Issue 49

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

FAREWELL, DON!

Donald Trump left the White House for the very last time on the morning of January 20^th to fly to Florida where he is planning to live at least for the time being at Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach. Trump wished President Biden luck during his farewell speech at Andrews Air Force Base, almost implying that he may have lost because of bad luck and that Biden will need all the luck possible to succeed.  Trump’s only gesture in line with a normal transition process was to leave a letter to his successor. The content of the letter is being kept private for now.

Trump and House Minority Leader McCarthy, Mar-a-Lago, January 28th
From McCarthy's Facebook page

Now, as the inauguration of Joe Biden has concluded, former president Trump is also leaving behind a legacy of chaos and tumult and a nation bitterly divided and confronted with emboldened white supremacists and conspiracy theorists.

Four years after standing on stage at his own inauguration and painting a dire picture of "American carnage," Trump departs the office twice impeached, with millions more out of work and 450,000 dead from the coronavirus. Republicans under his watch lost the presidency and both chambers of Congress. He will be forever remembered for the final major act of his presidency: inciting an insurrection at the Capitol that left five dead, including a Capitol Police officer, and horrified the nation.

Trump also became the first outgoing president since Andrew Johnson in 1869 to boycott the Inauguration Day ceremony marking the formal transfer of power, in a final display of spite at his failure to win re-election.

The night before, Donald Trump issued pardons for 73 people and commuted sentences for 70 others. Among the most notable was Steve Bannon who joined many other former Trump associates on the list. Trump has, however, not pre-emptively pardoned himself, members of his family or his long-time confidant and lawyer Rudy Giuliani. Secret pardons have been rumoured, but would have seem to have questionable validity.

Trump also pledged, "We'll be back in some form. "Have a good life, we'll see you soon," he said. Trump may have wanted to form a new political party further fracturing the already damaged GOP. That, however, is for now highly unlikely as there is still a strong majority of Republicans who, out of fear or loyalty, are unwilling to part from him.

Banned from Twitter after his supporters stormed the US Capitol on January 6th, Trump used an old-school method, an emailed press release, to distribute a farewell video on January 19^th in which he veered from his usual divisive rhetoric and sounded an upbeat message. "Now more than ever, we must unify around our shared values and rise above the partisan rancor, and forge our common destiny," Trump said in conclusion.

Such was an unusual end to the unusual presidency.

TO IMPEACH OR TO PROSECUTE, OR BOTH

The Democratic majority in the House was determined to ensure that Trump’s role in the January 6^th insurrection would be sanctioned as a major anti-democratic crime. Trump thus became the only president to be impeached for a second time. Despite most of the Republican senators’ known unwillingness to convict Trump, Democratic senators are continuing the impeachment procedure even if Trump is no longer president.  To a certain extent, the result does not so much matter. The impeachment has cast Trump as a disgraced president. The conduct of the trial will provide the occasion for a full exposure of Trump’s role in the insurrection. This may not be enough to disqualify him from holding office in the future but could discredit him further in the eyes of moderate voters and may leave the door open for further criminal prosecution.

There is still also the prospect of Trump being charged for violations of state law in New York state in connection with Trump Foundation irregularities as well as in a separate case of tax fraud. There was no point in Trump trying to pardon himself as presidential pardons do not protect from prosecution under state laws. There is a potential for Trump’s post -presidency life to become rather unpleasant.

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US-RUSSIA: THE BIDEN PARADOX

Amidst all the other actions taken by the Biden Administration, the decision to extend for five years the Strategic ARMS Reduction Treaty of 2010 (New START, that establishes a limit on deployed strategic warheads) did not receive much attention, except in Moscow. The decision was quickly welcomed by Russian authorities. By January 29^th, Russia had already ratified the treaty extension.

Russian Defense Ministry Press Service image of an intercontinental ballistic missile test launched from Plesetsk in Northern Russia

As a “compromised” president, Trump did not have credibility to agree on anything with Russia. In the case of the New Start he was also inclined to follow the views of John Bolton, one of his many national security advisors, who was known to advocate against treaties that are perceived as limiting the US’ freedom to do whatever it wants. Biden would have also recognized the futility of trying to bring China into a new treaty. Biden is expected to take a hard line with respect to Russia, but he has the moral authority to agree with Russia in a situation where US national security interests are at stake. For Moscow, this is better than what Trump produced. It also challenges the assumption that Russia would have preferred to keep Trump on board.

The Biden administration is also seeking a full review of all Russian actions: the major hacking of US computer systems, dubbed as the Solar Winds event, the poisoning of Russian activist Navalny as well the alleged bounties put on the heads of US soldiers in Afghanistan. This is a matter of continuing to define Moscow as the principal adversary and striking a balance when making a decision that appears to meet Russia wishes, even if it is perfectly in line with US national interest.

The most fundamental change in approaches to both China and Russia from Trump's policy has been formulated by key Biden associates: China is America's main competitor and Russia remains the main adversary.

Of some interest in the public discussion of Russian hacking is the discrete acknowledgment that Russia seems to be successful at doing what the US itself is doing or would like to do without getting caught. The US would find it difficult to condemn the kind of spying which it is known to have conducted itself for years. Direct retaliation in the form of disruption of Russian computer systems would be possible but would be dangerous. The general view is that the US has particularly good cyberwarfare offensive capacity but that its defensive capacity is not so strong, as was shown by the Solar Winds intrusion that operated for several months without being noticed. Furthermore, the US greater dependence on open computer systems would create a greater vulnerability.  

All things considered, Biden’s willingness to call Putin and to have in the words of the Kremlin a “business-like and open discussion” as well as to remain in contact may not offer the hope of improved US-Russia relations but it opens the door to cooperation on issues where interests converge. This would be the case with the renewal of the nuclear deal with Iran in which Russia, as the provider of civilian nuclear technology to Iran, has the inside track and is a key player.

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DEALING WITH IRAN

Donald Trump’s opposition to the Iran nuclear deal was mainly based on the view that anything done by Barack Obama was fundamentally flawed. Trump’s position was comforted in that it conveniently matched the views of Israeli PM Netanyahu.

Family photo at the announcement of the framework for agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, Lausanne, April 2nd, 2015

The rationale for the conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran remains the same as during the Obama presidency, that is curtailing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and having the capacity to verify Iran’s respect for its commitments. Judging by the people president Biden already put in charge of the State Department and the intelligence apparatus, many who were personally involved in the 2015 deal or who strongly believe in diplomacy with Iran, the odds are that the US will try to revive the deal.

For Iran, the rationale also remains the same. Giving up advancing quickly towards having a nuclear bomb is traded for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. The logic here is that Iran needs the money more than the bomb at this time. Yet, Iran can retain a dormant nuclear weapon capacity, not to be at a complete disadvantage with Israel that already has that capacity.

On this issue, Iran, the EU and Russia clearly see the election of Joe Biden as opening new opportunities. The economic implications for EU countries, especially France and Germany, are significant.

Beyond the visceral opposition of Israel and Sunni Arab states, there are two issues that could make it more difficult to re-activate the nuclear deal. First, the deal does not address the issue of ballistic missile capacity. Second the deal was concluded prior to Russia coming to the rescue of the Assad regime in Syria and in support of Iran’s own existing efforts in that country.

Since the sanctions that Iran wants lifted are related to its nuclear program there is no logic for other elements to enter the negotiating equation. Yet, Iran’s continuing development of its ballistic missile program and its presence in Syria, including its support for Hezbollah’s military activity, alter the overall context and make it more difficult to present the deal to Western public opinion. It may therefore be necessary to update the deal with provisions or measures that go further and amount to more than a few cosmetic changes.  

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THE NAVALNY PARADOX

On January 17^th Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny arrived in Moscow from Germany, where he was being treated after being poisoned, and was promptly detained by law enforcement authorities at Sheremetyevo airport. A live broadcast of his arrival showed police taking the 44-year-old Kremlin critic away at the passport control booth.

Russia's prison authority confirmed Navalny's detention and stated that he was being held because of “multiple violations” of the conditions of his suspended sentence relating to a 2014 fraud conviction and for evading criminal inspectors. Shortly before he was detained, Navalny told journalists he was “happy” to be back in Russia and that he was confident he would not be arrested.

Navalny arrived from Germany after being flown there for emergency medical care after being poisoned in Russia in August 2020. Laboratory tests conducted in Germany, France, and Sweden have established that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent of the Soviet-style Novichok class, a conclusion confirmed by the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Gelendzhik palace
©Wikipedia

After his arrival Navalny arranged for the release of a lengthy video in which he accused Vladimir Putin of long-standing corruption and of building himself a sumptuous palace near Gelendzhik  on the Black Sea coast. The video was viewed by millions in Russia. For the first time ever acknowledging even indirectly Navalny’s existence, Putin denied having anything to do with the Black Sea palace. Arkady Rotenberg, a long-time friend of Putin, has since then stated that he is the legal owner of the resort in question.

Navalny also called for massive anti-Putin protests to take place on January 24^th. The foreign media coverage of the protests focused on Moscow and St. Petersburg and highlighted the brutality of police repression and the large number of individuals under arrest. The Russian television coverage highlighted some aggressive behaviour by protesters in Moscow and tried to create outrage over the large number of under-age participants. Other observers rightfully noted that the national scope of the protests was far more important and that outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg protests were a generally peaceful affair. More protests are expected in coming weeks.

From Alexei Navalny's Facebook page

Among observers, both Russian and foreign, the debate centers on the political significance of the Navalny protests: is the regime shaken, frightened or simply annoyed? “Concerned” might be the better answer. By Russian standards, the protests were not as well attended as hoped, but they were also much more widespread. The protests have brought in many individuals who never participated in such actions before. The movement is more anti-Putin than pro-Navalny: the protests are an expression of anger and frustration at Putin’s leadership, but they have not yet morphed into a movement with political demands beyond the ouster of the current leader. As an activist focussing his attention on accusing Putin of corruption Navalny is successful in channeling the discontent of many politically minded individuals across the whole of Russia. This may make him the real opposition figure, but it does not make him yet a viable alternate political option and one that could have success in the forthcoming legislative elections this September.

Is the Navalny movement changing political life in Russia? Possibly, it is too early to tell. Using social networks to organise protests is one thing. Becoming an effective political force is a more difficult task. Will it lead to change at the top? For now, this is unlikely. The ones who would have and might go first are the members of the systemic opposition. With a real opposition in place, they would become redundant.

How will the Kremlin deal with Navalny from now on? Send him and his associates to jail for a long time or let them be. The first option seems more likely as is the more robust repression of protests.

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THE ZELENSKY PARADOX, THE UKRAINE PARADOX

As we noted before, President Biden’s election is prima facie good news for Ukraine. The President knows the country well and is seen as a strong supporter. That, however, may not be so useful now as it may seem.

Under the Poroshenko presidency, the priority was to strengthen the anti-terrorist operation against Eastern Ukraine rebels. Under the Zelenskyy presidency the priority is to keep the cease-fire and arrange the return of rebel territories to the sovereignty of Ukraine. The sympathy of the Biden administration means that Biden raised the Ukraine conflict with Putin during their first call. It is clear Ukraine will have plenty of  US-supplied military hardware President Zelenskyy would rather not use in a manner that would further alienate the population of Eastern Ukraine, if that population ever were to return to Ukrainian jurisdiction.

Then Vice-President Biden, former President Poroshenko, Kyiv, January 2017

Under Poroshenko, the fight against corruption was an uncertain proposition. Under Zelensky it is a priority. Zelenskyy does not really need outside pressure for the US to fight corruption: he already has all the pressure he can use from the IMF and the EU.

Economic cooperation was singled out by Zelenskyy’s office as the other area where it had expectations from the Biden administration. There will continue to be direct US assistance to Ukraine but not likely any significant increase in public spending in these difficult times. What would matter more is increasing the flow of US foreign direct investment into Ukraine, a more long-term objective.

The most immediate problem area in which President Zelenskyy (whose popular rating has taken a serious hit) could use some assistance is the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines. Amidst the ongoing difficulties encountered by many countries in securing additional supply of vaccines, there is at this time little sign of anyone coming quickly to the rescue. Relatively small shipments of the Pfizer vaccine may become available in February through the WHO-led COVAX programme.

There has of course been controversy over the idea of Ukraine procuring and even producing a version of the Russian Sputnik-5 vaccine, that is already approved for use in Hungary and Serbia, among many others. Ukraine would seem to have the capacity to replicate the Russian vaccine in its own specialised pharmaceutical facilities in Kharkiv. For political reasons, recourse to Sputnik-5 or the idea of producing it in Ukraine have been rejected for fear of allowing pro-Russian forces to benefit from the process. This happens at the same time as Russia, on a country-by-country basis, remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner. 

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KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan's newly elected parliament has voted to keep Prime Minister Askar Mamin in the post following the recent elections as the country looks for continuity to attract foreign investment into its oil, gas, and mining sectors.

International election observers from the OSCE found the legal framework for the January 10th elections “not yet conducive to holding elections in line with OSCE commitments for democratic elections, despite a number of revisions introduced since the country’s last parliamentary elections”.

It was Kazakhstan's first parliamentary elections since the resignation in early 2019 of long-time President Nursultan Nazarbayev who still holds considerable power after handpicking Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as his successor.

Despite having stepped down, Nazarbayev maintains vast influence over the country's politics. He is the head of the Nur Otan party, as well as the powerful Security Council and is titled "Elbasy", leader of the nation.

Despite the “uncompetitive campaign” qualifications made by the OSCE observers, the elections led to a notably increased presence in the number of opposition representatives in the Mazhilis. President Tokayev since then has reiterated his firm commitment to an incremental approach to political reforms by proposing more changes in areas such as lowering the threshold for smaller parties to obtain seats in parliament and the conduct of local elections.

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ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA

On January 11^th Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted a trilateral meeting in Moscow with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, nearly two months after a Russia-brokered cease-fire agreement ended six weeks of fierce fighting over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Trilateral meeting, Moscow, January 11th
©President of Russia Website

Following the talks, Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan issued a joint statement on the Kremlin website announcing the creation of a trilateral working group to oversee the "unblocking of all economic and transport links" in the region.

Putin at the start of the meeting thanked the two leaders for their cooperation with Russia's mediation efforts aimed at "stopping the bloodshed, stabilizing the situation, and achieving a sustainable cease-fire."

Under a cease-fire agreement reached on November 9th, a chunk of Nagorno-Karabakh and all seven districts around it were placed under Azerbaijani administration after almost 30 years of control by ethnic Armenians. More than 4,700 people were killed in the flare-up of violence. Around 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are deployed along frontline areas and to protect a land link connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. They are also engaged in demining, returning displaced Armenians, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure.

Many details of the agreement remain unclear, including the final political status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the exact contours of the border separating the two sides along a still militarized front line, and economic issues.

Pashinian said several issues remained unresolved, and that the meeting did not render a solution to the "most sensitive and painful question" of prisoners of war.

Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged their first prisoners in early December, more than a month after the peace deal was signed. It remains unclear how many more prisoners the two sides intend to exchange.

The truce agreement envisages a Russian-guarded transport corridor running through southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to its enclave of Nakxchivan, and thereby to its regional ally, Turkey.

Prior to the January 11^th meeting, Putin consulted by telephone with President Macron about what was going to happen. Russia, France and the US are co-chairs of Minsk group that is in charge of finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There was no similar call to the US President, likely on account of the US being in a transition period.

Many Armenians have blamed their own leader for the Nagorno-Karabakh fiasco. Some also accused Israel of having sold sophisticated weapons to Azerbaijan. Few seem to have wanted to see a link between the ongoing Macron-Erdogan spat and the unprecedented willingness of Turkey to support the military offensive of Azerbaijan against Armenia, a traditional friend of France. Few also seem to have seen the incapacity of the US to restrain Turkey, its NATO ally, from participating in military action against Armenia, a country that has close diaspora links with the US.

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AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIAGAS DEALS

Azerbaijan has started commercial natural-gas supplies to the European Union via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), as the region seeks to diversify energy supplies away from Russia. The 878-kilometer TAP is a segment of the Southern Gas Corridor, which took more than $30 billion and seven years to build. The overall project includes Shah Deniz 2, Azerbaijan’s largest gas deposit, and 3,500 kilometers of pipelines connecting the Caspian Sea with Western Europe via Georgia and Turkey.

Azerbaijan already supplies gas to Turkey and aims to supply European gas markets with 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year. Analysts say Azerbaijani gas poses some threat to Moscow's share of the continent's gas market but is unlikely to change Russia's dominant position as a supplier.

Russia, which already accounts for about one-third of the region’s gas supplies, plans to raise gas exports to Europe, including Turkey, to 183 bcm in 2021 from more than 170 bcm this year. Moscow has recently accelerated efforts to complete its undersea Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Germany, a project that stalled a year ago due to U.S. sanctions.

Under Trump, Washington has strongly opposed Nord Stream 2 as threatening the security of NATO allies in Europe by increasing dependence on Russia. President Biden has called it a bad idea but may be more willing to take German interests into consideration as well as less eager to export US shale gas.

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UKRAINE-MOLDOVA

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with his Moldovan counterpart Maia Sandu in Kyiv on January 12th. The leaders of Moldova and Ukraine have called for rebooting ties as the two neighbors pursue a pro-EU agenda and fend off territorial disputes with Russia-backed forces. This was President Sandu’s first official visit abroad. Sandu was inaugurated last month following her victory in an election against the Russia-backed incumbent Igor Dodon on a pro-EU and anti-corruption platform.

Presidents Sandu and Zelenskyy, Kyiv, January 12th
©President of Ukraine Website

Under Dodon, Moldova's relations with its neighbors Ukraine and Romania had been largely frozen. Since her election, Sandu, a former World Bank economist, has called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Moscow-backed separatist region of Trans Dniester, prompting the Kremlin to issue warnings.

Speaking alongside Zelenskyy, the Moldovan leader spoke of a "resumption of friendship" with Ukraine. For his part, Zelenskyy also called on the European Union to help Ukraine and Moldova obtain Western-produced coronavirus vaccines.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN JR, TAKE 2

 

Joe Biden deserved being person of the month for becoming President-elect Biden. President Biden deserves being person of the month for the transformation that he has gone through from an at-times bumbling candidate to a surprisingly active, engaging and humorous president. In his usual insult-throwing manner, Donald Trump used to call him “Sleepy Joe. No more! President Biden has issued executive orders to do away with as much of the Trump legacy as possible as well as to fulfill specific electoral promises, including reversing the permit for the Keystone pipeline. He has tackled the pandemic issue head on. Collegial President Biden has surrounded himself with an impressive group of experienced professionals who obviously will have both the authority and the capacity to do the heavy lifting. His appointees at State, Defence and Treasury have already been overwhelmingly confirmed by a divided Senate. He has already been calling world leaders even having a potentially difficult conversation with Vladimir Putin positively assessed by the Kremlin. He also managed to assemble and guide an inaugural committee to produce a ceremony that will probably go down as one of the best, even in times of a pandemic and enhanced security threats. Freed from the pressure of performing as a candidate Biden has turned into a far more effective manager than his campaign performance would have suggested. There is of course a lot more to do, but the first weeks of the Biden presidency are refreshingly upbeat.

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BRIEFLY NOTED

BELARUS

Belarus, that was to co-host with Latvia the ice hockey world championship in May-June of this year, lost the event essentially because of strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko’s ongoing crackdown on protesters who dispute the August 2020 election that kept him in power.

Many European countries, including Latvia, had been calling for the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) to cancel Minsk’s involvement over the violent crackdown, as well as fears that Lukashenko's government has failed to control the coronavirus pandemic and is underreporting cases and deaths. Along with a few other key sponsors, Czech carmaker Skoda Auto also had announced it would be pulling its sponsorship of the event if it were to be held in Belarus.

MONGOLIA

The next three to six months will be crucial to the future of the vast Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine in Mongolia, as the companies behind the operation engage in talks to find a way to improve the government’s financial benefits from an ongoing underground expansion.

That deal is commonly known in Mongolia as the “Dubai agreement” because the nation’s then Prime Minister Chimediin Saikhanbileg struck it with former Rio Tinto’s boss Jean-Sebastien Jacques in a Dubai hotel, ending an impasse that had lasted close to three years.

According to a senior government official, “It is calculated that Mongolia will not receive dividend payments until 2051 and will incur debts of $22 billion. In addition, Oyu Tolgoi is estimated to pay profit taxes or corporate income taxes only in four years until 2051.”

TURKMENISTAN

Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, the eccentric president of Turkmenistan, has claimed on television that the herb licorice might hold the answer to the cure for COVID-19 and has ordered scientists to work on a medicine.

Berdymukhammedov ordered the country's Academy of Sciences to "carefully study" the herb's "antiviral effects," adding that Turkmenistan has sufficient reserves of licorice "to produce medicine." He went on to say that the licorice root had long been used to treat "internal diseases, coughs, kidney diseases, upper respiratory problems, and stomach ulcers."

The secretive Turkmen government has not reported a single coronavirus infection in the country and prevents doctors from diagnosing any patient with COVID-19. Medical sources have been quoted in many media reports as saying that hospitals across Turkmenistan are full of patients with pneumonia and other symptoms that patients with COVID-19 would have.

VACCINATION, PRACTICE AND POLITICS FOOTNOTE

In one way or the other the long history of vaccines had some political connotations. In the end of the 18th century Russian society, in many ways like most European countries, was categorically against smallpox immunization. Catherine the Great, the Russian Empress, was the first person to be variolated (as the process was known at the time) in order to show the example to her subjects. French philosopher Voltaire wrote to Catherine that she showed exceptional political courage that would save millions of lives. Since that time, the vaccination has always been politicized. We see it now when the European Union insists that its members should be first in line for vaccine deliveries. Canada has become a victim of such an approach. Many countries are working on development of their own vaccines. There are 10 vaccines registered in one form or another. There are more than 60 other vaccines in active development. The need to put aside political disagreements and to increase cooperation both in development of the vaccines and their fair distribution around the world has been broadly acknowledged in principle. Practice has not always followed. That vaccination should not become politicized is probably the main lesson to be learnt. It should also be acknowledged though that public health policy and practices will have an impact on the efficiency of the process. Examples below illustrate this.

Russians are already being inoculated with the Sputnik-V vaccine after it was approved by Moscow in August despite a lack of large-scale clinical trials and perceived shortcomings in data to support its safety and efficacy. Since then, the Sputnik V vaccine has been approved in 15 more countries, including EU member Hungary. The process to approve the vaccine in the EU has been initiated.

Israel has rolled out the fastest Covid-19 vaccination campaign in the world, inoculating nearly 25% of its population in under a month with the Pfizer vaccine. The small country, with roughly 9 million people, about the same as New York City, now aims to inoculate most of its population by March. 

If Israel begins to see the impact of the vaccination, with no resurgence of Covid-19 cases in the coming months, this will provide a gold standard for other countries worldwide. However, with its smaller geography and population size, its pro-vaccine culture, its universal health care and digitalised medical system Israel finds itself having virtually all the comparative advantages.

There are also reports that Israel paid cash and a premium for early access. Even more important in securing access seems to have been the willingness to share freely some vaccination data with Pfizer.

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.