THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
FAREWELL, DON!
Donald
Trump left the White House for the very last time on the morning of January 20th
to fly to Florida where he is planning to live at least for the time being at
Mar-a-Lago club in Palm Beach. Trump wished President Biden luck during his
farewell speech at Andrews Air Force Base, almost implying that he may have
lost because of bad luck and that Biden will need all the luck possible to
succeed. Trump’s only gesture in line
with a normal transition process was to leave a letter to his successor. The
content of the letter is being kept private for now.
Trump and House Minority Leader McCarthy, Mar-a-Lago, January 28th From McCarthy's Facebook page |
Now, as the inauguration of Joe Biden has concluded, former president Trump is also leaving behind a legacy of chaos and tumult and a nation bitterly divided and confronted with emboldened white supremacists and conspiracy theorists.
Four years
after standing on stage at his own inauguration and painting a dire picture of
"American carnage," Trump departs the office twice impeached, with
millions more out of work and 450,000 dead from the coronavirus. Republicans
under his watch lost the presidency and both chambers of Congress. He will be
forever remembered for the final major act of his presidency: inciting an
insurrection at the Capitol that left five dead, including a Capitol Police
officer, and horrified the nation.
Trump also
became the first outgoing president since Andrew Johnson in 1869 to boycott the
Inauguration Day ceremony marking the formal transfer of power, in a final
display of spite at his failure to win re-election.
The night
before, Donald Trump issued pardons for 73 people and commuted sentences for 70
others. Among the most notable was Steve Bannon who joined many other former
Trump associates on the list. Trump has, however, not pre-emptively pardoned
himself, members of his family or his long-time confidant and lawyer Rudy Giuliani. Secret pardons have been rumoured, but would have seem to have questionable validity.
Trump also
pledged, "We'll be back in some form. "Have a good life, we'll see
you soon," he said. Trump may have wanted to form a new political party
further fracturing the already damaged GOP. That, however, is for now highly
unlikely as there is still a strong majority of Republicans who, out of fear or
loyalty, are unwilling to part from him.
Banned from
Twitter after his supporters stormed the US Capitol on January 6th, Trump used
an old-school method, an emailed press release, to distribute a farewell video
on January 19th in which he veered from his usual divisive rhetoric
and sounded an upbeat message. "Now more than ever, we must unify around
our shared values and rise above the partisan rancor, and forge our common
destiny," Trump said in conclusion.
Such was an
unusual end to the unusual presidency.
TO IMPEACH OR TO PROSECUTE, OR BOTH
The Democratic
majority in the House was determined to ensure that Trump’s role in the January
6th insurrection would be sanctioned as a major anti-democratic
crime. Trump thus became the only president to be impeached for a second time. Despite
most of the Republican senators’ known unwillingness to convict Trump, Democratic
senators are continuing the impeachment procedure even if Trump is no longer
president. To a certain extent, the
result does not so much matter. The impeachment has cast Trump as a disgraced
president. The conduct of the trial will provide the occasion for a full
exposure of Trump’s role in the insurrection. This may not be enough to
disqualify him from holding office in the future but could discredit him
further in the eyes of moderate voters and may leave the door open for further criminal prosecution.
There is still
also the prospect of Trump being charged for violations of state law in New
York state in connection with Trump Foundation irregularities as well as in a
separate case of tax fraud. There was no point in Trump trying to pardon
himself as presidential pardons do not protect from prosecution under state
laws. There is a potential for Trump’s post -presidency life to become rather
unpleasant.
--o--
US-RUSSIA: THE BIDEN PARADOX
Amidst all
the other actions taken by the Biden Administration, the decision to extend for
five years the Strategic ARMS Reduction Treaty of 2010 (New START, that establishes
a limit on deployed strategic warheads) did not receive much attention, except
in Moscow. The decision was quickly welcomed by Russian authorities. By January
29th, Russia had already ratified the treaty extension.
Russian Defense Ministry Press Service image of an intercontinental ballistic missile test launched from Plesetsk in Northern Russia |
As a
“compromised” president, Trump did not have credibility to agree on anything
with Russia. In the case of the New Start he was also inclined to follow the
views of John Bolton, one of his many national security advisors, who was known
to advocate against treaties that are perceived as limiting the US’ freedom to
do whatever it wants. Biden would have also recognized the futility of trying
to bring China into a new treaty. Biden is expected to take a hard line with
respect to Russia, but he has the moral authority to agree with Russia in a
situation where US national security interests are at stake. For Moscow, this
is better than what Trump produced. It also challenges the assumption that
Russia would have preferred to keep Trump on board.
The Biden
administration is also seeking a full review of all Russian actions: the major
hacking of US computer systems, dubbed as the Solar Winds event, the poisoning
of Russian activist Navalny as well the alleged bounties put on the heads of US
soldiers in Afghanistan. This is a matter of continuing to define Moscow as the
principal adversary and striking a balance when making a decision that appears
to meet Russia wishes, even if it is perfectly in line with US national
interest.
The most
fundamental change in approaches to both China and Russia from Trump's policy
has been formulated by key Biden associates: China is America's main competitor
and Russia remains the main adversary.
Of some
interest in the public discussion of Russian hacking is the discrete acknowledgment
that Russia seems to be successful at doing what the US itself is doing or
would like to do without getting caught. The US would find it difficult to
condemn the kind of spying which it is known to have conducted itself for
years. Direct retaliation in the form of disruption of Russian computer systems
would be possible but would be dangerous. The general view is that the US has particularly
good cyberwarfare offensive capacity but that its defensive capacity is not so
strong, as was shown by the Solar Winds intrusion that operated for several
months without being noticed. Furthermore, the US greater dependence on open
computer systems would create a greater vulnerability.
All things
considered, Biden’s willingness to call Putin and to have in the words of the
Kremlin a “business-like and open discussion” as well as to remain in contact may
not offer the hope of improved US-Russia relations but it opens the door to cooperation
on issues where interests converge. This would be the case with the renewal of
the nuclear deal with Iran in which Russia, as the provider of civilian nuclear
technology to Iran, has the inside track and is a key player.
--o--
DEALING WITH IRAN
Donald
Trump’s opposition to the Iran nuclear deal was mainly based on the view that
anything done by Barack Obama was fundamentally flawed. Trump’s position was
comforted in that it conveniently matched the views of Israeli PM Netanyahu.
Family
photo at the announcement of the framework for agreement on the Iranian nuclear
program, Lausanne, April 2nd, 2015 |
The
rationale for the conclusion of the nuclear deal with Iran remains the same as
during the Obama presidency, that is curtailing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and
having the capacity to verify Iran’s respect for its commitments. Judging by
the people president Biden already put in charge of the State Department and
the intelligence apparatus, many who were personally involved in the 2015 deal
or who strongly believe in diplomacy with Iran, the odds are that the US will
try to revive the deal.
For Iran,
the rationale also remains the same. Giving up advancing quickly towards having
a nuclear bomb is traded for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions. The
logic here is that Iran needs the money more than the bomb at this time. Yet,
Iran can retain a dormant nuclear weapon capacity, not to be at a complete
disadvantage with Israel that already has that capacity.
On this
issue, Iran, the EU and Russia clearly see the election of Joe Biden as opening
new opportunities. The economic implications for EU countries, especially
France and Germany, are significant.
Beyond the
visceral opposition of Israel and Sunni Arab states, there are two issues that
could make it more difficult to re-activate the nuclear deal. First, the deal
does not address the issue of ballistic missile capacity. Second the deal was
concluded prior to Russia coming to the rescue of the Assad regime in Syria and
in support of Iran’s own existing efforts in that country.
Since the
sanctions that Iran wants lifted are related to its nuclear program there is no
logic for other elements to enter the negotiating equation. Yet, Iran’s
continuing development of its ballistic missile program and its presence in
Syria, including its support for Hezbollah’s military activity, alter the
overall context and make it more difficult to present the deal to Western
public opinion. It may therefore be necessary to update the deal with
provisions or measures that go further and amount to more than a few cosmetic
changes.
--o--
THE NAVALNY PARADOX
On January
17th Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny arrived in Moscow
from Germany, where he was being treated after being poisoned, and was promptly
detained by law enforcement authorities at Sheremetyevo airport. A live
broadcast of his arrival showed police taking the 44-year-old Kremlin critic
away at the passport control booth.
Russia's
prison authority confirmed Navalny's detention and stated that he was being
held because of “multiple violations” of the conditions of his suspended
sentence relating to a 2014 fraud conviction and for evading criminal
inspectors. Shortly before he was detained, Navalny told journalists he was
“happy” to be back in Russia and that he was confident he would not be
arrested.
Navalny
arrived from Germany after being flown there for emergency medical care after
being poisoned in Russia in August 2020. Laboratory tests conducted in Germany,
France, and Sweden have established that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve
agent of the Soviet-style Novichok class, a conclusion confirmed by the
international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The Gelendzhik palace ©Wikipedia |
After his arrival Navalny arranged for the release of a lengthy video in which he accused Vladimir Putin of long-standing corruption and of building himself a sumptuous palace near Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast. The video was viewed by millions in Russia. For the first time ever acknowledging even indirectly Navalny’s existence, Putin denied having anything to do with the Black Sea palace. Arkady Rotenberg, a long-time friend of Putin, has since then stated that he is the legal owner of the resort in question.
Navalny also
called for massive anti-Putin protests to take place on January 24th.
The foreign media coverage of the protests focused on Moscow and St. Petersburg
and highlighted the brutality of police repression and the large number of
individuals under arrest. The Russian television coverage highlighted some
aggressive behaviour by protesters in Moscow and tried to create outrage over
the large number of under-age participants. Other observers rightfully noted
that the national scope of the protests was far more important and that outside
of Moscow and St. Petersburg protests were a generally peaceful affair. More
protests are expected in coming weeks.
From Alexei Navalny's Facebook page |
Among
observers, both Russian and foreign, the debate centers on the political
significance of the Navalny protests: is the regime shaken, frightened or
simply annoyed? “Concerned” might be the better answer. By Russian standards, the
protests were not as well attended as hoped, but they were also much more
widespread. The protests have brought in many individuals who never participated
in such actions before. The movement is more anti-Putin than pro-Navalny: the
protests are an expression of anger and frustration at Putin’s leadership, but
they have not yet morphed into a movement with political demands beyond the
ouster of the current leader. As an activist focussing his attention on
accusing Putin of corruption Navalny is successful in channeling the discontent
of many politically minded individuals across the whole of Russia. This may
make him the real opposition figure, but it does not make him yet a viable
alternate political option and one that could have success in the forthcoming
legislative elections this September.
Is the
Navalny movement changing political life in Russia? Possibly, it is too early
to tell. Using social networks to organise protests is one thing. Becoming an
effective political force is a more difficult task. Will it lead to change at
the top? For now, this is unlikely. The ones who would have and might go first
are the members of the systemic opposition. With a real opposition in place,
they would become redundant.
How will
the Kremlin deal with Navalny from now on? Send him and his associates to jail
for a long time or let them be. The first option seems more likely as is the more robust repression of protests.
--o--
THE ZELENSKY PARADOX, THE UKRAINE PARADOX
As we noted before, President Biden’s election is prima facie good news for Ukraine. The President knows the country well and is seen as a strong supporter. That, however, may not be so useful now as it may seem.
Under the Poroshenko presidency, the priority was to strengthen the anti-terrorist operation against Eastern Ukraine rebels. Under the Zelenskyy presidency the priority is to keep the cease-fire and arrange the return of rebel territories to the sovereignty of Ukraine. The sympathy of the Biden administration means that Biden raised the Ukraine conflict with Putin during their first call. It is clear Ukraine will have plenty of US-supplied military hardware President Zelenskyy would rather not use in a manner that would further alienate the population of Eastern Ukraine, if that population ever were to return to Ukrainian jurisdiction.
Then Vice-President Biden, former President Poroshenko, Kyiv, January 2017 |
Under
Poroshenko, the fight against corruption was an uncertain proposition. Under
Zelensky it is a priority. Zelenskyy does not really need outside pressure for
the US to fight corruption: he already has all the pressure he can use from the
IMF and the EU.
Economic cooperation
was singled out by Zelenskyy’s office as the other area where it had
expectations from the Biden administration. There will continue to be direct US
assistance to Ukraine but not likely any significant increase in public
spending in these difficult times. What would matter more is increasing the
flow of US foreign direct investment into Ukraine, a more long-term objective.
The most
immediate problem area in which President Zelenskyy (whose popular rating has
taken a serious hit) could use some assistance is the procurement of COVID-19
vaccines. Amidst the ongoing difficulties encountered by many countries in
securing additional supply of vaccines, there is at this time little sign of anyone
coming quickly to the rescue. Relatively small shipments of the Pfizer vaccine
may become available in February through the WHO-led COVAX programme.
There has
of course been controversy over the idea of Ukraine procuring and even
producing a version of the Russian Sputnik-5 vaccine, that is already approved
for use in Hungary and Serbia, among many others. Ukraine would seem to have
the capacity to replicate the Russian vaccine in its own specialised pharmaceutical
facilities in Kharkiv. For political reasons, recourse to Sputnik-5 or the idea
of producing it in Ukraine have been rejected for fear of allowing pro-Russian
forces to benefit from the process. This happens at the same time as Russia, on
a country-by-country basis, remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner.
--o--
KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan's
newly elected parliament has voted to keep Prime Minister Askar Mamin in the
post following the recent elections as the country looks for continuity to
attract foreign investment into its oil, gas, and mining sectors.
International
election observers from the OSCE found the legal framework for the January 10th
elections “not yet conducive to holding elections in line with OSCE commitments
for democratic elections, despite a number of revisions introduced since the
country’s last parliamentary elections”.
It was Kazakhstan's
first parliamentary elections since the resignation in early 2019 of long-time
President Nursultan Nazarbayev who still holds considerable power after handpicking
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as his successor.
Despite
having stepped down, Nazarbayev maintains vast influence over the country's
politics. He is the head of the Nur Otan party, as well as the powerful
Security Council and is titled "Elbasy", leader of the nation.
Despite the
“uncompetitive campaign” qualifications made by the OSCE observers, the
elections led to a notably increased presence in the number of opposition
representatives in the Mazhilis. President Tokayev since then has reiterated
his firm commitment to an incremental approach to political reforms by proposing
more changes in areas such as lowering the threshold for smaller parties to
obtain seats in parliament and the conduct of local elections.
--o--
ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN-RUSSIA
On January
11th Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted a trilateral meeting in
Moscow with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, nearly two months after a
Russia-brokered cease-fire agreement ended six weeks of fierce fighting over
the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Trilateral meeting, Moscow, January 11th ©President of Russia Website |
Following
the talks, Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan issued a joint statement on the Kremlin website
announcing the creation of a trilateral working group to oversee the
"unblocking of all economic and transport links" in the region.
Putin at
the start of the meeting thanked the two leaders for their cooperation with
Russia's mediation efforts aimed at "stopping the bloodshed, stabilizing
the situation, and achieving a sustainable cease-fire."
Under a
cease-fire agreement reached on November 9th, a chunk of Nagorno-Karabakh and all
seven districts around it were placed under Azerbaijani administration after
almost 30 years of control by ethnic Armenians. More than 4,700 people were
killed in the flare-up of violence. Around 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are
deployed along frontline areas and to protect a land link connecting
Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. They are also engaged in demining, returning
displaced Armenians, and rebuilding damaged infrastructure.
Many
details of the agreement remain unclear, including the final political status
of Nagorno-Karabakh, the exact contours of the border separating the two sides
along a still militarized front line, and economic issues.
Pashinian
said several issues remained unresolved, and that the meeting did not render a
solution to the "most sensitive and painful question" of prisoners of
war.
Armenia and
Azerbaijan exchanged their first prisoners in early December, more than a month
after the peace deal was signed. It remains unclear how many more prisoners the
two sides intend to exchange.
The truce
agreement envisages a Russian-guarded transport corridor running through
southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to its enclave of Nakxchivan, and
thereby to its regional ally, Turkey.
Prior to
the January 11th meeting, Putin consulted by telephone with
President Macron about what was going to happen. Russia, France and the US are
co-chairs of Minsk group that is in charge of finding a peaceful solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There was no similar call to the US President,
likely on account of the US being in a transition period.
Many
Armenians have blamed their own leader for the Nagorno-Karabakh fiasco. Some
also accused Israel of having sold sophisticated weapons to Azerbaijan. Few
seem to have wanted to see a link between the ongoing Macron-Erdogan spat and
the unprecedented willingness of Turkey to support the military offensive of
Azerbaijan against Armenia, a traditional friend of France. Few also seem to
have seen the incapacity of the US to restrain Turkey, its NATO ally, from
participating in military action against Armenia, a country that has close
diaspora links with the US.
--o--
AZERBAIJAN AND RUSSIAGAS DEALS
Azerbaijan
has started commercial natural-gas supplies to the European Union via the Trans
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), as the region seeks to diversify energy supplies away
from Russia. The 878-kilometer TAP is a segment of the Southern Gas Corridor,
which took more than $30 billion and seven years to build. The overall project
includes Shah Deniz 2, Azerbaijan’s largest gas deposit, and 3,500 kilometers
of pipelines connecting the Caspian Sea with Western Europe via Georgia and
Turkey.
Azerbaijan
already supplies gas to Turkey and aims to supply European gas markets with 10
billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year. Analysts say Azerbaijani gas poses
some threat to Moscow's share of the continent's gas market but is unlikely to
change Russia's dominant position as a supplier.
Russia,
which already accounts for about one-third of the region’s gas supplies, plans
to raise gas exports to Europe, including Turkey, to 183 bcm in 2021 from more
than 170 bcm this year. Moscow has recently accelerated efforts to complete its
undersea Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Germany, a project that stalled
a year ago due to U.S. sanctions.
Under
Trump, Washington has strongly opposed Nord Stream 2 as threatening the
security of NATO allies in Europe by increasing dependence on Russia. President
Biden has called it a bad idea but may be more willing to take German interests
into consideration as well as less eager to export US shale gas.
--o--
UKRAINE-MOLDOVA
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with his Moldovan counterpart Maia Sandu in
Kyiv on January 12th. The leaders of Moldova and Ukraine have called for
rebooting ties as the two neighbors pursue a pro-EU agenda and fend off
territorial disputes with Russia-backed forces. This was President Sandu’s first
official visit abroad. Sandu was inaugurated last month following her victory
in an election against the Russia-backed incumbent Igor Dodon on a pro-EU and
anti-corruption platform.
Presidents Sandu and Zelenskyy, Kyiv, January 12th ©President of Ukraine Website |
Under
Dodon, Moldova's relations with its neighbors Ukraine and Romania had been
largely frozen. Since her election, Sandu, a former World Bank economist, has
called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Moscow-backed separatist
region of Trans Dniester, prompting the Kremlin to issue warnings.
Speaking
alongside Zelenskyy, the Moldovan leader spoke of a "resumption of
friendship" with Ukraine. For his part, Zelenskyy also called on the
European Union to help Ukraine and Moldova obtain Western-produced coronavirus
vaccines.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN JR, TAKE 2
Joe Biden
deserved being person of the month for becoming President-elect Biden.
President Biden deserves being person of the month for the transformation that
he has gone through from an at-times bumbling candidate to a surprisingly
active, engaging and humorous president. In his usual insult-throwing manner,
Donald Trump used to call him “Sleepy Joe. No more! President Biden has issued
executive orders to do away with as much of the Trump legacy as possible as
well as to fulfill specific electoral promises, including reversing the permit
for the Keystone pipeline. He has tackled the pandemic issue head on. Collegial
President Biden has surrounded himself with an impressive group of experienced
professionals who obviously will have both the authority and the capacity to do
the heavy lifting. His appointees at State, Defence and Treasury have already
been overwhelmingly confirmed by a divided Senate. He has already been calling world
leaders even having a potentially difficult conversation with Vladimir Putin positively
assessed by the Kremlin. He also managed to assemble and guide an inaugural
committee to produce a ceremony that will probably go down as one of the best,
even in times of a pandemic and enhanced security threats. Freed from the
pressure of performing as a candidate Biden has turned into a far more
effective manager than his campaign performance would have suggested. There is
of course a lot more to do, but the first weeks of the Biden presidency are
refreshingly upbeat.
--o--
BRIEFLY NOTED
BELARUS
Belarus, that
was to co-host with Latvia the ice hockey world championship in May-June of
this year, lost the event essentially because of strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko’s
ongoing crackdown on protesters who dispute the August 2020 election that kept
him in power.
Many
European countries, including Latvia, had been calling for the International
Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) to cancel Minsk’s involvement over the violent
crackdown, as well as fears that Lukashenko's government has failed to control
the coronavirus pandemic and is underreporting cases and deaths. Along with a
few other key sponsors, Czech carmaker Skoda Auto also had announced it would
be pulling its sponsorship of the event if it were to be held in Belarus.
MONGOLIA
The next
three to six months will be crucial to the future of the vast Oyu Tolgoi
copper-gold mine in Mongolia, as the companies behind the operation engage in
talks to find a way to improve the government’s financial benefits from an
ongoing underground expansion.
That deal
is commonly known in Mongolia as the “Dubai agreement” because the nation’s
then Prime Minister Chimediin Saikhanbileg struck it with former Rio Tinto’s
boss Jean-Sebastien Jacques in a Dubai hotel, ending an impasse that had lasted
close to three years.
According
to a senior government official, “It is calculated that Mongolia will not
receive dividend payments until 2051 and will incur debts of $22 billion. In
addition, Oyu Tolgoi is estimated to pay profit taxes or corporate income taxes
only in four years until 2051.”
TURKMENISTAN
Gurbanguly
Berdymukhammedov, the eccentric president of Turkmenistan, has claimed on
television that the herb licorice might hold the answer to the cure for
COVID-19 and has ordered scientists to work on a medicine.
Berdymukhammedov
ordered the country's Academy of Sciences to "carefully study" the
herb's "antiviral effects," adding that Turkmenistan has sufficient
reserves of licorice "to produce medicine." He went on to say that
the licorice root had long been used to treat "internal diseases, coughs,
kidney diseases, upper respiratory problems, and stomach ulcers."
The
secretive Turkmen government has not reported a single coronavirus infection in
the country and prevents doctors from diagnosing any patient with COVID-19.
Medical sources have been quoted in many media reports as saying that hospitals
across Turkmenistan are full of patients with pneumonia and other symptoms that
patients with COVID-19 would have.
VACCINATION, PRACTICE AND POLITICS FOOTNOTE
In one way
or the other the long history of vaccines had some political connotations. In
the end of the 18th century Russian society, in many ways like most European
countries, was categorically against smallpox immunization. Catherine the
Great, the Russian Empress, was the first person to be variolated (as the
process was known at the time) in order to show the example to her subjects.
French philosopher Voltaire wrote to Catherine that she showed exceptional
political courage that would save millions of lives. Since that time, the
vaccination has always been politicized. We see it now when the European Union
insists that its members should be first in line for vaccine deliveries. Canada
has become a victim of such an approach. Many countries are working on
development of their own vaccines. There are 10 vaccines registered in one form
or another. There are more than 60 other vaccines in active development. The
need to put aside political disagreements and to increase cooperation both in
development of the vaccines and their fair distribution around the world has
been broadly acknowledged in principle. Practice has not always followed. That
vaccination should not become politicized is probably the main lesson to be
learnt. It should also be acknowledged though that public health policy and
practices will have an impact on the efficiency of the process. Examples below
illustrate this.
Russians
are already being inoculated with the Sputnik-V vaccine after it was approved
by Moscow in August despite a lack of large-scale clinical trials and perceived
shortcomings in data to support its safety and efficacy. Since then, the
Sputnik V vaccine has been approved in 15 more countries, including EU member
Hungary. The process to approve the vaccine in the EU has been initiated.
Israel has rolled out the fastest Covid-19 vaccination campaign in the world, inoculating nearly 25% of its population in under a month with the Pfizer vaccine. The small country, with roughly 9 million people, about the same as New York City, now aims to inoculate most of its population by March.
If Israel begins to see the impact of the vaccination, with no resurgence of Covid-19 cases in the coming months, this will provide a gold standard for other countries worldwide. However, with its smaller geography and population size, its pro-vaccine culture, its universal health care and digitalised medical system Israel finds itself having virtually all the comparative advantages.
There are
also reports that Israel paid cash and a premium for early access. Even more important
in securing access seems to have been the willingness to share freely some vaccination
data with Pfizer.
--o--
THE AUTHORS