Friday, December 31, 2021

BGN 59

HIGH-LEVEL RISK MANAGEMENT

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

December 7th Biden-Putin video conference
©President of Russia Website

The discussion in the media continues to focus on the movement of Russian troops in the vicinity of Ukraine and the possible invasion of Ukraine it may prepare, as well as on the sanctions against Russia this would produce. The December 30th diplomatic discussions between Presidents Biden and Putin seem to have focused much more on the matter of long-term security arrangements between the US/NATO and Russia. The media focus on possible war rather than on possible peace keeps the pressure on both sides to continue their discussion. This is important especially for the US as there is probably neither a full understanding of President Biden’s objectives nor full domestic or Euro-Atlantic support for the negotiation process he has agreed to initiate with Russia. That process is predicated on the pursuit of long-term objectives that may not be shared by the US foreign policy establishment or by the countries of the so-called New Europe such as Poland and the Baltic States. Some, even within the Biden administration, would rather continue the policy of confrontation with Russia and would object to anything that appears to reward rather than punish Russia.

Ever since the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty ceased to be operational in July 2007 there has not been an arrangement that would define the terms of acceptable military presence between Russia and, for all intents and purposes, the rest of Europe. More recently, with the US withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in August 2019, there has also been no framework for the control of nuclear missiles in the European theater of operations.

There have of course been attempts to fill the void, including the short-lived proposals for a new European security architecture by then President Medvedev in June 2008. Since then, with the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the conflict over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the circumstances have not been conducive to discussions on that theme. New START, the US-Russian treaty that limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads was, however, extended in 2021 for another five years.

What also has become clear to Vladimir Putin the course of last year is that tension can be creative. The movement of Russian troops closer to the Ukrainian border in early 2021 fulfilled its expected purpose. The Ukrainian side got the message that the Donbass was not going to be regained through military means. Bringing the troops back to the Ukrainian border might create the tension that would trigger US appetite for wide-ranging security discussions that have not really happened for many years.

Under the pressure of possible war in Ukraine, what Presidents Biden and Putin have agreed to do is to start working on a new broad long-term security arrangement that would deal with the new alignment of forces in Europe. This is what Russia essentially proposed as early as in 2008. In the context of an ever-expanding NATO, the US did not see this as a priority, but may be willing to consider it now as a way to ensure stability while reducing its own military presence in Europe. On a personal note, Biden is old enough, literally, to have been a first-row witness of all the major disarmament treaties that were signed with the Soviet Union beginning with START in 1971. He would be partial to that type of arrangement that could lessen the tension between the US and Russia. Nowadays he would fully appreciate the fact that this would allow him to focus more energy and attention to dealing with the China threat. It might not detach Russia from China but would lessen the prospect of a closer alliance between the two. Vladimir Putin publicising his briefing of Chinese President after his conversation with Joe Biden was both a reminder to Biden of what is at risk and to China that nothing will be done behind its back.

As for Canada, it would find it difficult not to support the Biden approach, but it may need to produce a creative way of reconciling its unconditional support for Ukraine with a process that appears to give less importance to the specific Ukraine-Russia conflict.

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THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT

In looking at the demands that Russia has made of the US and NATO, many analysts have focused on the idea of denying NATO membership to Ukraine. Paradoxically, it is not the prospect of early Ukrainian accession to NATO that has triggered a sense of urgency on the Russian side. The US and a few other leading NATO countries have made it abundantly clear to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy that NATO membership is not for the immediate future. Some have even used a specific term: at least 10 years. Ukraine has been told it must first go through more significant reforms. It is also understood that a country cannot enter NATO if it is not in full control of its national territory. The Donbass conflict must be resolved, or the rebel regions have to be given up. Crimea must be recovered or given up as well. All this is unlikely one way or another.

President Zelenskyy, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg
NATO Headquarters, December 16th
©President of Ukraine Website

What has become clear to Russia in the past few months is that there is a threat of some ersatz NATO membership for Ukraine in the form of a bilateral military partnership between the US and Ukraine. The flood gates of NATO membership may not open for Ukraine, but there could a creeping growth of US military presence on Ukrainian territory in the form of increasingly more sophisticated military equipment, well beyond Turkish drones and US Javelin missiles.

Joe Biden’s acquiescence to the idea of security discussions with Russia may also be consistent with his approach to the conflict in Afghanistan. The US should not extend its presence or commitment in a case when no resolution is in in sight. Afgnanistan returned to the Taliban, but Ukraine will not return to Russia.

The acquiescence to the discussions is also an indirect but clear acknowledgement that the situation in Ukraine will not be resolved shortly and that, in any event, it is not for Russia to make the next move. One should not expect that this would be well received in Ukraine. This is not to say that the US will stop supporting Ukraine or that the broad question of European security can eventually be resolved without the specific question of Ukraine being resolved or at least frozen in some acceptable way. It does however put some pressure on President Zelenskyy if he wants to avert the risk of Ukraine’s lost territory becoming a Cyprus-like frozen conflict.

Despite all the care that the Biden administration has taken to assuage Ukrainian concerns, it was only a matter of time before a political commentator would suggest that Biden is betraying Ukraine. Ironically, it is Andrey Illarionov, a Russian national, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin and one of his most vocal critics who did it, in unequivocal terms: “Biden once again surrendered Ukraine. On all issues that matter to her, he completely sided with Putin.”

The Kremlin readout of the most recent Biden-Putin meeting also notes that President Biden offered assurances that the US does not intend to deploy offensive weapons on the territory of Ukraine. That would held clear the atmosphere of the upcoming US-Russia negotiations but would once more disappoint the more hawkish elements in the US and Ukraine.

What is not covered thus far is what the US proposes to do with the Ukraine-Russia confrontation. There is still an interest in resolving that conflict. There is now a new truce in place in the Donbass area. It may last longer than previous ones. Reducing militarisation in that region first might be a first step that fits in the resolution of the global conflict. In order to enable Zelenskyy to engage credibly in any peace discussions, he has to be seen as having gained a stronger position both at home and vis-à-vis Russia. This is a tall order. A complete cease-fire, the withdrawal of some Russian troops and possibly the commitment to the presence of neutral peacekeepers might help.

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THE NEGOTIATION

The Russian idea of publicising the draft texts of treaty with the US and with NATO may have appeared as rather unusual. The fact is that this is a negotiation that will have to be transparent in any event given the number of participants and the expected reluctance in some NATO quarters. Ultimately, public discussion could facilitate the work of the leaders. Including a clause that would preclude further eastward expansion of NATO (mostly Ukraine) allows all the NATO spokespersons to posture and repeat their mantras about the unacceptability of Russia deciding for NATO. As noted above, Presidents Biden and Putin already know that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO in the near future. They also know that an outright exclusion of NATO membership will never pass. Renouncing that exclusion can, however, be presented as a Russian concession whenever appropriate. In any event the real goal is to prevent NATO assets (missiles and troops) from being too numerous and too close to Russia and equally for Russian assets to be in comparable number and distance from all NATO countries and NATO-aspiring countries.

Evolution of NATO in Europe
©Patrick Neil

It has been observed that the staging of NATO missiles in the proximity of Russia would be as unacceptable to Russia as the staging of Soviet missiles on Cuba was unacceptable to the US in 1962. This gives a good sense of what has to be negotiated first. It should also be noted the deployment of US missiles is what is at stake, not any British or French ones, and that this would be exclusively a US decision no matter how much the Ukrainians may want them on their territory.

Finally, the staging of the upcoming discussions (US-Russia on January 10th, NATO-Russia on January12th and OSCE on January 13th) may not guarantee success but suggests that the process is carefully choreographed.

--o--

UKRAINE: SCRAMBLING FOR SOLUTIONS

At a time when the need for a strong president is felt more acutely, it looks as though President Zelenskyy has reached his lowest popularity level. His attempts to buttress his nationalist credentials with some anti-Russia trade measures or to appear as a strong leader by allowing for the prosecution of his predecessor, former President Poroshenko, are unlikely to have much positive effect. Zelenskyy is of course coming under all forms of attack from political adversaries but also receives the occasional indirect criticism from the US Embassy for, as an example, the appointment of a key anticorruption official.

President Zelenskyy visiting the Donbass frontlines, December 6th
©President of Ukraine Website

The latest attack from a former Interior Minister is that the Putin administration disposes of compromising material against Zelenskyy. That would seem far-fetched but is revealing of the current atmosphere.

The fact that Zelenskyy was perhaps the only leader not to have received New Year’s greetings from Vladimir Putin would normally have been a badge of honour but seems to have had no positive effect on Zelenskyy’s standing. More timely calls from Joe Biden would probably have been useful. In the context of the current US-Russia conversations, the question remains as to whether Zelenskyy is part of the problem or can become part of the solution.

--o--

MEMORIAL, THE SAKHAROV LEGACY

Andrey Sakharov at the founding of Memorial, 1989

Memorial, the human rights NGO whose work includes researching and keeping the memory of past repressions in the USSR and current repression in Russia, was shut down on December 28th by a decision of the Russian Supreme Court. That decision can be explained in legal terms on account of the restrictive Russian legislation on foreign agents. The decision to prosecute may not have been only based on an attempt to deny the repression of the Stalin era but as well to quell a dissenting voice in the interpretation of historical and current events. The nuance is important in the context of a society that no longer has the likes of Andrey Sakharov and, as a result, has few widely respected and authoritative dissenting voices.

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.

Thursday, December 2, 2021

ISSUE 58

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

UKRAINE UNDER ATTACK?

The international discussion about the movement of Russian troops within Russia itself and how it might presage a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia has certain elements of déjà vu. Earlier in 2021 Russia moved troops close to the border with Ukraine, probably even closer than they are now. There was not so much speculation then about a full-fledged Russian invasion. The incident faded away and many of us were able to conclude that Russia had responded to Ukrainian moves around the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine by sending a message to Kyiv about the military reaction that could be expected should Ukraine be tempted to follow the recent Azerbaijan example. (In the fall of 2020 Azerbaijan used military force to regain control of a part of its internationally recognized territory in the Karabakh region.) The early 2021 events around Eastern Ukraine were then followed by high-level meetings including the first Biden-Putin summit and a period of relative quiet.

Things are different this time around. On the previous occasion, Dmitry Kozak, the Russian presidential administration point man on Ukraine stated unequivocally that a Ukrainian offensive on the rebel regions would lead “to the end of the Ukrainian state in its current form.” This time the interpretation of military movements has been that there was no pre-condition and that Russia was considering invading the whole of Ukraine. Some commentators have speculated that for Putin Ukraine remains the unresolved conflict of his presidency and that as he moves along in years, he may be inclined to consider more radical measures. There has also been some reference to Putin’s statements about Russian’s red lines and about tensions being useful to get the attention of the other side.

Does Russia really contemplate invading Ukraine? If one looks at the question from the point of view of Russian national interests, the answer is an obvious no in virtually every respect. Does Vladimir Putin contemplate invading Ukraine? To give that answer Putin turned to his long-term associate Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian acronym: SVR), to re-state that Russia has no intention to invade Ukraine. In the response to the claim of an unusual presence of troops near the border the Russian authorities had earlier chosen to use the SVR as the agency to rebuff the claims of an unusual presence of troops. The SVR statement even compared what it called a US propaganda exercise as something taken from Goebbels’ book, no less.

When it was made earlier this year, the above-mentioned Kozak statement was not understood to imply an invasion of Ukraine but rather a strong military and political response to any attempt by Kyiv to recover through military action the rebel territories of Eastern Ukraine. The conditional aspect was clear. What it also made clear is that Putin would not consider ever abandoning the Russian-speaking populations of Eastern Ukraine.

The one leader who seems to have understood the situation clearly and said so is President Zelenskyy. During his late November marathon press conference, he did not deny the risk of war but criticized alarmists for predicting imminent open armed confrontation. He nevertheless emphasised that Ukraine is now much more ready to defend itself than it was a few years ago. “We have been at war for eight years. And the likelihood of large-scale or continuation of a strong escalation by Russia or militants backed by the Russian Federation may take place any day. But I think that today there is intimidation from some sites and media that there will be a war tomorrow.”

Zelenskky has perfectly understood the meaning and extent of the Russian threat. He is the person who could trigger that threat by ordering military action to retake the rebel regions. That would be running against everything that he has said since he became president. To this day, he keeps emphasising that he wants to negotiate, but from a position of strength: “we will not be able to stop the war and return the territories without our troops and without direct talks with Russia.”

As for NATO countries, they have no choice but to denounce the Russian threat and in turn threaten of serious consequences, even though not extending to direct military actions. This will not put Russia on the defensive but will justify increasing military assistance to Ukraine. The US is using the same strong rhetoric but without going too far. Ahead of his own meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Secretary of State Blinken was edging his bets on the likelihood of an imminent invasion, so as not to prevent the organisation of another Biden-Putin conversation later this year.

Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov
Stockholm, December 2nd

As for Russia, it has no expectation from Ukraine, but may not have given up on NATO countries. A credible threat may have been enough to trigger the launch of discussions on long-term security guarantees between Russia and NATO, as seems to be suggested by Russia’s publicly expressed hopes on the agenda for the upcoming Biden-Putin virtual meeting. This is not the same as excluding Ukraine from NATO membership for ever. It goes back to the fundamental long-term issue of staging and deployment of military assets. It does not imply less support for Ukraine from the NATO side. It would imply, however, the acknowledgement that the Ukraine conflict itself will not be resolved any time soon as well as that Ukraine has so “separated” itself from Russia that it is no longer as crucial as it was seen during Colin Powell’s time as Secretary of State. Frustration and anger emanating from Kyiv could be expected and did not fail to materialize. It should be understood though that this is a long-term discussion that will not alter the current US rhetoric, may run into political obstacles and would unfold slowly in any event.

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NEGOTIATIONS, WHAT NEGOTIATIONS?

Behind the discussion about the possible Russian invasion of Russia, there have been political and military developments that have set the stage for the current level of public confrontation.

Politically, there has been pressure on Russia to convene another meeting of the Normandy Four (Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia). The story went on that President Putin had agreed to this under pressure from President Macron and Chancellor Merkel but that, according to French and German sources, Foreign Minister Lavrov was balking. This led Lavrov to take the highly unusual step of publishing the full text of his correspondence with his French and German counterparts. This was intended to clarify the Russian position that Putin had agreed to ask Lavrov to try to organise a meeting, but that the Russian conclusion is that there is no point in another meeting of the Normandy Four as this time. The main reason is that there has been no progress on the implementation of the decisions of the previous meeting, specifically Ukraine making no progress toward the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (that establish the principles for a settlement of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine). After many years of Ukraine supporters parroting the line that Russia needs to abide by the Minsk Agreements, there is now subdued recognition among diplomatic observers that it is Ukraine that has a fundamental problem with these arrangements.

President Zelenskyy addressing the Rada
December 1st, Kyiv
©President of Ukraine Website

Things are also different on the military front. Ukraine has begun to use its Turkish-made drones in Eastern Ukraine, it also apparently used US-provided Javelin missiles and, using the cover of both, it has according to Russian sources brought its troops closer to the confrontation line. The UK sent a military ship to the Black Sea to test the limits of what might be legally and operationally possible. The US has also sent strategic bombers in the vicinity of Crimea. NATO countries also have assessed the limits of Russian preparedness in the Black Sea, in the vicinity of Ukraine. Poking the bear is the comparison that comes to mind.

There have been indications to Ukraine that it would not be allowed to join NATO anytime soon. There has however been increasing US and other support for the Ukrainian military that, for its part, has been constantly improving its capacity and performance.

President Zelenskyy recognizing a Ukrainian veteran
December 1st, Kyiv
©President of Ukraine Website

Things have also changed in Ukraine proper. The Zelenskyy administration has allowed the passage of legislation that does not include ethnic Russians as native people of Ukraine. It is also preparing legislation that, in Moscow’s view, is equivalent to withdrawing from the Minsk Agreements.

More important though is the message that Russia has essentially given up on Zelenskky as a political leader who could resolve the Eastern Ukraine problem. Ukrainian public opinion will not support the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. Zelenskyy has neither really tried to change nor offered the beginning of a workable alternative solution.

The offer of President Erdogan of Turkey to mediate the conflict between Ukraine and Russia was not taken seriously and was most likely seen as the product of a mind that has an over-inflated idea of its importance. As France and Germany have failed, others should perhaps be inspired by the offer and come forward. As it is, there is no sign of any possibility of progress in the foreseeable future. As noted above, Zelenskyy’s call for direct talks with Russia will elicit no response.

--o--

LUKASHENKO, AS A PASSEUR

Alexander Lukashenko has acted in a way that puts him in the same category as the passeurs who take advantage of refugees and charge them large amounts of money to take them across the English Channel. Lukashenko did not do it for money of course, but for some eventual political advantage in the form of some sort of de facto recognition from the EU. The most likely inspiration, though, for his actions is that he probably wanted to seek vindication against the Polish authorities. Lukashenko seems to have enjoyed exposing what he sees as the double standards of the Polish government that rushed to offer political asylum to Belarus opposition figures but would turn back asylum-seekers from the Middle East. He would also have enjoyed the irony of the proposal to fly the asylum-seekers directly to Germany, an idea that would throw further light on the discrepancy between the Polish and German approaches to refugee issues. The fact that the asylum-seekers are leaving their home countries as a result of failed US/NATO policies would just have been an extra source of satisfaction.

Lukashenko’s utter disregard for the life and well-being of the refugees obviously meant he could not avoid well-founded criticism. Sacrificing a few people did not matter to him.

Chancellor Merkel, in her end of reign caretaker capacity agreed to speak directly to Lukashenko to achieve a resolution of the problem. Rather than receiving due gratitude, Merkel is now being criticized by the Polish Prime Minister for offering recognition to an illegitimate dictator. The German side is strongly denying this is the case.

Lukashenko’s dumping of refugees on the border with Poland was such a blatant provocation that the Polish side did not suffer too much reputational damage for its hard-line refugee policy. The whole incident, however, gives comfort to other EU countries such as Hungary that harbour policies like that of Poland. It illustrates policy differences among European countries at a time when France and the UK are confronted with serious challenges in this area.

Lukashenko may not have won much in all of this other than to reinforce his image at home and in the neighbourhood as a strong Soviet-era leader, the so-called cunning peasant, and one who does not care much about a few lost lives.

--o--

ZELENSKYY’S PRESS CONFERENCE

From Zelenskyy’s end of November marathon press-conference the item that got the most attention was his allegation that a coup d’état against him was under preparation for early December by unspecified individuals from Ukraine and Russia. He mentioned oligarch Rinat Akhmetov as one who may have been played by the alleged conspirators. The expected denial of any such conspiracy from all possible sources quickly followed.

Ukrainian oligarchs would certainly have no love for Zelenskyy and his attempts to de-oligarchise the Ukrainian economy. Conversations they may have had about Zelenskyy would most likely have included some rather unpleasant remarks directed at the President. Oligarchs do however still have a lot of tools at their disposal, including the media, to undermine Zelenskky other than a coup d’état.

Wittingly or not, Zelenskyy’s remark about a coup briefly shifted public attention from a Russian threat to Ukraine to a rather vaguely defined threat against himself. One of his problems has always been the perception that he is not strong enough to face Vladimir Putin or to reign in the oligarchs. Presenting himself as one who can overcome attempts is always useful.

--o--

ZELENSKYY’S RECORD

As could be expected in the case of a President who has been in power for more than two years, a lengthy unscripted press conference will lead to the airing of alleged mistakes, scandals, or disputes. Zelenskky now has plenty of accusations to contend with in this respect, some of which are not warranted at all. The most significant attack against his policies came from an unlikely source, an article in the Atlantic Council. The title says it all: “Ukraine’s anti-oligarch law could make President Zelenskyy too powerful.” The article essentially criticizes the President for his continuing links with oligarchs as well as the new legislation concentrating too much power in the presidential office. The substance of the article may not matter so much as the fact that an entity that is expected to be pro-Ukraine should publish an article that is critical of the President, thus confirming a misalignment between Zelenskky and some pro-Ukraine voices.

By contrast, looking at presidential activity since Zelenskyy’s accession to power, it might be equally noteworthy that the government procurement methodology that is currently in place has been supporting the rather successful implementation of the President’s "big construction" program. By doing away with the level of corruption that so prevailed especially during the Yanukovych presidency, the Ukrainian governments seems to have been able to devote resources to infrastructure projects that will support the modernisation of the country. The long-term impact will be significant.

The other project that deserves mentioning is the revival of the Ukrainian aircraft industry on the basis of the Antonov aircraft plant as well as the modernisation of the air transport infrastructure. In the context of a continuing pandemic, and despite the priority seemingly given to cargo aircraft, the timing of the announcement may surprise. The long-term view is nevertheless laudable. There was yet no indication of a Canadian connection to this project.

--o--

THE TALIBAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

As the US and the Taliban prepare for their first consultations since the US dropped out of Afghanistan, a few observations are in order.

Many explanations have been given for the quick takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. The Taliban have received credit for their proximity to the people. The outgoing authorities have been blamed for their corruption and in some regions for their authoritarian conduct. Ethnic and tribal factors have been mentioned. There has however not been a fundamental acknowledgement that the US and NATO policies were flawed. There however has been some outside acknowledgement of the immoral aspect of the US and NATO abandoning their supporters and their civil society allies.

In the discussions with the Taliban, the US will be expected to insist on the necessary inclusiveness of new Afghanistan government if it wants to receive international recognition and gain access to the country’s financial reserves kept by international institutions. The question arises as to how far the US is ready to go to withhold funds that are now needed for humanitarian purposes.

John Bolton, briefly Trump’s national security advisor and one of the supporters of the flawed US policy in Afghanistan, recently claimed that with the US departure Afghanistan would soon become the source of terrorist attacks against US interests. In this case, reiterating past assumptions implies not being even close to acknowledging mistakes.

There has also been the idea that the Taliban could be supported to squeeze out ISIS-K, considered as a distinct radical terrorist entity. That may be a way for both sides to save face, if the Taliban can be convinced to go after their Muslim brothers.

In dealing with Afghanistan, the US seems to have tried to exercise some influence over Pakistan, with little success. Other than that, the US seems to have held the view that they could deal with Afghanistan on their own. There may have been little appetite to deal with Russia, Iran or China. Relatively little attention would have been paid to Central Asian countries.

It is worth noting that it is mostly Uzbekistan that supplies electric power to the city of Kabul, to this day, on humanitarian grounds, even if the Afghan side is not able to pay. The Uzbek Foreign Minister was the first foreign official to visit Kabul. Uzbekistan and the Taliban have now already agreed on Uzbekistan re-building the Mazar-i-Sharif airport.

For its part, Russia has already started sending humanitarian shipments to Afghanistan and flying back to Russia Afghan students that are registered in Russian universities.

There is no sign yet that US could acknowledge that it might achieve its own objectives in Afghanistan by cooperating with the other governments of the region.

--o--

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

It would look as though Vladimir Putin not only managed to sit the President of Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia in the same room on November 26^th, but also managed to achieve results on three main topics of discussion.

On the delimitation of the boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it looked as though Azerbaijan was hoping to extract further concessions from Armenia prior to agreeing to the formal process of delimitation. Delimitation would be crucial to avoid further armed skirmishes on the confrontation lines. The results are not immediately visible, but the process should be launched before the end of the year.

Humanitarian issues: this is mostly about returning home the prisoners held by both sides. It would seem that there are more Armenians to be returned than Azerbaijanis. There is no specific deadline but a general expectation of early movement.

Re-opening of economic corridors: this goes beyond just stopping the fighting. Re-establishing the functioning of land transport is a vital long-term economic requirement that can bring changes to the region.

The general sense is that Armenia got more on boundary delimitation and humanitarian issues than Azerbaijan had hitherto been willing to concede. What leverage Putin was able to use on Aliev is not entirely clear but may become evident in coming weeks as the implementation of decision unfolds. There may have been a discrete but decisive role for Turkey in this process.

Economic corridors matter to all, including Russia, but Armenia would probably stand to gain more in the short term.

--o--

GAS PRICES IN EUROPE, UPDATE

In the seemingly endless debate around the completion and now the legal certification of Nord Stream 2, a short mid-November news item seems to have gone largely unnoticed. As the German authorities announced there would be delay in legal certification, gas prices in Europe jumped by 10% in one day. That should speed up the process of using a pipeline that is now fully completed. Yet Ukraine and the UK, obviously not having to foot the bill, are still fighting against Nord Stream 2, as a matter of principle. Fact that they are also driving up the price for one of Russia’s main commodity exports also seems not to matter.

--o--