Monday, April 30, 2018

Issue 18

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER


SHOOT FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER


The use of chemical weapons is absolutely condemnable. In Europe and North America, Bashar al Assad generally has a terrible reputation, on several accounts. The President of France has previously stated that the use of chemical weapons is a red line not to be crossed. On April 7th allegations emerge that chemical weapons have been used by the Assad forces in Eastern Ghouta. An amateur video seems to confirm this. What more is needed to launch retaliatory strikes against Assad’s alleged chemical weapons research facilities and installations? If at the same time the opportunity exists to show common resolve between the US, France and the UK, what can go wrong?

A few things can go wrong. More and more reputable observers, including Western military specialists, have begun to cast doubt on the reality of the April 7th incident, underlining the fact that it made no sense from either a military or political point of view, since the Eastern Ghouta battle was virtually over. Other observers have begun to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the military response, the April 14th targeted missile strike. The Syrians have even boasted to have sent to Moscow an unexploded Tomahawk missile, so that it could be thoroughly analysed by Russian specialists. Poor Secretary of Defense Mattis, who probably played a crucial role in making this a sensible strike, was left trying to answer the question as to how you can destroy a chemical weapons storage facility without causing the accidental release of deadly chemicals. “We do our best! “is the only answer he could give. Public opinion polls also showed that there was not a very strong popular support for the strikes.

What started as “Trump, Macron and May more decisive than Obama story” moves to the back pages of the newspapers, if such things still exist. Yet, in the meantime, not having awaited the outcome of expectedly futile UN Security Council discussions, the OPCW decides to send its own inspectors to the Eastern Ghouta. After having met the exigencies of the UN Security Division the inspectors finally gain access to the area where chemical weapons were allegedly used. The OPCW is however no different than any other fact-finding entity. It can find evidence of the use of chemical weapons and make a definite statement about that. If it does not find such evidence, it can only say that it has not found evidence, but cannot make a definite statement to the effect that chemical weapons were not used. The public relations battle will not stop with the tabling of the OPCW report, for sure.

Throughout this process, Macron claims to have convinced Trump to keep US forces in Syria. Finishing off ISIS and working for long-term peace in Syria would be the objectives. Yet, Trump’s instincts would have him leave Syria. It is easy to understand why there would be limited interest in continuing being involved in the Northern Syria standoff between the Kurdish forces and the Turkish army and its local allies. In Southern Syria, it might make more sense to keep a military presence near the Iraq border. That might serve as a tool that could limit the ambitions of Iran and Hezbollah. How effective that presence would be is a big question. Ultimately though, for Macron, the issue is not the US military presence per se but the continuing involvement of the US in the overall discussions on Syria, more specifically in the recently inactive UN-led Geneva peace process. Macron clearly has a preference for that process over the Russia/Iran /Turkey-led Astana peace process. There are serious issues at stake: who participates and whether a durable peace arrangement can be achieved.

Since the US-UK-France strikes, the Syrian forces have continued their offensive against the remaining pockets of rebel resistance, especially in the southeast of the country, in areas that are relatively close to Damascus. Whereas there may little progress in the peace and reconstruction process, the Assad regime is progressively regaining control of its territory, strengthening its position whenever it has to sit down at a negotiating table, if ever.

Even though Turkey joined Western countries in condemning the alleged use of chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta, this did not prevent the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Iran and Russia having a meeting in Moscow on April 28th. On the occasion, they agreed on holding another high-level meeting of the Macron-disliked “Astana format peace negotiations “in Astana in mid-May.
Ultimately, in themselves, the alleged chemical incident, the military response and the ensuing public relations battle that follows do not so much matter for the future. What will matter more is whether France having used the incident to keep the US in Syria will be able to take advantage of that to give new life to its preferred peace process. Given the evolution of the situation in Syria, there may not be a lot of time left to do that.


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ARMENIA ON EDGE


Serzh Sargsyan only recently completed the major reform of transforming Armenia from a presidential republic into a parliamentary one. Despite having given prior assurances to the contrary, he then moved from the position of President to that of Prime Minister, de facto remaining in power. He now has admitted his error and resigned in order to quell massive street protests.

Sargsyan led Armenia for 10 years with two main principles in mind: close relations with Russia and steadfast defense of the status quo in the bitter conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Sargsyan is himself a native of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Sargsyan’s “clinging” to power triggered popular discontent that quickly morphed into demands for radical improvements in living standards as well as more political freedom. With the lack of real progress on the economic front for the whole period of Sargsyan’s presidential tenure as well as the widespread perception of pervasive corruption, the prospect of his use of constitutional reform to remain in power indefinitely brought the situation to a breaking point. The Government in Yerevan could not use violent force against protesters for many reasons, one being that on April 24th Armenia marks the anniversary of the 1915-1923 genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman government. On that occasion, thousands of Armenians from France, Russia, Germany and the United States arrive in the country. The presence of uniformed soldiers among the protesters may also have been cause for restraint.

With the resignation of Sargsyan, a new Prime Minister has to be chosen by Parliament. This is to be done on May1st. If no candidate receives a majority of votes, there will be a second attempt 7 days later. If that attempt also fails, Parliament is dissolved and new elections are held. Since the last parliamentary elections were held in April 2017, there is some normal pressure for this “young” legislature to sort out the matter. This is also what President Putin suggested in his call on Acting Prime Minister Karapetian on April, along with the insistence that the crisis be resolved exclusively through legal means. Later on, the State Department issued a roughly similar statement. If new elections have to be held, the coalition of reformers led by parliamentarian Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the recent protests could well win, but Pashinyan himself has insisted that he should be appointed Prime Minister since he is the people’s choice. This is becoming more likely. Armen Sarkissian, the President of Armenia, is reported as trying to facilitate dialogue between the parties.

Whoever becomes Prime Minister, be it sooner or later, there is no expectation of a major change in Armenia’s geo-political positioning. If compared to its ancient predecessors, modern Armenia is a small country. It is in conflict with two neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and gets along with the third one, Georgia, more by necessity than by affinity. Russia is the only strong economic and military ally and support base. Russia is generally wary of situations where street protests run the risk of creating unpredictability and eventually political chaos. Its reaction this time has been guarded. Russia has no reason to be overly concerned by even very significant re-alignments on the internal political scene. This is not likely to become another battlefield between the US and Russia.

Even if Russia may not be overly pleased with the current crisis, the departure from power of Sargsyan may not be considered as a terrible loss. Despite the perception of Sargsyan’s strong pro-Russian inclinations, there were issues. Ultimately, one might even contend that outgoing Prime Minister Sargsyan’s profile is similar to that of several regional leaders that have been sacked by Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, should events in Armenia lead to a turn towards more openness and liberalization, Russia may rather welcome a more dynamic yet still friendly partner, something that certainly corresponds to the traditional image of Armenia as a place of initiative and creation, even during the Soviet period.


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UNTYING THE KOREAN KNOT


Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in, Panmunjom, April 27th

In his last act as CIA director Mike Pompeo made a secret visit to North Korea during the recent Easter holiday and met with Kim Jong-un. The purpose of the trip was to set up the expected meeting between President Trump and Kim. This odd summit will take place in June. For its location, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s capital is currently the first choice, with Singapore in second place. (It looks as though Trump may want a more spectacular location.) Kim's unexpected decision to discuss denuclearization has been prompted by a combination of factors such as the heavy pressure from China, the main ally and support base of the North Korean regime, the discrete diplomacy of Russia that sent several delegations to meet its former client and, of course, the never seen before credible threat of US military action. This last point will be conveniently re-reinforced during the negotiations with North Korea by the recent strike on Syrian targets by an American-led coalition: the threat had been made, it was carried out quickly, without the need for a formal UN approval.

Washington also gave its blessing to the inter-Korean summit which just took place in the demilitarized zone between North and South. Technically both countries are still in a state of war. The armistice signed in 1953 at the conclusion of a 3 year-long conflict is the only formal agreement between the two states. This time the Korean leaders agreed on the principle of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and on the proposal to pursue talks with the US and China toward the negotiation of a real peace treaty that would bestow normalization of economic, political and cultural relations. The idea of such a negotiation has already been endorsed by President Trump.

There are reasons to believe that Kim may do away with his nuclear program in exchange for the end of sanctions, massive economic and financial assistance from the US, South Korea and Japan and firm guarantees for his regime's security. The idea of allocating fewer resources to the military may eventually come up, but not immediately as it raises some fundamental questions about the very nature of the North Korean regime.

As for possible obstacles in the peace process, observers have mostly raised the question of the genuine nature of North Korea’s commitment to peace. Only time will tell, but current indications are indeed positive. A problem may, however, still arise on the other side. For now, there are seemingly no difference between the US and South Korean positions. In light of his recent highly-visible success, Moon Jae-in could become too enthusiastic and less uncompromising. In that context, keeping some of the limelight for Donald Trump might not be a bad idea.


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TRADE WITH RUSSIA GROWS DESPITE SANCTIONS



It is a common view that the worsening of international relations and the wide spread use of economic sanctions rapidly downgrades bilateral trade. In the case of trade relations between Canada and Russia the reverse dynamics appear to take place. According to Eurasian Union statistics, Russian exports to Canada have been steadily increasing and reached over $1 billion in 2017, roughly 50% more than in the previous year. Russia sells to Canada mineral products, chemicals, machinery, plastic and base metals. Meanwhile Canadian exports to Russia also have increased by over 35%, with machinery and transport equipment in the lead. It is worth recalling that Canada lost pork exports to Russia as the main element of Canadian export structure. In 2012-2013 Russia purchased almost $500 million worth of pork. These sales were lost due to counter sanctions introduced by Moscow in response to Canadian measures put in effect immediately after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg (May 25-26) will address this new reality: how to manage the growth of international trade in a sanction-ridden world. More on that will follow in next month’s issue.


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UKRAINE UPDATE


Patriarch Bartholomew, President Poroshenko, Istanbul, April 9th

There have been serious efforts to move along the proposal for a peacekeeping contingent in Eastern Ukraine. There are indications that the proposal may be closer to reality than ever before. It could well be that, after the appointment of the new government in Russia in mid-May, the matter will receive increased attention. This being said, the overall prospects for peaceful settlement of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are as remote as ever. As noted before, in the current circumstances in Ukraine, there is no appetite for any form of compromise with rebel regions. There is also no outside pressure on Kyiv authorities since they enjoy the unconditional support of their Western allies. There are as well occasional rumours that the presidential and parliamentary elections that are scheduled for 2019 could be held at an earlier date. In the context of this pre-electoral atmosphere, there is no likelihood whatsoever of any change in the position of Kyiv on how to reintegrate the Donbass into Ukraine.

An example of the unconditional support extended to Kyiv was given at the recent meeting of G7 Foreign Affairs ministers in Toronto. On the occasion, the chair of the meeting, Canadian Foreign Minister Freeland invited the Foreign Minister of Ukraine to address the meeting. The objective was clearly to firm up G7 support for Ukraine and to keep “the disruptive influence of Russia on the West” as a top agenda item.

As for President Poroshenko, it seems as though seasoned political observers in Ukraine are already writing his political obituary, as his chances for re-election seem to get slimmer every month. Poroshenko himself does not however seem to want to give up and has turned to a highly symbolic, sensitive and complex issue to restore some of his credentials.

During his April 9th visit in Istanbul, Poroshenko met Oecumenical Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul to discuss the possibility of granting the tomos of autocephaly i.e. independence to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, with a view to creating one independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. There are currently three Orthodox churches in Ukraine, each one with its own patriarch. Only one of them formally recognizes the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. Following consultations with the three patriarchs and with parliamentarians, Poroshenko sent one of his officials to Istanbul to deliver his appeal for the tomos of autocephaly to the Oecumenical Patriarch. This will likely be followed by elaborate consultations, including discussions between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Moscow Patriarch. Should the Oecumenical Patriarch agree to granting independence to a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church, deciding which of the three patriarchs should head that entity is going to be a most difficult process. Even if the patriarchs were to agree among themselves, there is no guarantee that their followers would. The Moscow Patriarchate would most likely never accept a decision that would affect its jurisdiction. There could follow a serious and lengthy inter-confessional crisis in Ukraine, where the animosity between Ukrainian and pro-Moscow Orthodox Churches is deeply set.


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PERSON OF THE MONTH: EMMANUEL MACRON

Presidents Macron and Trump, Washington, April 23rd

The youthful president of France is steadily taking over the leadership of contemporary Europe. Germany's Angela Merkel has been retreating from this role due to the weakness of her coalition and her somewhat strained relations with Donald Trump. The recent joint attack on Syria by US, UK and France has propelled Macron into a strategic parity with his more global allies.

Macron’s recent visit to the US reinforced his growing influence with Trump. Macron managed to steer Trump away from withdrawing American troops from Syria and making coalition strikes less devastating and away from Russia's zones of control in order not to risk all out conflict with powerful Russia. His best efforts to persuade Trump not to leave the nuclear deal with Iran were not successful, but he not giving up. He is now taking the approach that it might be possible to negotiate an even better deal for the future, while keeping the current arrangement on the understanding that the "imperfect deal is better than no deal at all".

He also wants to play a peacemaker role with Russia and wants to work with the Kremlin to fix Middle East and Ukrainian issues. In late May, Macron will go to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum to promote growing French trade and investment interests in Russia as well as for a meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.


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BRIEFLY NOTED


AZERBAIJAN


In April 2018, after the targeted strike on Syria, Azerbaijan hosted high level talks between Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov and NATO military Commander General Scaparrotti, the first such talks since 2013.The parties discussed issues of military activities of NATO and Russia in the European region as well as raising the level of confidence and prevention of incidents. They also exchanged views on Syria and the fight against international terrorism.
Separetely Gerasimov held talks with Azerbaijan President Aliyev and his military advisers on cooperation between Russia and Azerbajan. When Armenia is in a state of political turmoil, Russia's military assistance to Azerbaijan can become a very delicate issue.

BELARUS


Aleksandr Lukashenko who has led  Belarus since 1994 said in his televised address to parliament that his country will try to keep good relations not only with Russia, its traditional ally, but with the EU and United States. He accused Russia of unfairness and economic discrimination against Belarus dairy and other industries. He promised to develop better ties with the EU in the sphere of exports of Belorussian agricultural products. He also confirmed that Belarus could be part of peacekeeping force in Ukraine should the UN so require.

RUSSIA-US


The US Treasury Department announced that the sanctions recently introduced against the Russian aluminum giant Rusal could be lifted providing that Oleg Deripaska, the main shareholder and the CEO, would leave the company. It was explained that the main target of sanctions was Deripaska himself, as a member of Putin's inner circle, not the company as such. This decision could save thousands of jobs in many countries, including the United States. Russian officials indicated that such a compromise maybe in the works.

KAZAKHSTAN


Human rights observers reported about the increasing tensions between Kazakhstan and China in connection with ethnic Kazakhs' in their border provinces. More than 1 million Kazakhs now reside in China. Growing prominence of Kazakhstan on the international arena gave rise to local Kazakh nationalism in China. Some Kazakhs there demand more cultural autonomy and closer ties and travel privileges with their native Kazakhstan. China wants to downplay these nationalistic tendencies. For its part, Astana welcomes the influx of Chinese Kazakhs as a means of offsetting its large Russian speaking population. 

CANADA-RUSSIA


On a slightly lighter and musical note, the Vancouver Courier just recently published an article with the heading “Vancouver Opera Festival colludes with Russia”. This has nothing to do with Donald Trump or fake news, but refers to a major cultural festival being held in Vancouver. We offer you a direct quote from the Vancouver Opera website:
From April 28 to May 6, under the banner of the Russian White Nights, the second annual Vancouver Opera Festival celebrates Russian composers with a Russian classic opera, a much anticipated opera premiere, a series of instrumental and vocal chamber music concerts, and much more.  https://www.vancouveropera.ca/

 

THE AUTHORS


Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His particular area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.