Isse 56

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

PRISONERS OR HOSTAGES?

The release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from unwarranted detention is cause for unmitigated celebration. After the initial euphoria, some questions nevertheless arise as to what really happened and what lessons can be drawn. There has been no shortage of well-informed commentary. There are however a few unanswered questions as well a few observations that deserve mention in that they may be relevant for guiding future action, especially with respect to Chinese motivations.

Even though Washington officially refuses to see the linkage (or, even worse, admit in the slightest way that the Biden administration is getting soft on China), the release of the two Canadians was the direct result of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) negotiated between the US Department of Justice and Meng Wanzhou’s lawyers. Avoidance of collateral damage is deemed an acceptable reason for concluding a DPA. In the case of Meng Wanzhou’s DPA, no collateral damage is specifically mentioned. There is however a reference to the fact that the extradition hearings in Canada might last for months if not years.  It would be a generous interpretation to construe this as an indirect reference to the lengthy detention of the two Canadians.

Although there may have been a difference of opinion on timelines, the Chinese side came around to the idea that an admission of guilt in the context of a DPA was the quickest and perhaps the only way to secure the release of their VIP. The Biden administration continues to hold the line that the US Department of Justice is an independent agency that makes its own decisions without political interference, thus implying that diplomacy did not play a role, and contradicting the assertions of some former Canadian diplomats to the effect that diplomacy solved the problem. Stricto sensu the US statements are right: the Department of Justice made its own decision about the appropriateness of a DPA. A DPA would satisfy their main requirement, an admission of guilt. That along with time in detention, even in a gilded cage, would form the basis of a reasonable legal decision. The Department of Justice’s concern for collateral damage may however have also evolved over the last year. A Department of Justice headed by Merrick Garland, a distinguished jurist, rather than William Barr, a Trump stooge, would certainly be more enlightened in the interpretation of the concept. The problem is that by releasing the two Canadians immediately after the DPA was signed off in New York the Chinese authorities made clear that in their view there unmistakably was a direct linkage. By beginning a few weeks earlier to discuss arrangements for letting the two Michaels go, they were not offering an early release as much as one that would be simultaneous with the departure of Meng Wanzhou.  The later suggestion that the two Michaels were freed for health reasons would only be a convenient excuse. One had to be found. There was no need for it be credible.

Incidentally, the discrepancy between what the Chinese do and what they say is not a sign of stupidity or of a misunderstanding of public opinion. Like Donald Trump, but for much longer, the Chinese authorities have known the value of a good lie.  Their inspiration would however be found in the Marxist-Leninist aphorism that “it is right to lie to your class enemy”. This also does not mean that you cannot engage in propaganda activities to advance your own narrative.

The Chinese authorities would not have failed to observe that over time the US Department of Justice has prosecuted foreign nationals and even sought extra-territorial application of US laws, despite the vehement protests of some of the governments whose nationals were affected by this. This has been the case with Russia on a few occasions. The difference is that the Chinese would not be satisfied with protests. In the case of Meng Wanzhou, but not for the first time, they showed they would respond in a ruthless manner to secure the release of their national, even if it means the arbitrary, unfounded, cruel, and fundamentally unethical detention of foreign nationals.

The release of the two Michaels barely hours after Meng Wanzhou was freed was meant to confirm that there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that should another Chinese national be arrested the way she was, the response would be the same.

Any foreign national living on Chinese territory (including Hong Kong and Macau) should however be aware of the fact that he is a potential prisoner if the government of his country of origin is likely to engage in what the Chinese see as aggressive prosecution or even possibly other forms of perceived aggression. No large exodus of foreigners has yet been observed, since the odds are not that great that you will be the one eventually targeted. There will nevertheless be a greater incentive for foreigners from certain countries to follow as religiously as possible all local rules so that their name does not make its way to the short list of candidates for arrest.

The Meng Wanzhou case ultimately confirms what we already know or should have known: in dealing with China, any aggressive action, no matter whether perceived or real, will be met with a direct and possibly brutal response. Reducing your vulnerability to a country with which you are eager to do business is the first challenge. The more long-term challenge is to make China conform to our version of what is acceptable behaviour. There may not a full answer to that yet, but, clearly, weakness is not an option.

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BUYING A BETTER SUBMARINE AND A BETTER SHIELD

The security agreement between Australia, the UK and the US that foresees among other things the construction in Australia of eight nuclear-powered submarines using the latest US and UK technologies was rightfully called a stab in the back by the French Foreign Minister. The new deal led to the immediate cancellation of the 2016 France-Australia agreement for the eventual construction of twelve conventional-powered submarines.

From what we have seen so far, it would seem it is the Australian side (probably spearheaded by their military establishment) that took the initiative of the new agreement.  The US and the UK would have had economic reasons to entertain the proposal. The impact on France would have been readily dismissed.  The US and the UK would have known that this would increase the French incentive to create a distinctly European military capability in order to move away from “brain-dead” NATO.  In that sense, Biden and Johnson may have done more to undermine NATO than Trump and Putin together, but the stakes were high, and the risk could be managed. Besides, Emmanuel Macron is not Charles de Gaulle and will not walk away from NATO.

From a geo-political point of view, AUKUS is clearly intended to allow Australia to position itself militarily against China. The nuclear-powered submarines can apparently do this better along with the new technologies that have been offered as a bonus by the US. As noted above, in dealing with China, weakness is not an option. The new equipment procured by Australia will essentially serve to effect surveillance and to dissuade. The real match for the Chinese military will, of course, remain with the US for the foreseeable future, but some burden-sharing is always welcome.

The problem with the AUKUS deal is that it has created a rift between the three countries in question on one side and one of the two remaining EU powers on the other side (while Germany is still looking for a new leader) at a time when a unified collective approach in dealing with China might be more useful.  Dividing that front is not helpful.

Military capacity is relevant to dissuade China from pursuing its military ambitions in connection with Taiwan. It can maybe serve to prevent China from building more artificial islands in the South China Sea where it has territorial ambitions. Military capacity addresses the more classical Chinese threats, but it does not deal with Chinese behaviour that does not conform to our understanding of international rules. We are talking here about the broad range of issues that the English-speaking world and Europe currently have with China, from the Hong Kong democracy challenges, the plight of the Uighurs, up to unfair trade practices, among others.

The fundamental question is whether to use the stick or the carrot, to punish or to engage. There are calls from some quarters for strong punitive sanctions against the Chinese regime. From what we have seen in the case of Russia, economic sanctions have limited impact and can even in some cases be turned to long-term advantage by fostering the development of some areas of the targeted economy. It could hardly be different in China. Political sanctions make the proponent feel good and indispose the target of the sanctions, but also have limited impact. Given the level of interdependence that now exists between China and the Western world across the whole range of economic activity, sanctions would likely end up punishing the proponent more than the target.

As far as engagement is concerned, it would seem that we have for some time reached the point where further engagement is not going to elicit any significant change in Chinese behaviour. The opening to the world that was necessary for China to modernize has happened. There is nothing more that can be offered that would change Chinese behaviour in a significant way.

Dealing with China is not a problem that will be resolved by short-term solutions. A long-term approach needs to be developed. A robust and sustained political dialogue is probably one of the pre-requisites, along with a policy approach that excludes the idea that China can be expected to do the right thing by our standards and, as noted above, reduces our vulnerability to Chinese actions. In that context, entering into a major information technology project with a Chinese entity such as Huawei would have to come with iron-clad assurances and the means to enforce compliance.

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AFGHANISTAN MOSAIC

In addressing the US/NATO debacle in Afghanistan, observers have ascribed a certain influence to countries other than Pakistan, namely Iran and China. Iran, despite its previous confrontation with the Taliban, would somehow have welcomed and supported the Taliban’s return to power if only to undermine the US position. Iran would also have to take into consideration its ethnic links to the Tajik population of Afghanistan and of neighbouring Tajikistan. Tajiks are considered as Persian and speak a relatively archaic version of the Persian spoken today in Iran. China would have provided weaponry to the Taliban in support of Pakistan, its traditional ally in their permanent confrontation with India. China which is accused of perpetrating a genocide of its Muslim population, the Uighurs of Xinjiang, would have wanted to extend its influence in a neighbouring country and side with the Taliban in order to control them and to prevent any risk of terrorist contamination. 

The open confirmation of the ongoing consultation process between Russia, Iran, China, and Pakistan took the form of a meeting of the four relevant foreign ministers on September 17th in Dushanbe on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Organisation for Collective Security meetings. Although they would have been available the representatives of Central Asian countries and of India were not in the room, thus confirming that the meeting was restricted to the players with real influence. The Dushanbe meeting of the four foreign ministers focused on the concern for stability in Afghanistan. This would also include keeping the Taliban within Afghanistan, finding a way to have the Taliban engage with the international community at the same time as the new Taliban regime somehow addresses widespread concerns about human rights especially women’s rights. It would also include how the regime deals with, among others, the Tajik minority especially in the Panjshir Valley which the Taliban now claims to control completely.

With international humanitarian aid (Including from Canada) already flowing into Afghanistan through the UN and the Red Cross, the challenge is to arrive at an arrangement that would allow international financial institutions to resume their work and, more immediately, for the Taliban government to gain access to the country’s frozen financial reserves. That of course would mean bringing the international community, especially the US, to acknowledge in some way the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

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RUSSIAN ELECTIONS 2021: NEW PEOPLE?

In Russia’s managed democracy system, a highly predictable electoral outcome does not mean that the process is not taken seriously by a large proportion of the population. Parliamentary legislations such as the ones that concluded on September 19th are an occasion for people to express their views. They also offer legitimacy to the governing élites. The fact that non-systemic opposition elements were excluded from participation does not seem to receive the same attention inside Russia as it does outside, even with very active social networks disseminating every possible information.

As noted above, the results were as expected. At the national level, United Russia settled for less than 50% of the popular vote but did very well at the local level in single-mandate races and captured 324 of the 450 seats, thus keeping its capacity to modify the Constitution, if necessary. The Communist Party improved it performance. A new party, New People, crossed the threshold and will enter the Duma with 13 seats. Zhirinovksy Liberal Democratic Party (21 seats) lost ground and Mironov’s Just Russia Party (27 seats) essentially stagnated.

This illustrates that the Communist Party has been and continues to be the only party that could pretend to offer the beginning of an alternative to United Russia. Preventing a return of the Communists to power was one of the reasons for Yeltsin’s popularity at home and abroad. Initially, it was also a preoccupation of Vladimir Putin. Many of his social policy actions are in fact intended to cater to an electorate that could be attracted back to communist-style ideas. The problem nowadays is not only that no one wants the return to power of the Communists, but that the Communists themselves do not seem to want it either. Managing the results of their relative success even seems to be a challenge.

The electoral process itself was marred by a collapse of the electronic voting system in Moscow. This does not seem to have had an impact on the result, but certainly created a negative impression. Overall, the administration of the electoral law at the national level, under Ella Pamfilova’s vigorous leadership, seems to continue moving in the right direction. A more serious problem seems to be the use of dirty tricks at the local level in certain regions.  There may not be short-term response to that other than exposing the behaviour of some local stakeholders.

Looking at the long-term, the arrival of a new party led by a successful businessman offers a glimmer of hope that there will be more changes in the future. Interest groups other than the security services or the Communists may envisage the idea of having their own party. A real democratic transition is, however, not yet in sight.

--o--

 

UKRAINE UPDATE

Following, from the Ukrainian point of view, a string of rather unproductive meetings over the last few months, President Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington did not produce any new major achievement, but it at least confirmed the US government’s continuing political, economic, and military support for Ukraine. As before, President Biden while expressing support for Ukraine’s NATO membership seemed to have stopped short of an unqualified commitment. Zelenskyy’s proposal for President Biden to become personally involved in the Donbass peace negotiations still has to be picked up.

Since his visit to Washington, Zelenskyy seems to have focused less on the conflict in Russia, but more on the issues where he can contribute to the modernisation of the country and to political reforms. There may of course be a lot left to be done in terms of eradicating corruption but cleaning up government procurement practices seems to have significantly improved the use of government resources in areas such as infrastructure Zelenskky’s “big construction” program may be one more significant long-term achievements along with the improved business climate that seems to afford local enterprises a more user-friendly environment.   

A major news item was the Ukraine’s special forces spectacular rescue of some of the individuals who were trying to flee Kabul after the return of the Taliban. This included a former local employee of Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper. The effectiveness and courage of the Ukrainian soldiers indeed deserved high praise and were a moral booster for the country. The fact is that they seemed to have done better in difficult circumstances than larger and more richly endowed similar services.

Far less good news was the assassination attempt against Serhiy Shefir a top aide to Zelenskyy and one of his long-time associates. The attempt would seem to emanate from those who oppose the de-oligarchizing of Ukraine. Whoever sponsored the attach should however have known that this would only reinforce the determination of Zelenskky and his team to pursue reforms.

The conclusion of a major gas supply contract between Hungary and Russia’s Gazprom also fell in the category of bad news, in that the 15-year deal excludes transit through Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister called it a major attack to which there would be an appropriate response. The gas is not expected to flow to Hungary through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline the Ukrainians so despise but through TurkStream that currently delivers Russian gas to Turkey and Bulgaria.  The Ukrainian side has already expressed its deep displeasure to the Hungarians. It would be surprising for that to change the Hungarian decision. In the turmoil that currently affects the gas markets in Europe, the Hungarian decision to secure long-term supplies and to do so via a brand-new pipeline looks like a sound economic idea and one in line with long-term Hungarian interests. Ukraine’s suggestion that the Hungary-Russia contract be reviewed by the EU has already been termed by Hungary as an attack on its sovereignty.

Ukraine's geo-political arguments about Russian agressive intentions and in favour of the continuation of transit through its territory no more convince Hungary than they did Germany. Ukrainian indignation does not change the fundamentals of the relationship between Russia and its clients in the gas business. 

On a separate but related issue, there are also noises in Kyiv about Hungary opposing Ukraine's accession to NATO because it does not like the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Western Ukraine, bringing the very sensitive issue of the general treatment of minorities in Ukraine into the mix. 

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.

Issue 55

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

DÉJA VU IN AFGHANISTAN

Thirty-two years ago, the Soviet Army left Afghanistan in a clear admission that a war which lasted for 10 years and claimed one million Afghan and 15,000 Soviet lives could not be won. Many historians claim that the Afghan debacle accelerated the collapse of the USSR (the country ceased to exist two years after its military left Afghanistan). The brutal war gave rise to the Islamic awakening in the country where Islam historically lacked a fundamentalist edge. Ironically it was the US that backed militarily and financially all forms of radical Muslim and Jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thousands of Arab fighters, including Bin Laden, flooded Afghanistan to fight "the godless communists". "God is on your side" were the famous words of apprentice-sorcerer Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor on his visit to the Khyber refugee camp at the Afghan-Pakistan border in February 1980. This gave rise to the Taliban, one of the most radical and effective terrorist entities in the world.

God, in his mysterious ways, was truly on the side of the anti-Soviet coalition. It eventually not only defeated the Soviets but turned the mountainous, relatively poor country into one big narco-state and terrorist enclave from where Al-Qaeda went on to attack the US. Today the Taliban is back. However, the situation is slightly ironic. The Americans are leaving after 20 years in the country, the longest war in American history. The Russians are gloating because deep down nothing pleases the Russians more than an American failure.

Taliban delegation at Moscow Press Conference, July 8th
©RFE/RL

On July 23^rd Russia’s top diplomat commended the Taliban for being “of sound mind” and criticized the Afghan government for stalling power-sharing talks. Foreign Minister Lavrov became the latest Russian political figure to praise the militant group, with the Kremlin calling it a “powerful force” and Russia's envoy for Afghanistan calling its rapid takeover of border areas “positive” for regional security.

Lavrov also said the Taliban delegation promised during its recent Moscow visit not to threaten neighboring ex-Soviet Central Asian states and to fight the Islamic State. He added it has also expressed readiness to discuss Afghanistan’s political structure with other stakeholders “despite accusations that they want to create an Islamic emirate based on Sharia law.”

“The statement I am talking about sends a very important signal that the Taliban are sane people,” Lavrov further commented.

However, on July 24^th the “sane people” beheaded their first translator, an Afghan man who worked for the US Army. Everybody who knows Taliban and their country, anyone who followed radical Islam's blood fest around the world of the last several decades (including Europe, Asia and Africa) knows: the genocidal atrocities are just around the corner.

The Russians are not naive. Surely, they are happy that Americans have failed. However, the Kremlin still keeps the Taliban on the list of terrorist groups and the Russians know what a serious threat Islamists pose to the security of Central Asian client states. That is why Russia also promised to activate its troops and offer any conceivable help to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in case Taliban resurgence will spill over the borders into the Russian zone of influence. 

Afghanistan President Ghani, Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev

The situation may still be different this time around. Pakistan remains the strongest foreign supporter of the Taliban, but its relations with the various states of the region have evolved. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, secular states where Muslims are a majority, can exert a much greater influence in the region. The recent simultaneous visit to Toshkent of Pakistan PM Imran Khan and Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani gave rise to the expected initial clash. More relevant though was the fact that when they eventually sat down for a bilateral meeting Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed, Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was in attendance.  ISI has long been regarded as the most effective supporter of the Taliban.

PM of Pakistan Imran Khan, President Mirziyoyev

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IRAQ, AS WELL, SYRIA NEXT?

Following closely on the decision to leave Afghanistan, the recent announcement that the US troops in Iraq will withdraw from active combat by the end of 2021 may cause some US foreign policy observers to wonder who won the 2020 presidential election, the “America first” guy or the “America is back” one.  The rationale advanced by supporters of the US move is that the current government in Baghdad will be reinforced by the disengagement of US troops whose presence in Iraq has been criticized by Iran-backed opposition groups. How the US acquiescing to an Iranian demand cannot be acknowledged as a clear victory for Iran is somehow puzzling. Yet, this is not to say that Iran will take over Iraq soon. The lingering memory of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the inter-ethnic and inter-religious complexities of the situation as well as the continuing presence of various terrorist entities will most likely keep Iran and Iraq apart and keep many fires burning.

The next question though is whether the US will also want to reduce its military presence next door in Syria as well. It would be a logical next step, but the remaining terrorist threat may preclude this. The support for a moderate opposition to the Assad regime may no longer be a significant factor. The necessary support of Kurdish allies, the opposition to Russian presence, the need to counter Iranian/Hezbollah influence as well as the need to agree common objectives with NATO ally Turkey would seem to create pre-conditions that will preclude an early move for now.

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CULMINATION OF DRAMA

The completion of the great Cheops pyramid in ancient Egypt was dubbed by archeologists as the first political-industrial drama in known history. The completion of Nord Stream 2 falls in the same category. The recent agreement reached between President Biden and Chancellor Merkel took away the last obstacles in the final stage of the ten year-long construction. Germany's assertion that Nord Stream 2 is just a commercial project has finally prevailed over both Trump and Biden's allegations that it is mainly a political undertaking by Moscow to make Europe totally dependent on the Russian energy supply. It is also most often overlooked that prior to Nord Stream 1 and 2 the system carrying Russian gas to Western Europe was built during Soviet times. It needed major upkeep. The choice was between repairing the Soviet-built system on land on foreign territory or turning to state-of-the art German technology to be deployed in international waters, an altogether easy call. 

Trump’s objection to Nord Stream 2 owed a great deal to the idea that the US could replace Russia as a supplier of natural gas, even if at a greater cost. Biden as the advocate of green energies could not entertain the same interest.  In many ways the decision to let Nord Stream 2 happen apart from being a personal victory for Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin was a logical consequence of the Biden-Putin meeting on July 16th. From now on Europe will satisfy 75% of its natural gas consumption from Russian supply

Pipeline Inspection Gauge used to detect even the smallest changes in the lines
©Nord Strem 2

What about the Ukrainian transit line that up to now was the main artery for the Russian gas deliveries to Europe? The answer to this question is at the centre of the political intrigue that came about as the result of the Washington meeting between Biden and Merkel. Formally the German Chancellor has accepted Biden's insistence on the continuing guarantees obliging Moscow to continue its Ukrainian transit at least at the current level-55 million cubic meters annually. In reality, and Ukraine understands it clearly, Moscow will bring some additional conditions for prolonging the use of the Ukrainian transit line in the future. As noted above, it is well known that the technological state of the Ukrainian gas transit system run by the Naftogas state company is rather outdated. There is an urgent need for massive investment to upgrade the system. Up to now there are no investment proposals from Europe. Moscow having no vital economic interest to protect anymore in the use of the old pipeline, it is up to Kyiv to come up with an attractive proposal.

--o--

UKRAINE, WHERE ARE YOUR FRIENDS?

To President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian political class, the confirmation that Nord Steam 2 will be completed is bad news, well beyond the availability of a new alternate option for the transportation of Russian natural gas to Western Europe. As with recent moves by Western European leaders to re-engage with Russia, there are accusations of betrayal of Ukrainian interests. The fact that the betrayal was consummated through a US-German arrangement makes it even more politically significant and painful. The attenuating measures that were included in the US-German deal, such as eventual new sanctions against Russia should it not behave, cover the gas transit issue and sound as wishful thinking. They are another consolation prize and convey a relatively weak message.

Chancellor Merkel, President Biden, Washington, July 15th

To Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian political class, Ukraine is at war with Russia. Zelenskky has repeatedly made the point lately. To a large extent, opposition to Nord Stream 2 has been the economic embodiment of that state of war.  By putting an end to its long-lasting opposition to Nord Stream 2, the US not only acknowledges it has lost that particular battle, but it also sends a message as to how far it will go in supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. It does not help of course, as we have noted before, that Ukraine still has an active trade relationship with Russia and that Ukraine ‘s desire to transport Russian natural gas is inconsistent with its professed desire to lessen its dependence on Russia. 

The Nord Stream developments happen a few weeks after it has been made abundantly clear that NATO is not yet ready to receive Ukraine. If the state of war does not justify blocking Nord Stream 2 or opening the door to NATO, there may be something to be said about joining others in seeking something from the EU, in the very words of Zelenskyy: “If the EU does not show iron support for the European aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, someone will show iron muscles near our borders”.

If Ukraine is not ready to join NATO on account of the work that needs to be done to weed out corruption, it is difficult to imagine what appetite the EU would have for greater economic integration with two of the poorest countries in Europe, Moldova and Ukraine being at the bottom of the list in terms of GDP per capita. In some ways, by opening its door to Ukrainian workers, the EU already makes a significant contribution to the Ukrainian economy by keeping the flow of remittances going back to Ukraine.

With the doors to NATO and the EU clubs remaining closed, Ukraine seems to have come up with the idea of creating its own “new Europe” club with Poland and the Baltic states. Others have even seriously suggested Ukraine turning to Canada as an alternate unconditional supporter. What can be achieved through these processes would appear rather limited.

It would seem Ukraine has little more to expect from the US. Zelenskyy’s trip to Washington, originally scheduled for mid-July has now been confirmed for late August, at a time when the US Congress is in recess. Preventing Zelenskyy from too much interaction with a Congress that has more sympathy for Ukraine than the President may be cynical, but it is not an unusual part of managing expectations within a bilateral relationship.  

To spin a more positive story over recent events, Zelenskyy has fallen back on putting the responsibility for everything first on Russia and accessorily on Ukraine’s European and American supporters, as if nothing had happened.

In all of this, Russia is playing the long game. President Putin just published an article in Russian and Ukrainian about the historic unity of the Ukrainian and Russian people. The choice of topic is highly controversial and the likelihood of changing the views of anyone rather unlikely. Coming at a time when many Ukrainians feel they have been let down by their European and American supporters, it may nevertheless get more attention than would have otherwise been the case.

--o--

UNEASY TRIANGLE

On her way from Beijing veteran diplomat Wendy Sherman, US deputy state secretary, stopped in Geneva where she met with Russian deputy foreign minister Ryabkov. The official topic of discussion was to work out the main strategic lines of cooperation for the next 10 years. De facto the discussion started with stunning news brought by Sherman from China: Chinese leaders announced that they will increase by four times the number of ICBMs with a 14,000 km range. When the US representative noted that such a decision could significantly offset strategic nuclear balance in the region, the answer was firm: China will not be a part of a negotiated agreement with other powers on strategic armament issues.

This allowed some observers to conclude that one of the main aspects of the Geneva talks was to work out a Russian-US joint stand on China's military build up. It is also certain that the conference in Geneva will start a long preparatory work to create a chain of limited agreements covering the broad aspects of the balance between NATO and Russia in the military sphere. A group of Republican senators already issued a statement accusing President Biden of being too conciliatory with Russia without paying attention to China. 

--o--

A NEW LOOK AT THE OLD SECRET: ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARSENAL

A recently discovered e-mail dating back to 2016 from former Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted that Israel possessed 200 nuclear warheads. It is now being corrected by several experts. The more precise number stands at 80. This arsenal is small (compared to that of France, the UK and China) but it is a potent threat and an ultimate insurance policy for a small state with several bitter enemies who possess and are developing a wide range of weapons.

Israeli so-called 'nuclear ambiguity' has an interesting history as it was not solely an Israeli invention. Initially France supplied Israel a large, heavy water nuclear reactor (in the late 1950's) and an underground plutonium reprocessing plant, which would turn spent reactor fuel into the key ingredient for nuclear weapons. The reactor was built at Dimona in the Negev desert.

By the late 1960s the United States assessed Israeli nukes as “probable,” and U.S. efforts to slow the nuclear program and get Israel to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty failed. In 1969 President Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir reportedly reached a secret agreement that the US would cease its demand for inspections and Israeli compliance with antiproliferation efforts, and in return Israel would not declare or test its nuclear weapons. That deal was possibly violated by Israel in 1979 in what is known as the "Vela Incident", a mysterious nuclear explosion off the coast of South Africa. It is almost certain that Israel was behind it.

It is assumed that Israel had a crude nuclear device (or several) during the 1973 war against Syria and Egypt and was close to using it against Egyptian forces, but the tide of war turned, and Israel managed to regain the advantage by conventional means.

When the mass immigration of Soviet Jews into Israel began in the late 1980's with them came hundreds of nuclear scientists and engineers who had an expertise of working for the major nuclear superpower. At this point Israel managed to make serious breakthroughs in the miniaturization of warheads and assembly of a potent arsenal of ICBMs. Currently the Israeli ICBM Jericho-3, according to the American intelligence, has a range of 7,500 km with a 500 kg warhead. Israel has about 2 dozen such missiles. It has not been proven, but not out of the question, that Israel has an ability to deliver nuclear weapons by means of submarine-based nuclear tipped cruise missiles and maintains a squadron of F-15's and F-16's specially designed to carry tactical nuclear weapons. This old-fashioned way of delivery has one advantage: the plane, unlike an ICBM, can be recalled.

A lot about the Israeli nuclear arsenal is shrouded in secrecy, especially the number of warheads and the range of its ICBMs but there is very little doubt that Israel is in possession of a small but robust nuclear arsenal with a long reach.

--o--

RUSSIAN POLITICS, RANDOM OBSERVATIONS

Foreign observers have been puzzled by the Russian population’s reluctance to get vaccinated. Only a quarter of the population has shown interest so far. Soviet and Russian traditions would have seemed to suggest that the population would welcome vaccination. It turns out that many people simply do not trust what they perceive as hastily created vaccines. This is a serious problem for the health authorities. An even greater long-term problem for political authorities is that people get their information and give their trust to information that is carried by social network not by the state-controlled media. This tendency could change other things down the road.

Foreign Russia-based media have in recent months reported on the crackdown against non-systemic political opposition in the lead-up to the September parliamentary elections. Some have observed that the crackdown seems to target the individuals and groups associated with foreign entities. In Russia itself, this not so unpopular. Other seasoned observers of Russian political life, such as the experts at the Carnegie Foundation in Moscow, have focused on the fact that the Putin-backed United Russia party is presenting a slate of establishment candidates and older individuals (Defense Minister Shoigu, Foreign Minister Lavrov). This is to suggest that candidates that may have been associated with the post-Putin transition were excluded. Putin not wanting ever to look like a lame duck made him chose old-timers rather than candidates with a future. This is not necessarily the best vote-getting strategy.

The managed democracy system that Putin installed on the basis established by Yeltsin suffered its only real setback in December 2011 when the Putin-backed party failed to obtain more than 50% of the popular vote, immediately after Putin announced he would run for the presidency himself rather than then President Medvedev. The pandemic conditions as well as the decision by Putin to keep the door open for him to be President until 2036 can create enough dissatisfaction to cause electors to think twice before casting their ballot. Putin might easily get elected as President any time. Parliamentary elections are a different game. There have also been incremental improvements in the conduct and observation of elections since 2011. We are not predicting a defeat for United Russia, but simply saying that an overwhelming victory is not a foregone conclusion, especially if social networks continue to increase their influence and perhaps even more important if the liberal elements of the opposition can finally agree to work together and with other opposition parties.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: THOMAS BACH

International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach has taken his organisation through another one of the demanding periods of its history. He can take some credit for the very fact that the summer games are currently taking place in Tokyo despite the prevailing pandemic conditions. His long opening session message of peace and solidarity was uplifting and more explicitly political than could normally have been expected from a sports bureaucrat.

There has been considerable criticism over the years of the IOC, its presidents, its modus operandi, the rising costs of hosting the games, as well as the various scandals that have affected its members (including their insistence on super VIP treatment). For its oligarchic structure, the IOC was compared over time to the Roman Curia and the Communist Party Politburo. Thomas Bach himself was not spared criticism during his tenure that began in 2013.

What distinguishes Thomas Back from his predecessor though is that he himself was an athlete and an Olympic participant: as a young fencer he won Olympic gold in Montréal in 1976. The interest of the athletes has been his primary preoccupation.

Defending the athletes and the possibility for all to participate is precisely what triggered the largest amount of criticism against Bach. For many, the resolution of the Russian doping scandal was a cop-out, the punishment too moderate. Russian athletes can no longer participate under the Russian flag, but they can still compete under the cover of the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC). Russian media coverage of the ROC team happily glosses over the distinction. As the IOC was dealing with the prospect of fewer countries wanting to host the Olympic games, Bach was also accused of disregarding China’s human rights record. The 2022 Winter Olympics will he held in Beijing. After that France, Italy and the US will take their turn in hosting the Olympic event.

Despite all the criticism, the Olympic games remain one of the most widely covered international event and one that carries an underlying message of worldwide peaceful coexistence and competition. Thomas Bach is playing a key role in keeping the Olympic flame burning.

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BRIEFLY NOTED

TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan says it has put its entire armed forces on high alert for a combat-readiness check and relocated thousands of troops to the border with Afghanistan amid increasing security concerns in Central Asia over the Taliban's territorial gains in the northern part of the war-torn country. Tajikistan has mobilized 100,000 active servicemen, 130,000 reserve officers and soldiers, as well as law enforcement agencies for an exercise on July 22nd on the orders of President Emomali Rahmon, in the biggest such exercise in the 30-year history of independent Tajikistan.

Amid concerns that the Afghan government may collapse in the face of the rapid withdrawal of foreign forces and the Taliban's battlefield successes, Russia has announced joint military maneuvers with Uzbekistan from July 30 to August 10. Moscow, which operates a military base in Tajikistan, also plans to hold joint drills there with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in August.

BELARUS

A Russian court has ruled world champion kickboxer Alyaksey Kudzin can be extradited to his homeland, Belarus, despite concerns the athlete may be politically persecuted and tortured. The decision by a Moscow appeals court on July 21 came despite an earlier European Court of Human Rights opinion that banned his extradition. Kudzin, a mixed-martial-arts fighter, is wanted in Belarus on charges of assaulting a security officer during pro-democracy protests against strongman Alexander Lukashenko after a disputed election in August 2020. If convicted, he faces up to five years in prison.

The athlete, who has made sharp statements about Belarusian security forces and the government on social media, may face "torture, repression, and even death" if extradited to Belarus, the Belarusian Sports Solidarity Fund has said.

MOLDOVA

Pro-Western President Maia Sandu's party has scored a clear victory in Moldovan snap parliamentary elections, a result likely to weaken Russia's influence in the country. With nearly all ballots counted from the July 11th elections, Sandu's center-right Action and Solidarity (PAS) had just under 53 percent of the vote, while its main rival, former President Igor Dodon's Moscow-friendly Socialists and Communists (BECS) bloc, had a little more than 27 percent. The election commission chief said no serious violations were reported during the July 11 vote. But Dodon told reporters that he would "decide whether to protest the election results" after investigating possible violations.

ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijani and Armenian forces exchanged fire for several hours on July 19th along a section of their border as tensions continue to simmer between the two countries after last year's war over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh. Around 6,000 lives were lost in the war that was decisively won by Azerbaijan which managed to return large parts of its territories lost to Armenia in the early 1990's

The defense ministries of both countries accused the other side of provoking the July 19th flare-up along Armenia’s Yeraskh section of the border with Azerbaijan's Nakxchivan exclave, which is sandwiched between Armenia and Iran. Both Yerevan and Baku said that the situation at the border was calm on the morning of July 20th.

There were no initial reports of casualties on either side. The skirmish came five days after another shoot-out along the same section of the border left one Armenian soldier dead and at least one Azerbaijani soldier wounded.

GEORGIA

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili's mid-July actions surrounding a cancelled LGBT pride march and mob attacks on journalists covering it sparked a week of public protests and calls for his resignation.

The violence further shrouded Tbilisi as mourners honored 36-year-old Lekso Lashkarava, who was severely beaten and died days after suffering head injuries by anti-LGBT activists and supporting mobs. The event was cancelled due to threats of violence by right-wing groups. The mayhem is another disturbing chapter in a long-running dispute between Georgian activists seeking public acknowledgement of the plight of sexual and other minorities in the face of stubborn resistance from religious and other ultraconservative elements.

UKRAINE

The sudden resignation of Ukrainian political heavyweight Arsen Avakov from the post of Interior minister could open the door for President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to concentrate more power in his hands as he seeks to take on entrenched interests and advance a reform agenda. Avakov quietly resigned on July 13th without offering a reason for his sudden departure. This could only mean that Zelenskiy reached a back-door agreement with the influential minister to step down after seven years in office. The 57-year-old Avakov is considered by many to be one of the most powerful people in the country after Zelenskiy and his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak. He oversaw about 300,000 law enforcement officials and a significant share of Ukraine's annual budget expenditures.

This development means that Zelensky in earnest began to consolidate power and is ready to promote his own people.  This follows Zelensky's removal of the head of the constitutional court and crackdown on several business tycoons.

RUSSIA

A court-ordered psychiatric examination concluded that Ilnaz Galyaviyev, a teenager who attacked a school in Russia's Republic of Tatarstan in May, killing nine people, is mentally ill. The evaluation was conducted by Moscow-based Serbsky medical center and had stated that 19-year-old Ilnaz Galyaviyev "was insane at the moment of the mass killings." The more detailed evaluation would be released and presented to the court on a later date.

Galyaviyev was arrested after he set off an explosion and opened fire at a school in Tatarstan’s capital, Kazan, 700 kilometers east of Moscow, on May 11, killing four boys, three girls -- all eighth graders -- and two teachers. Twenty-three people, mainly children, were injured in the attack, which shocked the republic and the entire country.

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.

 

issue 54

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

BIDEN-PUTIN SUMMIT. THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP

Most assessments of the Biden-Trump June 16th Geneva meeting tend to cast it as having been generally positive, but having produced only minor results. The fact that there had not been such a summit for a relatively long while, especially taking into account that Trump-Putin meetings were heavily discounted, somehow inflated expectations. Apart from Trump, Biden is not so different from most of his predecessors, but Vladimir Putin is neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin. Putin came to this meeting not to achieve a compromise but to advance Russia’s interests in roughly the same manner as US Presidents have traditionally tried to advance US interests. This was not a negotiation to improve the relationship, as may have been the case at the end of the Soviet Union and in the following years.

©President of Russia Website

The point that Biden made during one of the presidential campaign debates about foreign affairs being all about relationships re-surfaced in his comments after the meeting and was also picked up in some way by Putin. In simple terms the leaders established a working relationship that can serve to prevent further conflicts down the road.. There was agreement for ambassadors to return to their respective embassies. There was also agreement to initiate consultations about the status of diplomatic and consular representations

It was also agreed to resume strategic stability consultations. That specific outcome does not get the media coverage that it deserves or is reduced to the dimension of consultations over nuclear weapons. In the professional diplomatic language, these consultations have a rather broad meaning and may be meant to cover virtually every arms control issue and most regional issues. The Biden-Putin conversation was in itself already very broad covering many regional issues, trade relations and even the Arctic.  

To avoid a repetition of the Trump-Putin fiasco in Helsinki in 2018, Biden and Putin held separate press conferences. Since Biden had suggested he would be sending strong messages to Putin about human rights especially the Navalny case and about cybersecurity he needed to stand alone and state how forceful he had been in his conversation with his Russian counterpart.

Nowhere is this more evident than on the issue of cybersecurity. The parties have essentially agreed to work together in addressing the new challenges in this area, very much in the same way as during the last days of the Obama administration. Yet, ever since 2016 when Donald Trump invited Russia to offer whatever dirt it had on Hillary Clinton and the Democrats, the matter of Russian interference in US elections has become politically hyper-sensitive. Donald Trump’s attempt to create a joint commission to look into cybersecurity was swiftly taken down by Congress and the foreign policy establishment. The prevailing view is that Russia must be punished and that its offers of cooperation are at best a smoke screen. In order to sweeten the bitter pill of cooperation with Russia Biden presented it as part of an injunction to Russia to stay away from 16 specific crucial areas of US infrastructure, thus making the US look like it is controlling Russian behaviour. This did not prevent Putin from singling out the agreement to cooperate in this area as extremely important. In due course, it could indeed have a major impact on the overall tone of the US-Russia relationship.

Ultimately, strategic stability consultations and cyber-security expert meetings are in the interest of both countries. They would however tend to reflect the Russian agenda and do not coincide with the prevailing US view that the US should be tough and give nothing to Russia. This put Biden on the defensive with his own media. This is why Biden kept insisting that personal dialogue and a working relationship were crucial and that the results of the June 16h decisions would become visible in some months. More symptomatic in the current world situation were the new American sanctions imposed on Russia soon after the summit was over. The sanctions are attached to the Navalny case and even to the companies at Nord Stream 2 despite the previous announcement that those sanctions were cancelled.

©President of Russia Website

All things considered, the most significant change coming out of the Summit is the confirmation of a return to the traditional pre-Trump diplomatic dialogue. This is more about process than results. There has been no reset of the relationship and the real work remains to be done. The fact that meaningful work can take place nevertheless explains why the Russian side called the meeting constructive.

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AFTER BIDEN-PUTIN: EUROPE AND UKRAINE 

In the logic of the conflict with Russia, Ukrainian officials have in the past voiced concern over Canadian diplomatic engagement with Russia. Speaking with the enemy as if nothing happened  is perceived as lessening of support for Ukraine and of some forgiveness towards Russia for having absorbed Crimea and fomented revolt in the Donbass. The US President is not held to the same restriction. The June 16th US-Russia Summit was unavoidable. The fact that it produced a statement on strategic stability might not be to Ukraine’s liking as it somehow conveys a sense of return to normal, a return to the situation prior to the current crisis. It looks as though the Summit did not give rise to a detailed discussion over Ukraine and that Biden did not spend a lot of time on it.

The German Chancellor or the French President are also exempt from the prohibition of speaking to Vladimir Putin. They are in any event expected to play a key role in the attempt to find a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

©EU Website

In the days after the Biden-Putin Summit Chancellor Merkel and  President Macron went further and suggested that the EU should follow with its own summit with Putin in order to somehow normalize regular contacts with Moscow. The proposal was met with categorical and sharp rebuke from Poland and the Baltic states. Merkel and Macron would certainly have known that they could not achieve in a few days the required unanimity in favour of such a decision. What may have looked like a setback served to expose the point that opposition to reinstating the formal EU-Russia dialogue is preventing the EU from keeping up with the US. The stage is set for further discussion in coming months especially if US-Russia discussions show some result.  

©EU Website

Merkel and Macron’s move was enough for them to be accused of “a great betrayal” and “a disgusting act of treachery” on the front page of the Ukrainian capital’s English-language daily, the Kyiv Times. The unusually strong language may look extreme, but reflects Ukrainian sensitivity on this matter. Merkel and Macron have been regular interlocutors of Vladimir Putin and were convenient targets. Merkel as the supporter of Nord Stream 2, the sea floor pipeline that will allow to bypass Ukraine pipelines for the delivery of gas to Europe, was even more suspect. The US or Biden have been spared such harsh criticism. Yet, it is the US that may have been the cause of greater anger and frustration in Kyiv. During Secretary of State Blinken’s May visit to Ukraine, it was made clear that the road to NATO membership would go through a major eradication of corruption. To many in Ukraine that would mean postponing NATO accession to the next generation, at least. Biden also contradicted Zelenskyy after the latter had claimed that NATO had confirmed Ukraine's NATO membership path. Biden's response was essentially: “it remains to be seen”. In addition, Washington, though it keeps expressing its opposition to Nord Stream 2, has essentially given up trying to prevent its completion. It is trying to engage Germany to find a way to compensate Ukraine for its financial losses from no longer being a lucrative gas transit corridor.

In this difficult context, President Biden finally invited President Zelenskyy to Washington, but not before his meeting with Putin, as Zelenskyy had hoped. The visit is to be scheduled in July and has the feel of a consolation prize.

The fundamental elements of the Ukraine-Russia conflict have not changed. The contours of the military and political support Ukraine can expect from its allies against Russia have, however, been clarified. At the same time, the Euro-Atlantic diplomatic isolation of Russia was challenged by a businesslike US-Russia Summit and by the above-noted diplomatic push from the two major EU countries. It also made clear that Ukraine joining NATO, a Moscow “red line” is not for the near future. It confirmed that it is unlikely that outside pressure will have a significant bearing on breaking the current deadlock in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

As virtually the only one with an interest in resolving the conflict, President Zelenskyy has been carrying the burden for creating the circumstances that could lead to change and, eventually, to  resolution of the conflict. It is now the case even more than before. It has become more evident that change will not come from the outside. Changes are also highly unlikely in Ukrainian public opinion or in the dispositions of the rebel regions (not to mention Crimea) towards Kyiv. The stalemate was illustrated by the recent statement of former President Kravchuk, the head of Kyiv’s delegation to the Minsk talks. Kravchuk said in a television interview that Donbass is Ukraine’s “cancerous tumor” that must be removed to allow “development of an independent state”.

The seven-year old conflict looks more and more like a Cyprus-type frozen conflict. It also seems more broadly accepted as such by France and Germany. Recent Russia-engineered changes in the oligarchic management of the rebel regions of Eastern Ukraine also suggest that Russia is sharing this view and is preparing for a long-term virtual protectorate role in these regions. As a result it is installing a management that will take a more sustainable approach to regional economic development.   

As for Zelenskky, he can only hope that the pageantry and prestige that will accompany his upcoming visit to Washington can boost his flagging popular support.

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ARMENIA

Acting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has cemented his position with a landslide election victory called to end a political crisis that erupted after ethnic Armenian forces lost a six-week war against Azerbaijan last year and ceded territory in and around the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Pashinian’s democratic credentials would seem to have allowed him to defeat a challenge from old-guard politicians that tend to be associated with the so-called Karabakh faction that used to dominate Armenian politics.  

From PM Pashinian's Facebook page

Preliminary results showed that Pashinian's Civil Contract party won 53.9 percent of the vote. The results, if correct, mean Pashinian's party will control an even greater percentage of seats than the 50 percent needed to rule, since the votes of the 22 election contenders that did not clear the threshold will be distributed among those that enter parliament.

Civil Contract is expected to have about 71 seats in the 107-member assembly, while the Armenia Alliance should have 29 and I Have The Honour, 7.

International observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said the vote was "competitive and generally well-managed."

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NORTH KOREA SLIDES INTO MASS HUNGER AMID INCREASED POLITICAL CRACKDOWNS

To have a real idea of what real systemic oppression, injustice, poverty, corruption and mismanagement really mean just look closely at the reality of today’s North Korea (or as it is officially called: Democratic People's Republic of Korea). This is an example of what an authoritarian regime can do to its people. For those who love George Orwell parallels, this is the closest country on the planet to the dystopian Oceania from the 1984 novel.

Six children were recently dragged into a North Korean court in shackles and had clearly been harshly interrogated since their arrest, a source from within the country told South Korea’s NK News. The public trial for the three boys and four teenage girls in Nampo was perfunctory, with the state prosecutor detailing the reasons why they were before the court, which he insisted were "serious crimes."  The children were sentenced to five years at one of North Korea's notorious re-education camps.The children were found guilty of watching South Korean films and television series over the past year and sharing them with classmates, reported NK News, which employs a network of contacts within the North to obtain news for one of the most respected dissident media outlets. 

Further crackdowns include banning certain types of haircuts and western style clothing like jeans. There are also reports of increased number of public executions and forced slave child labour masqueraded  as "youth volunteers from orphanages". The children as young as 12 are being dispatched to work in coal mines and agricultural sectors. The Pyongyang Times reported them to be 17 years of age and claimed they  "chose to give back one millionth of love given to them by the Party back". 

Aside from the ongoing and daily political terror, North Korea is once again sliding into starvation. This is by now a well-known problem, and the government is at least admitting it this time. When North Korea last experienced a similar economic meltdown—in the late 1990s—then leader Kim Jong-il refused to admit it, as around one million people starved to death around him. Current leader Kim Jong-un is admitting reality. This may mean, though nothing is certain in that socialist paradise, he seems to care about the state of the economy more than his reclusive, disinterested father.

Kim Jong-un, prior to recent weight loss

Officially the food shortages are blamed on the weather. The same excuse was used twenty-five years ago. Somehow weather variations do not provoke famine alerts in neighbouring South Korea. The real reasons are simple: staggering misgovernment and corruption. Sanctions imposed on North Korea mainly concern the communist elites and their luxury goods or industrial items, agriculture is not covered by sanctions. 

The West, especially South Korea, is willing to assist but the communist regime rejects any accountability for foreign aid because it controls everything that comes into the country. If Kim is a reformer, as some say, he then he will recognize that outside assistance is not simply a blank check. There needs to be some mechanism to ensure its proper use.

Another problem is the closure of the border with China due to the coronavirus. It is not unlikely that thousands of North Koreans will try to cross the border in desperation during the  famine.   

The only conceivable threat to the regime is people's revolt. So is the regime in danger? Will another food crisis in North Korea finally bring popular pushback? Probably not. North Koreans may actually believe in the Kim cult, or perhaps the sheer harshness of the state against dissent has deterred North Koreans these many years. There has never been a revolt in North Korea in its seventy-five-year history. Just like in Orwell's Oceania the people are no longer capable of revolting: they are too weak, too brainwashed and the oppressive apparatus is too sophisticated and brutal. 

The DPRK has at least 100 nuclear warheads and if there was a regime in the world that will have no qualms using you are looking at it. The only country that can control and influence the North is China. However China, as seen through its geopolitical stance of late, will most likely use the crisis to blackmail the West with the situation at the Peninsula.  This may not end well.

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ISRAEL'S NEW GOVERNMENT 

The fall of Benjamin Netanyahu proved once again the correctness of Mark Twain's assertion that "ruling politicians have to be changed as often as diapers and for the same reason". 

The broad coalition headed by Naftali Bennet, right wing leader of the Zionist Yamina party managed to get everyone on board, from an Islamist Arab party to the left wing Meretz with secular Russian Avigdor Liberman in the middle, united by one major goal: get rid of the longest serving Israeli PM. He was there for 12 years and in the last several years it was unclear if Bibi (as he is called in Israel) served the interests of the state of Israel or the other way around. He betrayed and conspired against every major political figure around him and managed to push away even his closest allies and supporters. In spite of Netanyahu's incredible political achievements (in some ways unprecedented in the Israeli history) his personality and unethical conduct brought him down.

Israel's economy boomed during his reign, Donald Trump was the most pro-Israeli president in history who moved American embassy to Jerusalem and accepted the 1982 Israeli annexation of the Golan heights. Netanyahu can be credited with influencing American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, a very potent military stance against Iran in Syria, personal amicable relations with Putin, Modi and other powerful leaders around the world and diplomatic relations with several key Arab states through the Abraham accords. It was under this PM Israel conducted an incredibly clean and technologically sophisticated operation against Hamas which fired 4.500 rockets against Israel (most of them intercepted) losing only one soldier and having several rooftops damaged. On the other hand in 11 days Hamas was dealt an extensive damage and civilian deaths were kept to minimum (for the large operation such as this). And finally there was this incredible success of the vaccination. And still the country rejected Netanyahu because most people knew that he had to go. 

The new Israeli government faces multitude of hurdles and tasks but none is more important, even ahead of Iranian problem or the relations with Biden, than how to deal with the Palestinian question. 

Israel also has to reform its broken political system, not the democratic spirit of it, but from the technical point of view something has to be done with the multitudes of the religious parties and never ending political deadlocks. Otherwise its business as usual for the only democracy, yes, problematic one, but still the only democracy in the Middle East.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: YAIR LAPID

Born in Tel Aviv in 1963, Yair Lapid followed in the footsteps of his father, Tommy, another famous journalist-turned-politician who escaped from Hungary to Israel after World War II.

In 2003, Tommy achieved an electoral breakthrough for the staunchly secular, liberal Shinui (Change) Party, when it became the third-largest party and joined then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's coalition. The partnership did not last and Shinui was dropped two years later.

Like his father, Yair began his career in the media, as a military correspondent for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), before becoming editor of a local Tel Aviv newspaper and later a columnist for the centre-right Maariv daily.

His journalistic skills and talent as an effective communicator drew him into television, and from the mid-1990s he established himself as a popular TV personality, and a talk show host. Yari Lapid became a household name in 2012 when he turned to politics with the new centrist party, Yesh Atid.

In May 2021 Lapid and his party pulled off what many had thought was impossible, cobbling together a coalition of bitter ideological rivals, ranging from right-wing religious nationalists to conservative Muslim Arab lawmakers.

That achievement was all the more remarkable given recent intercommunal clashes between Jewish and Arab citizens, sparked by the latest conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

The coalition deal he brokered will now see Lapid assume the premiership only after a two-year stint at the top by his main coalition ally, nationalist hardliner Naftali Bennett.

This coalition would have been impossible without Lapid's ability to compromise and bring such diverse partners together. He is currently Israel's foreign minister. 

If the government survives for 2 years (a tall order for any Israeli government especially in its current form), Lapid will be the first Israeli PM from the entertainment and media sector and one of the very few without any background in military or security establishments. 

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BRIEFLY NOTED

RUSSIA

Russian President Vladimir Putin has marked the 80th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the USSR by hailing the sacrifices made by the Soviets during the war while claiming that European security has been "dramatically degraded" amid "escalating tensions."Putin also reiterated his previous statements, saying that his country "will never allow the distortion of the truth" about World War II.

In recent years, Putin frequently accused European countries of what he called the diminishing of the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany and the stressing of atrocities committed by Soviet forces, like the mass murder of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest in 1940 or the mass rapes of German women.

In an article published on June 22 in the German weekly Die Zeit, Putin emphasized that "despite attempts to rewrite the pages of the past that are being made today, the truth is that Soviet soldiers came to Germany not to take revenge on the Germans, but with a noble and great mission of liberation."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel called Putin on June 22 to "express empathy with the unmeasurable woes and suffering brought by the war that was launched by the Nazi regime," the Kremlin said.

"Both parties underlined the importance of preserving the historic memory of those tragic events" and noted that "overcoming mutual enmity and reconciliation of the Russian and German peoples had key importance for the destinies of postwar Europe and It was emphasized that preserving security on the continent now is also possible only through joint efforts," the Kremlin added.

CENTRAL ASIA

The World Bank says that Europe and Central Asia continue to grapple with containing the coronavirus pandemic, which is clouding the economic outlook for the region. 

The Washington-based institution stated in its latest Global Economic Prospects report, released in early June that economic growth for the countries of the region is projected to reach 3.9 percent in 2021.

The World Bank warned, however, that the outlook remains “uncertain,” with uneven vaccine roll-outs and the withdrawal of domestic macroeconomic support measures weighing on the regional recovery.

The World Bank also noted that recent currency depreciations have put further upward pressure on prices, a growing concern for some economies that are still trying to shake off the effects of decades of Soviet-era planning.

“As a result of inflationary pressures, policy interest rates have been raised in one-third of the region’s economies thus far in 2021,” the bank said, pointing to Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Ukraine.

BELARUS

The United States, the European Union, Britain, and Canada have slapped a fresh round of coordinated sanctions on Belarus in response to the regime of Alexander Lukashenko's mounting repression against the political opposition and the free media.

"These coordinated designations demonstrate the steadfast transatlantic commitment to supporting the Belarusian people's democratic aspirations," Secretary of State Blinken said in a statement on June 21st, as the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 16 individuals and five entities. The Treasury said the move was coordinated with the US' international partners and was meant to hold to account Lukashenko's regime for its ongoing abuses and violations of international norms, including its forced diversion of a commercial Ryanair flight and arrest of journalist Raman Protasevich and his girlfriend Sofia Sapega last month.

Among the entities blacklisted by the Treasury were the main Belarusian security service, the KGB, the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry, and the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption, known as the GUBOPIK, who were all involved in the post-election repression.

Other individuals covered by sanctions include members of Lukashenko’s entourage as well as  lawmakers, prosecutors, judges, and other officials who are in the case of the latter regarded as "responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition”.

AZERBAIJAN 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has dismissed speculation that Turkey could build a military base in Azerbaijan as "rumours." 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during a visit to Baku on June 15th that he has not ruled out the possibility Ankara could build a military base in Azerbaijan. The so-called Shusha Declation on Allied Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey was signed during the visit. It calls for stepped-up cooperation between Ankara and Baku in the military sphere.

Such a move by NATO-member Turkey could require Russia to take steps to ensure its own security and interests.

BULGARIA/NORTH MACEDONIA

Bulgaria's leaders have expressed their strong support for North Macedonia's road to joining the European Union, a departure from Sofia's earlier objections to North Macedonia starting talks to join the bloc.

The start of North Macedonia's accession talks was blocked by EU member Bulgaria in 2020 due to disputes over history, national identity, and language. Bulgaria wants North Macedonia to formally recognize that its language has Bulgarian roots, while Skopje has said any question of its identity and language are not negotiable.

CUBA

Cuba announced on June 21st that its three-shot Abdala vaccine against the coronavirus had proved around 93% effective in last-stage clinical trials. Another Cuba vaccine Soberana 2 has 62% efficacy with two of its 3 shots. The announcement came from state-run biopharmaceutical corporation BioCubaFarma, the producer of both vaccines which are expected to be granted emergency authority by local regulators any day. 

Since the US imposed sanctions on Cuba in 1962, the country has developed strong pharmaceutical and bio-engineering industries.The communist-run country has opted not to import foreign vaccines but to rely on its own. Some experts said it was a risky bet but it appears to have paid off.

--o--

THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.