NOTED


IRAN

Iran has confirmed that the country would end by February 23rd its implementation of the voluntary measures as envisaged in its 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. The move came after Tehran floated the possibility of dramatically escalating uranium enrichment as Washington and its Western partners scrambled to salvage the Nuclear Deal that is officially called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA was abandoned by Washington in 2018. One of its key features is that it allows for so-called snap inspections of nuclear-related sites.

Rafael Grossi, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director general, responded to the Iranian pullout by striking a three-month deal in Tehran on February 21st that he said left him satisfied that his inspectors could still continue to do their work, albeit less effectively than before.

In the meantime, the EU and the US will have to engineer a way for meaningful discussions to resume despite the Iranian insistence that US sanctions must first be lifted as well as despite the US intention to table shortly a motion of blame against Iran at the IAEA.

The diplomatic ballet is complicated by time pressures and as well as by the EU’s relative slowness in playing a proper mediation role. Yet, the early decisions by the Biden administration leave little doubt about its determination to revive the JCPOA. It is also clear that it would not want to let other considerations, such as Iran ballistic missile capacity, derail the process. These issues would be addressed in the second stage of eventual negotiations.


UKRAINE

Ukraine has accused Russia of the "targeted assassinations" of "perceived opponents" in a case filed at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the latest in a series of legal complaints against Moscow.

The case, published on the court's website on February 23, accuses Moscow of carrying out assassinations "in Russia and on the territory of other states... outside a situation of armed conflict" in what Kyiv says is a violation of the "right to life" as stipulated in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In the application, Ukraine also alleges that Russia's failure to investigate such alleged assassinations amounts to "an administrative practice" that is also sustained through "deliberately mounting cover-up operations aimed at frustrating efforts to find the persons responsible."

The court did not provide details of the alleged assassinations.

It is the ninth case taken by Ukraine against Russia at the ECHR, which hears complaints over alleged breaches of the Convention on Human Rights.

 

ISRAEL

The Pfizer Inc. and BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine appeared to stop the vast majority of recipients in Israel becoming infected, providing the first real-world indication that the immunization will curb transmission of the coronavirus.

The vaccine, which is being rolled out in a national immunization program that began December 20th was 89.4% effective at preventing laboratory-confirmed infections, according to a copy of a draft publication that was posted on Twitter and confirmed by a person familiar with the work. The companies worked with Israel's Health Ministry on the preliminary observational analysis, which was not peer-reviewed. Some scientists disputed its accuracy.

If confirmed, the early results on lab-tested infections are encouraging because they indicate the vaccine may also prevent asymptomatic carriers from spreading the virus that causes COVID-19. That has not been clear because the clinical trials that tested the safety and efficacy of vaccines focused on the ability to stop symptomatic infections.

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THE AUTHORS


Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.