THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
SHOOT FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER
The use of
chemical weapons is absolutely condemnable. In Europe and North America, Bashar
al Assad generally has a terrible reputation, on several accounts. The
President of France has previously stated that the use of chemical weapons is a
red line not to be crossed. On April 7th allegations emerge that
chemical weapons have been used by the Assad forces in Eastern Ghouta. An
amateur video seems to confirm this. What more is needed to launch retaliatory
strikes against Assad’s alleged chemical weapons research facilities and
installations? If at the same time the opportunity exists to show common
resolve between the US, France and the UK, what can go wrong?
A few
things can go wrong. More and more reputable observers, including Western
military specialists, have begun to cast doubt on the reality of the April 7th
incident, underlining the fact that it made no sense from either a military or
political point of view, since the Eastern Ghouta battle was virtually over.
Other observers have begun to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the military
response, the April 14th targeted missile strike. The Syrians have
even boasted to have sent to Moscow an unexploded Tomahawk missile, so that it
could be thoroughly analysed by Russian specialists. Poor Secretary of Defense
Mattis, who probably played a crucial role in making this a sensible strike, was
left trying to answer the question as to how you can destroy a chemical weapons
storage facility without causing the accidental release of deadly chemicals. “We
do our best! “is the only answer he could give. Public opinion polls also showed
that there was not a very strong popular support for the strikes.
What
started as “Trump, Macron and May more decisive than Obama story” moves to the
back pages of the newspapers, if such things still exist. Yet, in the meantime,
not having awaited the outcome of expectedly futile UN Security Council
discussions, the OPCW decides to send its own inspectors to the Eastern Ghouta.
After having met the exigencies of the UN Security Division the inspectors
finally gain access to the area where chemical weapons were allegedly used. The
OPCW is however no different than any other fact-finding entity. It can find
evidence of the use of chemical weapons and make a definite statement about
that. If it does not find such evidence, it can only say that it has not found
evidence, but cannot make a definite statement to the effect that chemical
weapons were not used. The public relations battle will not stop with the tabling
of the OPCW report, for sure.
Throughout
this process, Macron claims to have convinced Trump to keep US forces in Syria.
Finishing off ISIS and working for long-term peace in Syria would be the
objectives. Yet, Trump’s instincts would have him leave Syria. It is easy to
understand why there would be limited interest in continuing being involved in
the Northern Syria standoff between the Kurdish forces and the Turkish army and
its local allies. In Southern Syria, it might make more sense to keep a military
presence near the Iraq border. That might serve as a tool that could limit the
ambitions of Iran and Hezbollah. How effective that presence would be is a big
question. Ultimately though, for Macron, the issue is not the US military
presence per se but the continuing
involvement of the US in the overall discussions on Syria, more specifically in
the recently inactive UN-led Geneva peace process. Macron clearly has a
preference for that process over the Russia/Iran /Turkey-led Astana peace
process. There are serious issues at stake: who participates and whether a
durable peace arrangement can be achieved.
Since the
US-UK-France strikes, the Syrian forces have continued their offensive against
the remaining pockets of rebel resistance, especially in the southeast of the
country, in areas that are relatively close to Damascus. Whereas there may
little progress in the peace and reconstruction process, the Assad regime is
progressively regaining control of its territory, strengthening its position
whenever it has to sit down at a negotiating table, if ever.
Even though
Turkey joined Western countries in condemning the alleged use of chemical
weapons in Eastern Ghouta, this did not prevent the Foreign Ministers of
Turkey, Iran and Russia having a meeting in Moscow on April 28th. On
the occasion, they agreed on holding another high-level meeting of the Macron-disliked
“Astana format peace negotiations “in Astana in mid-May.
Ultimately,
in themselves, the alleged chemical incident, the military response and the
ensuing public relations battle that follows do not so much matter for the
future. What will matter more is whether France having used the incident to
keep the US in Syria will be able to take advantage of that to give new life to
its preferred peace process. Given the evolution of the situation in Syria,
there may not be a lot of time left to do that.
--o--
ARMENIA ON EDGE
Serzh
Sargsyan only recently completed the major reform of transforming Armenia from
a presidential republic into a parliamentary one. Despite having given prior
assurances to the contrary, he then moved from the position of President to
that of Prime Minister, de facto remaining in power. He now has admitted his
error and resigned in order to quell massive street protests.
Sargsyan
led Armenia for 10 years with two main principles in mind: close relations with
Russia and steadfast defense of the status
quo in the bitter conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Sargsyan
is himself a native of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Sargsyan’s “clinging”
to power triggered popular discontent that quickly morphed into demands for
radical improvements in living standards as well as more political freedom. With
the lack of real progress on the economic front for the whole period of
Sargsyan’s presidential tenure as well as the widespread perception of
pervasive corruption, the prospect of his use of constitutional reform to
remain in power indefinitely brought the situation to a breaking point. The
Government in Yerevan could not use violent force against protesters for many
reasons, one being that on April 24th Armenia marks the anniversary of the 1915-1923
genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman government. On that occasion, thousands of
Armenians from France, Russia, Germany and the United States arrive in the
country. The presence of uniformed soldiers among the protesters may also have
been cause for restraint.
With the resignation
of Sargsyan, a new Prime Minister has to be chosen by Parliament. This is to be
done on May1st. If no candidate receives a majority of votes, there will be a
second attempt 7 days later. If that attempt also fails, Parliament is
dissolved and new elections are held. Since the last parliamentary elections
were held in April 2017, there is some normal pressure for this “young”
legislature to sort out the matter. This is also what President Putin suggested
in his call on Acting Prime Minister Karapetian on April, along with the
insistence that the crisis be resolved exclusively through legal means. Later on,
the State Department issued a roughly similar statement. If new elections have
to be held, the coalition of reformers led by parliamentarian Nikol Pashinyan,
the leader of the recent protests could well win, but Pashinyan himself has
insisted that he should be appointed Prime Minister since he is the people’s
choice. This is becoming more likely. Armen Sarkissian, the President of
Armenia, is reported as trying to facilitate dialogue between the parties.
Whoever
becomes Prime Minister, be it sooner or later, there is no expectation of a
major change in Armenia’s geo-political positioning. If compared to its ancient
predecessors, modern Armenia is a small country. It is in conflict with two
neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and gets along with the third one, Georgia,
more by necessity than by affinity. Russia is the only strong economic and
military ally and support base. Russia is generally wary of situations where street
protests run the risk of creating unpredictability and eventually political
chaos. Its reaction this time has been guarded. Russia has no reason to be
overly concerned by even very significant re-alignments on the internal
political scene. This is not likely to become another battlefield between the
US and Russia.
Even if
Russia may not be overly pleased with the current crisis, the departure from
power of Sargsyan may not be considered as a terrible loss. Despite the
perception of Sargsyan’s strong pro-Russian inclinations, there were issues. Ultimately,
one might even contend that outgoing Prime Minister Sargsyan’s profile is
similar to that of several regional leaders that have been sacked by Vladimir
Putin. Furthermore, should events in Armenia lead to a turn towards more
openness and liberalization, Russia may rather welcome a more dynamic yet still
friendly partner, something that certainly corresponds to the traditional image
of Armenia as a place of initiative and creation, even during the Soviet
period.
--o--
UNTYING THE KOREAN KNOT
 |
| Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in, Panmunjom, April 27th |
In his last
act as CIA director Mike Pompeo made a secret visit to North Korea during the
recent Easter holiday and met with Kim Jong-un. The purpose of the trip was to
set up the expected meeting between President Trump and Kim. This odd summit
will take place in June. For its location, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s capital is
currently the first choice, with Singapore in second place. (It looks as though
Trump may want a more spectacular location.) Kim's unexpected decision to
discuss denuclearization has been prompted by a combination of factors such as the
heavy pressure from China, the main ally and support base of the North Korean
regime, the discrete diplomacy of Russia that sent several delegations to meet
its former client and, of course, the never seen before credible threat of US military
action. This last point will be conveniently re-reinforced during the
negotiations with North Korea by the recent strike on Syrian targets by an American-led
coalition: the threat had been made, it was carried out quickly, without the
need for a formal UN approval.
Washington
also gave its blessing to the inter-Korean summit which just took place in the
demilitarized zone between North and South. Technically both countries are still
in a state of war. The armistice signed in 1953 at the conclusion of a 3
year-long conflict is the only formal agreement between the two states. This
time the Korean leaders agreed on the principle of denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula and on the proposal to pursue talks with the US and China toward
the negotiation of a real peace treaty that would bestow normalization of
economic, political and cultural relations. The idea of such a negotiation has
already been endorsed by President Trump.
There are
reasons to believe that Kim may do away with his nuclear program in exchange
for the end of sanctions, massive economic and financial assistance from the US,
South Korea and Japan and firm guarantees for his regime's security. The idea
of allocating fewer resources to the military may eventually come up, but not
immediately as it raises some fundamental questions about the very nature of
the North Korean regime.
As for
possible obstacles in the peace process, observers have mostly raised the
question of the genuine nature of North Korea’s commitment to peace. Only time
will tell, but current indications are indeed positive. A problem may, however,
still arise on the other side. For now, there are seemingly no difference
between the US and South Korean positions. In light of his recent highly-visible
success, Moon Jae-in could become too enthusiastic and less uncompromising. In
that context, keeping some of the limelight for Donald Trump might not be a bad
idea.
--o--
TRADE WITH RUSSIA GROWS DESPITE SANCTIONS
It is a
common view that the worsening of international relations and the wide spread
use of economic sanctions rapidly downgrades bilateral trade. In the case of
trade relations between Canada and Russia the reverse dynamics appear to take
place. According to Eurasian Union statistics, Russian exports to Canada have
been steadily increasing and reached over $1 billion in 2017, roughly 50% more
than in the previous year. Russia sells to Canada mineral products, chemicals,
machinery, plastic and base metals. Meanwhile Canadian exports to Russia also have
increased by over 35%, with machinery and transport equipment in the lead. It
is worth recalling that Canada lost pork exports to Russia as the main element
of Canadian export structure. In 2012-2013 Russia purchased almost $500 million
worth of pork. These sales were lost due to counter sanctions introduced by
Moscow in response to Canadian measures put in effect immediately after the
beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
The
International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg (May 25-26) will address this
new reality: how to manage the growth of international trade in a
sanction-ridden world. More on that will follow in next month’s issue.
--o--
UKRAINE UPDATE
 |
| Patriarch Bartholomew, President Poroshenko, Istanbul, April 9th |
There have
been serious efforts to move along the proposal for a peacekeeping contingent
in Eastern Ukraine. There are indications that the proposal may be closer to
reality than ever before. It could well be that, after the appointment of the
new government in Russia in mid-May, the matter will receive increased
attention. This being said, the overall prospects for peaceful settlement of
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine are as remote as ever. As noted before, in the
current circumstances in Ukraine, there is no appetite for any form of
compromise with rebel regions. There is also no outside pressure on Kyiv
authorities since they enjoy the unconditional support of their Western allies.
There are as well occasional rumours that the presidential and parliamentary elections
that are scheduled for 2019 could be held at an earlier date. In the context of
this pre-electoral atmosphere, there is no likelihood whatsoever of any change
in the position of Kyiv on how to reintegrate the Donbass into Ukraine.
An example
of the unconditional support extended to Kyiv was given at the recent meeting
of G7 Foreign Affairs ministers in Toronto. On the occasion, the chair of the
meeting, Canadian Foreign Minister Freeland invited the Foreign Minister of
Ukraine to address the meeting. The objective was clearly to firm up G7 support
for Ukraine and to keep “the disruptive influence of Russia on the West” as a
top agenda item.
As for
President Poroshenko, it seems as though seasoned political observers in Ukraine
are already writing his political obituary, as his chances for re-election seem
to get slimmer every month. Poroshenko himself does not however seem to want to
give up and has turned to a highly symbolic, sensitive and complex issue to
restore some of his credentials.
During his
April 9th visit in Istanbul, Poroshenko met Oecumenical Orthodox
Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul to discuss the possibility of granting the tomos of autocephaly i.e. independence
to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, with a view to creating one independent
Ukrainian Orthodox Church. There are currently three Orthodox churches in
Ukraine, each one with its own patriarch. Only one of them formally recognizes
the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. Following consultations with the
three patriarchs and with parliamentarians, Poroshenko sent one of his
officials to Istanbul to deliver his appeal for the tomos of autocephaly to the Oecumenical Patriarch. This will likely
be followed by elaborate consultations, including discussions between the
Oecumenical Patriarch and the Moscow Patriarch. Should the Oecumenical
Patriarch agree to granting independence to a united Ukrainian Orthodox Church,
deciding which of the three patriarchs should head that entity is going to be a
most difficult process. Even if the patriarchs were to agree among themselves,
there is no guarantee that their followers would. The Moscow Patriarchate would
most likely never accept a decision that would affect its jurisdiction. There
could follow a serious and lengthy inter-confessional crisis in Ukraine, where
the animosity between Ukrainian and pro-Moscow Orthodox Churches is deeply set.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: EMMANUEL MACRON
 |
| Presidents Macron and Trump, Washington, April 23rd |
The
youthful president of France is steadily taking over the leadership of
contemporary Europe. Germany's Angela Merkel has been retreating from this role
due to the weakness of her coalition and her somewhat strained relations with
Donald Trump. The recent joint attack on Syria by US, UK and France has
propelled Macron into a strategic parity with his more global allies.
Macron’s
recent visit to the US reinforced his growing influence with Trump. Macron
managed to steer Trump away from withdrawing American troops from Syria and
making coalition strikes less devastating and away from Russia's zones of
control in order not to risk all out conflict with powerful Russia. His best
efforts to persuade Trump not to leave the nuclear deal with Iran were not
successful, but he not giving up. He is now taking the approach that it might
be possible to negotiate an even better deal for the future, while keeping the
current arrangement on the understanding that the "imperfect deal is
better than no deal at all".
He also wants
to play a peacemaker role with Russia and wants to work with the Kremlin to fix
Middle East and Ukrainian issues. In late May, Macron will go to the St.
Petersburg Economic Forum to promote growing French trade and investment
interests in Russia as well as for a meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir
Putin.
--o--
BRIEFLY NOTED
AZERBAIJAN
In April 2018, after the targeted strike on Syria, Azerbaijan hosted high level talks between Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov and NATO military Commander General Scaparrotti, the first such talks since 2013.The parties discussed issues of military activities of NATO and Russia in the European region as well as raising the level of confidence and prevention of incidents. They also exchanged views on Syria and the fight against international terrorism.
Separetely
Gerasimov held talks with Azerbaijan President Aliyev and his military advisers
on cooperation between Russia and Azerbajan. When Armenia is in a state of
political turmoil, Russia's military assistance to Azerbaijan can become a very
delicate issue.
BELARUS
Aleksandr Lukashenko who has led Belarus since 1994 said in his televised address to parliament that his country will try to keep good relations not only with Russia, its traditional ally, but with the EU and United States. He accused Russia of unfairness and economic discrimination against Belarus dairy and other industries. He promised to develop better ties with the EU in the sphere of exports of Belorussian agricultural products. He also confirmed that Belarus could be part of peacekeeping force in Ukraine should the UN so require.
RUSSIA-US
The US
Treasury Department announced that the sanctions recently introduced against
the Russian aluminum giant Rusal could be lifted providing that Oleg Deripaska,
the main shareholder and the CEO, would leave the company. It was explained
that the main target of sanctions was Deripaska himself, as a member of Putin's
inner circle, not the company as such. This decision could save thousands of
jobs in many countries, including the United States. Russian officials
indicated that such a compromise maybe in the works.
KAZAKHSTAN
Human
rights observers reported about the increasing tensions between Kazakhstan and
China in connection with ethnic Kazakhs' in their border provinces. More than 1
million Kazakhs now reside in China. Growing prominence of Kazakhstan on the
international arena gave rise to local Kazakh nationalism in China. Some
Kazakhs there demand more cultural autonomy and closer ties and travel privileges
with their native Kazakhstan. China wants to downplay these nationalistic
tendencies. For its part, Astana welcomes the influx of Chinese Kazakhs as a
means of offsetting its large Russian speaking population.
CANADA-RUSSIA
On a
slightly lighter and musical note, the Vancouver Courier just recently
published an article with the heading “Vancouver Opera Festival colludes with
Russia”. This has nothing to do with Donald Trump or fake news, but refers to a
major cultural festival being held in Vancouver. We offer you a direct quote
from the Vancouver Opera website:
From April 28 to May 6, under the banner of the
Russian White Nights, the second annual Vancouver Opera Festival celebrates
Russian composers with a Russian classic opera, a much anticipated opera
premiere, a series of instrumental and vocal chamber music concerts, and much
more. https://www.vancouveropera.ca/
THE AUTHORS
Ilya Gerol,
former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in
Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His
particular area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern
and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has
written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on
relations of media and society.
During his
career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at
the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet
period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and
Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for
Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil
servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.
