THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
NATO-RUSSIA: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
In early October, NATO expelled eight Russian military officials working at Russia’s Representation to NATO. In response Russia closed its representation to NATO and NATO’s Information Office in Moscow. Even in a quiet month for relations between Euro-Atlantic countries and Russia, this is almost a non-event as NATO-Russia relations have been reduced to virtually nothing over the last seven years since the Ukrainian crisis. NATO’s actions were founded on "an increase in Russian malign activity, and hence the need for greater vigilance. A NATO official said the individuals were "undeclared Russian intelligence officers". There is some unrecognized irony in this. If you are a Russian official at NATO and you can only have limited official contacts with your counterparts, there is not much left to do other than to try to collect intelligence. In any event you would report directly to the Intelligence group at your Ministry of Defence as all military attachés around the world do on a regular basis. In a limited interaction context, if you cannot collect intelligence, one might even ask what is the point of a representation?
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| NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, President Putin, NATO-Russia Summit, Rome, May 2002 ©NATO Website |
In an ideal
world, the situation in Afghanistan when the US decided to enter the country in
2001 could have been an occasion for NATO-Russia cooperation. This is not to
say that the outcome would have been different. That which can be observed
though is that in and around 2001 the US and NATO had the option, in support of
their Afghan operations, to operate bases in Central Asia with the acquiescence
of Russia. Nowadays Russia openly calls on Afghanistan's neighbours to refuse
to host U.S. or NATO military forces following their withdrawal from
Afghanistan. This may not be so significant in strategic terms, but in terms of
NATO/Russia cooperation that step backward is far more significant than closing
the NATO Information Office in Moscow. It also confirms that nothing much can
be expected on the NATO-Russia front for the near future.
--o--
THE LESS KNOWN COLIN POWELL
NATO
The brief
return of NATO to the headlines around the time of the passing of former
Secretary of State Colin Powell is the occasion to take another look at NATO,
starting with some private but not so secret observations that Colin Powell himself
made about his NATO experience. Powell was known to have observed that one of
the NATO ministerial meetings in which he had to participate was probably the
worst meeting he ever attended. These observations were relatively private and
do not amount to calling the organisation brain-dead as President Macron did 20
years later, but they reflect a frustration with the lifeless political
conversation within NATO.
It should
be understood that the criticism directed at NATO really focuses on the
Alliance’s stultified political function. It should also be acknowledged that,
to many members, having a politically brain-dead institution is desirable, as
they see no need for creativity or change. This also explains the inherent lack
of interest for a NATO-Russia Council that could have changed the terms of the
relationship with Russia.
The
commitment to NATO on the part of founding members as well on the part of
Eastern European countries who wanted so badly to join after the end of the
Cold War is really based on the mutual defence commitment embodied in article 5
of the Washington Treaty. The collective defence arrangements that follow from
this commitment are really what matters. Among newer NATO members, there is
little or no appetite for change. There is also little enthusiasm for a purely
European defence arrangement.
UKRAINE
One of the
other private comments made by Colin Powell during his tenure as Secretary of
State in the early 2000s was that the next battlefront with Russia would be
Ukraine. This was before any Orange Revolution. This was Powell’s straightforward
and prescient acknowledgement that Russia’s attempts either to re-build the
Soviet Union with Ukraine inside or even to keep Ukraine in its zone of
influence would be met with resistance on the part of the US and most likely as
well, some of the new members of NATO, especially Poland and the Baltic states.
The comment had the merit of clarity to the effect that the primary concern was
to counter Russia.
On a
separate but related front Dimitry Trenin, the Director of the Carnegie Office
in Moscow, recently reported that Russia would have wanted to expand the
Normandy Four (Ukraine, France, Germany, Russia) discussions to include the US,
acknowledging that the US has the most influence on Ukraine. This was also a
Ukrainian suggestion. France and Germany objected as it would lessen their role
and not necessarily lead to any resolution of the conflict with the US having
little incentive to normalise the Ukraine-Russia relationship.
--o--
THE
EUROPEAN GAS CRISIS
There have
been contradictory analyses and statements about the role of Russia in the
current European gas crisis during which prices have increased three times in
some cases. Prices went down 20 % after Russia announced in late October its
intention to increase exports. Some have credibly explained that Russia is not
responsible, with many other factors including the weather causing the current
problems. Since it is clear that, with German approval, the Nord Stream 2 will
soon become operational, the idea that Russia was withholding gas to secure
some other form of approval for the pipeline did not seem to be widely believed.
Others have argued that Russia’s reputation as a dependable supplier suffered.
Giving itself the good role, Ukraine
offered to arrange for the transit at a reduced rate of more Russian gas
to Western Europe. Others have even argued that Russia’s insistence on
long-term contracts contradicts the objective of moving away from fossil fuels.
Chancellor Merkel corrected the copy by clarifying that the initial necessary
transition is from coal to natural gas.
The above-noted
turmoil in the European gas market would seem to suggest that Chancellor Merkel
was quite right in supporting the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
that will bring Russian gas to Germany through a pipeline on the floor of the Baltic
Sea. It will avoid land crossings and the attending transit fees; it will
diversify the pipeline grid and it will use a more modern and more reliable
technology than Soviet-era pipelines.
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| Nord Stream 2 at Russian landfall |
Ultimately,
for the foreseeable future, there is mutual dependence and convergence of
interests between Russia, the largest provider and Germany, the largest
customer: long-term, stable, and secure sales and supplies. The EU, the US and
transit states have different concerns, but they do not alter this fundamental
element.
In an early
November last-minute attempt to prevent the approval of Nord Stream 2, the head
of Naftogaz, the Ukrainian State Gaz company, added to the usual geopolitical
arguments the observation that the end of the transit of Russian gas through
Ukraine makes the prospect of open war between the two countries more likely.
Theoretically, he may be right. The rather excessive nature of the remark
limits its usefulness but illustrates the state of mind in some parts of
Ukraine.
--o--
UKRAINE UPDATE
The late
October use of a Turkish-made drone by Ukrainian Armed Forces against Eastern
Ukraine insurgent forces has caught considerable attention and even elicited
critical comments from France and Germany. No such criticism came from the US.
There is a sense that, as the situation in Eastern Ukraine generally stagnates,
President Zelenskyy may be inclined to turn to an increase of military
activity, especially if that activity is conducted on a remote basis that
avoids new casualties on the Ukrainian side. In political terms Zelenskyy has
little choice but to show a stronger positionvis-à-vis Russia. This may sustain his popularity,but may not achieve anything else.
--o--
VACCINES IN RUSSIA
Questions
have been repeatedly raised about why Russians do not get vaccinated and
whether this is a rejection of Vladimir Putin and his policies.
The first
question has received a fairly credible answer from public opinion experts.
When it comes to vaccines, the Russian experience was shaped by the mandatory
vaccine policy implemented by the Soviet bureaucracy. The end of the USSR and
individuals regaining their personal space have meant that people are
protective of their freedom of choice when it comes to things that were in the
past imposed from above. The fact that vaccines served to eradicate some
diseases does not seem enough to counter that tendency.
When it
comes to vaccine and leadership, a possible explanation may be that the
situation is most likely complicated by the way Russians receive official
information and how this is to a considerable extent separate from approval of
leaders. Anything that falls into the category of messages that are intended to
influence opinion (what used to be called propaganda) tends to be automatically
discounted and read at a different level. In other words, the fact that you are
popular does not mean that I believe everything you say especially if you are
trying to tell me what to do.
Incidentally,
with vaccines perhaps not so readily available in neighbouring Ukraine, by the
end of October the vaccination rate there would seem only be at 24% compared to
Russia’s 38 %. Some of the same vaccination reluctance may extend beyond
Russia’s border for reasons that are not dissimilar.
--o--
VALDAI CLUB NEWS
President
Putin’s speech at this year’s mid-October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club argued
that Russia’s development should be founded on a “conservatism for optimists.” The speech may offer a picture of a Putin that is less extreme than is generally perceived. What is more striking though is that the speech is at a philosophical level that virtually no
one would ever expect from a North American leader. This is the kind of speech
that Merkel or Macron might do on special occasions. It may not and should not change your
opinion of Putin as an authoritarian leader, but it is revealing of the Russian
political culture that the President sees the need to engage in such a discussion.
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| President Putin and discussion moderator Fedor Lukyanov, Sochi, October 21 ©President of Russia Website |
Another
less widely publicised element of this year’s Valdai Club meeting was the
attendance of the most recent co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Russian
journalist Dmitry Muratov. To Western observers this may have looked rather
unusual. A person who is presented as an anti-establishment journalist and a
defender of freedom of speech not only gets invited but engages in a public
conversation with the President about the vexed question of foreign agents. You may not have a choice if the President
invites you, but if he invites you, he signals to the rest of the establishment
that you are under his roof. This is also revealing of a slightly more complex
political environment than is generally described in Western media.
--o--
RUSSIA AND CHINA: PACTA SUNT SERVANDA?
As many
political analysts are trying to devise what might be a new China policy for
the US and for Canada, there is a temptation to find points of comparison
between the way the West dealt with the USSR/Russia and the way it should deal
with China.
This also
has some bearing on the ongoing academic debate about whether Russia is on a
convergence or divergence path with Europe.
Without
going into a long academic discussion, we would single out a major difference:
throughout the difficulties of relations between the Euro-Atlantic community
and Russia it was clear that Russia wanted to be a member of the club or, as
some put it more crudely, join the civilised world. Ukraine became a turning
point in that there was a major collision between the interests of Russia and
the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. There is fundamental disagreement
as to whether rules were followed. Russia essentially rejected the Western
interpretation of how the rules of international law should be applied. In
engaging in the Minsk Peace Process, Russia nevertheless confirmed its
intention to have at least part of the problem resolved through diplomatic
negotiations.
In the case
of China, issues such as the ill-treatment of the Uighur minority or the
prolonged unfounded detention of two Canadians are important, but none is more
indicative of China’s state of mind than its current Hong Kong policy. China
has no intention whatsoever of abiding by the terms of the agreement with the
United Kingdom that led to the return of the territory to China. Neither the
United Kingdom nor any of its allies has any leverage to change that. Unlike
Russia, China is a club in itself. You would not hear a Chinese leader at any
level suggest that China wants to join the civilised world. When it comes to
matters of civilisation, China does not see the need to join what it probably
sees as a lesser form of life.
The other
main difference is that there never was between the West and Russia the kind of
economic relationship that currently exists between China and other major
economic entities.
Another
difference is that Russia may seek to use its diaspora for improving relations
whereas China seeks to control its diaspora to advance its interests. The
nuance is important.
The policy
of engagement with Russia hit the wall in Ukraine. With China, the priority was
always economic interaction. There are no major lessons to draw from our
relations with Russia we could apply to China other than that it should be quite
different as we are confronted with a global power that will interpret the
rules as it sees fit and a major client over which we have virtually no
influence or leverage.
--o--
THE MOLDOVAN EXCEPTION
In late
October, the European Union accused Russia of using gas to bully Moldova, the
small, former Soviet republic and, as the BBC called it to make it a bit more
dramatic, the poorest country in Europe. Within days, on October 29th, Russia's
Gazprom and the Moldovan government signed a new five-year contract for Russian
gas supplies on “mutually beneficial terms”. This is not
surprising. By force of habit, the EU had opted to blame Russia when the gas
contract negotiations were difficult. Granted, the discussions were complicated
with the European gas market being in turmoil and the two parties having to
deal with the gas supply to Moldova’s Russian-supported breakaway region of
Transdniestria. The EU reading of the situation did not, however, consider that
Maia Sandu, the pro-European President of Moldova seems to have astutely
created a very good working relationship with Dimitry Kozak, the Deputy Head of
the Russian Presidential Administration and a very long-time associate of
Vladimir Putin. To her credit, Ms. Sandu’s pro-Europe preferences did not
prevent her from creating the circumstances for advancing Moldova’s interest in
relation with Russia in a constructive manner. Politically she is in a win-win
position. Moldova is not Ukraine, but this may warrant re-considering the usual
assumptions about the incompatibility of good relations with both the EU and
Russia.
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| August 11 meeting between Dmitry Kozak and President Sandu, Chisinau |
--o--
THE END OF THE ROAD FOR MISHA?
Mikheil
Saakashvili, former President of Georgia and former senior official in Ukraine,
returned to his home country in early October and called on his supporters to
march on the capital. He stands in opposition to the Georgian Dream party that
currently holds power in Georgia. He was imprisoned almost immediately on the
basis criminal charges against him going back to 2014. He has now undertaken a
hunger strike. Saakashvili can claim substantial reform achievements from his
time as President of Georgia (2004-2013), but also displayed
authoritarian tendencies that are behind the criminal accusations against him.
Russia holds him responsible for starting the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. Worse
though is that many Georgians hold him responsible for losing the war. His impulsive
style and egocentric tendencies have not always served him well and have not
made him many friends. In response to calls for the hunger-striking Saakashvili
to be moved from prison to hospital Georgian Prime Minister Garibashvili simply
said that Saakashvili “has the right to commit suicide.”
--o--
On October
24th Uzbekistan incumbent President Shavkat Mirziyoyev won a second
term with a majority 80% of the vote. Credible international observers from the
OSCE suitably acknowledged the reforms conducted so far by the President, but
also singled out a number of deficiencies. This is a classic case of observers
having to balance support for reforms with the continuing existence of legal
shortcomings. Perhaps more remarkable however was the fact that, after the
election, President Mirziyoyev received the head of the OSCE Observation
Mission. This is not a customary practice. Acknowledging the work of the
Observation Mission is not only a goodwill message to the Mission itself but it
is also a message to the political establishment about the validity of the critical conclusions of the Mission.
--o--
UNWANTED AMBASSADORS
President
Erdogan’s decision to declare a number of foreign Ambassadors (Including the
Canadian one) persona non grata over their criticism of his treatment of businessperson
and philanthropist Osman Kavala, jailed in 2017 despite not having been
convicted of a crime, was excessive even for an impulsive leader like him. His
reversal of the decision was a confirmation of the erratic nature of his
behaviour. Erdogan’s subsequent meeting with President Biden on the margins of
the G20 meeting in Rome “was held in a positive atmosphere”. What this might
mean is that Erdogan does not begrudge the Biden administration for what he saw
as the US support to the July 2016 failed military coup against him. With the acquisition
of an advanced Russian missile system still on track and with the supply of
American F-16 fighter aircraft still not resolved, it does not however signal a
significant turnaround in US-Turkey relations.
--o--
