THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
PRISONERS OR HOSTAGES?
The release
of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor from unwarranted detention is cause for unmitigated
celebration. After the initial euphoria, some questions nevertheless arise as
to what really happened and what lessons can be drawn. There has been no
shortage of well-informed commentary. There are however a few unanswered
questions as well a few observations that deserve mention in that they may be relevant
for guiding future action, especially with respect to Chinese motivations.
Even though
Washington officially refuses to see the linkage (or, even worse, admit in the
slightest way that the Biden administration is getting soft on China), the release
of the two Canadians was the direct result of the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (DPA) negotiated between the US Department of Justice and Meng Wanzhou’s
lawyers. Avoidance of collateral damage is deemed an acceptable reason for
concluding a DPA. In the case of Meng Wanzhou’s DPA, no collateral damage is specifically mentioned.
There is however a reference to the fact that the extradition hearings in
Canada might last for months if not years. It would be a generous interpretation to construe
this as an indirect reference to the lengthy detention of the two Canadians.
Although
there may have been a difference of opinion on timelines, the Chinese side came
around to the idea that an admission of guilt in the context of a DPA was the
quickest and perhaps the only way to secure the release of their VIP. The Biden
administration continues to hold the line that the US Department of Justice is
an independent agency that makes its own decisions without political
interference, thus implying that diplomacy did not play a role, and contradicting
the assertions of some former Canadian diplomats to the effect that diplomacy solved
the problem. Stricto sensu the US statements are right: the Department
of Justice made its own decision about the appropriateness of a DPA. A DPA
would satisfy their main requirement, an admission of guilt. That along with
time in detention, even in a gilded cage, would form the basis of a reasonable legal
decision. The Department of Justice’s concern for collateral damage may however
have also evolved over the last year. A Department of Justice headed by Merrick
Garland, a distinguished jurist, rather than William Barr, a Trump stooge,
would certainly be more enlightened in the interpretation of the concept. The
problem is that by releasing the two Canadians immediately after the DPA was
signed off in New York the Chinese authorities made clear that in their view
there unmistakably was a direct linkage. By beginning a few weeks earlier to discuss
arrangements for letting the two Michaels go, they were not offering an early
release as much as one that would be simultaneous with the departure of Meng
Wanzhou. The later suggestion that the two
Michaels were freed for health reasons would only be a convenient excuse. One had to be found. There was no need for it
be credible.
Incidentally,
the discrepancy between what the Chinese do and what they say is not a sign of stupidity
or of a misunderstanding of public opinion. Like Donald Trump, but for much
longer, the Chinese authorities have known the value of a good lie. Their inspiration would however be found in
the Marxist-Leninist aphorism that “it is right to lie to your class enemy”.
This also does not mean that you cannot engage in propaganda activities to
advance your own narrative.
The Chinese
authorities would not have failed to observe that over time the US Department
of Justice has prosecuted foreign nationals and even sought extra-territorial
application of US laws, despite the vehement protests of some of the governments
whose nationals were affected by this. This has been the case with Russia on a
few occasions. The difference is that the Chinese would not be satisfied with
protests. In the case of Meng Wanzhou, but not for the first time, they showed they
would respond in a ruthless manner to secure the release of their national, even
if it means the arbitrary, unfounded, cruel, and fundamentally unethical
detention of foreign nationals.
The release
of the two Michaels barely hours after Meng Wanzhou was freed was meant to confirm
that there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that should another Chinese
national be arrested the way she was, the response would be the same.
Any foreign
national living on Chinese territory (including Hong Kong and Macau) should
however be aware of the fact that he is a potential prisoner if the government
of his country of origin is likely to engage in what the Chinese see as
aggressive prosecution or even possibly other forms of perceived aggression. No
large exodus of foreigners has yet been observed, since the odds are not that
great that you will be the one eventually targeted. There will nevertheless be
a greater incentive for foreigners from certain countries to follow as
religiously as possible all local rules so that their name does not make its
way to the short list of candidates for arrest.
The Meng
Wanzhou case ultimately confirms what we already know or should have known: in
dealing with China, any aggressive action, no matter whether perceived or real,
will be met with a direct and possibly brutal response. Reducing your vulnerability
to a country with which you are eager to do business is the first challenge.
The more long-term challenge is to make China conform to our version of what is
acceptable behaviour. There may not a full answer to that yet, but, clearly,
weakness is not an option.
--o--
BUYING A BETTER SUBMARINE AND A BETTER SHIELD
The security
agreement between Australia, the UK and the US that foresees among other things
the construction in Australia of eight nuclear-powered submarines using the
latest US and UK technologies was rightfully called a stab in the back by the
French Foreign Minister. The new deal led to the immediate cancellation of the 2016
France-Australia agreement for the eventual construction of twelve conventional-powered submarines.
From what
we have seen so far, it would seem it is the Australian side (probably
spearheaded by their military establishment) that took the initiative of the
new agreement. The US and the UK would have had economic
reasons to entertain the proposal. The impact on France would have been readily
dismissed. The US and the UK would have
known that this would increase the French incentive to create a distinctly
European military capability in order to move away from “brain-dead” NATO. In that sense, Biden and Johnson may have done
more to undermine NATO than Trump and Putin together, but the stakes were high,
and the risk could be managed. Besides, Emmanuel Macron is not Charles de
Gaulle and will not walk away from NATO.
From a
geo-political point of view, AUKUS is clearly intended to allow Australia to position
itself militarily against China. The nuclear-powered submarines can apparently do
this better along with the new technologies that have been offered as a bonus
by the US. As noted above, in dealing with China, weakness is not an option.
The new equipment procured by Australia will essentially serve to effect
surveillance and to dissuade. The real match for the Chinese military will, of
course, remain with the US for the foreseeable future, but some burden-sharing
is always welcome.
The problem
with the AUKUS deal is that it has created a rift between the three countries
in question on one side and one of the two remaining EU powers on the other
side (while Germany is still looking for a new leader) at a time when a unified
collective approach in dealing with China might be more useful. Dividing that front is not helpful.
Military
capacity is relevant to dissuade China from pursuing its military ambitions in
connection with Taiwan. It can maybe serve to prevent China from building more
artificial islands in the South China Sea where it has territorial ambitions.
Military capacity addresses the more classical Chinese threats, but it does not
deal with Chinese behaviour that does not conform to our understanding of
international rules. We are talking here about the broad range of issues that
the English-speaking world and Europe currently have with China, from the Hong
Kong democracy challenges, the plight of the Uighurs, up to unfair trade
practices, among others.
The
fundamental question is whether to use the stick or the carrot, to punish or to
engage. There are calls from some quarters for strong punitive sanctions
against the Chinese regime. From what we have seen in the case of Russia, economic
sanctions have limited impact and can even in some cases be turned to long-term
advantage by fostering the development of some areas of the targeted economy. It
could hardly be different in China. Political sanctions make the proponent feel
good and indispose the target of the sanctions, but also have limited impact.
Given the level of interdependence that now exists between China and the
Western world across the whole range of economic activity, sanctions would likely
end up punishing the proponent more than the target.
As far as
engagement is concerned, it would seem that we have for some time reached the point
where further engagement is not going to elicit any significant change in Chinese
behaviour. The opening to the world that was necessary for China to modernize
has happened. There is nothing more that can be offered that would change Chinese
behaviour in a significant way.
Dealing
with China is not a problem that will be resolved by short-term solutions. A
long-term approach needs to be developed. A robust and sustained political
dialogue is probably one of the pre-requisites, along with a policy approach
that excludes the idea that China can be expected to do the right thing by our
standards and, as noted above, reduces our vulnerability to Chinese actions. In
that context, entering into a major information technology project with a
Chinese entity such as Huawei would have to come with iron-clad assurances and the
means to enforce compliance.
--o--
AFGHANISTAN MOSAIC
In addressing the US/NATO debacle in Afghanistan, observers have ascribed a certain influence to countries other than Pakistan, namely Iran and China. Iran, despite its previous confrontation with the Taliban, would somehow have welcomed and supported the Taliban’s return to power if only to undermine the US position. Iran would also have to take into consideration its ethnic links to the Tajik population of Afghanistan and of neighbouring Tajikistan. Tajiks are considered as Persian and speak a relatively archaic version of the Persian spoken today in Iran. China would have provided weaponry to the Taliban in support of Pakistan, its traditional ally in their permanent confrontation with India. China which is accused of perpetrating a genocide of its Muslim population, the Uighurs of Xinjiang, would have wanted to extend its influence in a neighbouring country and side with the Taliban in order to control them and to prevent any risk of terrorist contamination.
The open confirmation of the ongoing consultation process between Russia, Iran, China, and Pakistan took the form of a meeting of the four relevant foreign ministers on September 17th in Dushanbe on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Organisation for Collective Security meetings. Although they would have been available the representatives of Central Asian countries and of India were not in the room, thus confirming that the meeting was restricted to the players with real influence. The Dushanbe meeting of the four foreign ministers focused on the concern for stability in Afghanistan. This would also include keeping the Taliban within Afghanistan, finding a way to have the Taliban engage with the international community at the same time as the new Taliban regime somehow addresses widespread concerns about human rights especially women’s rights. It would also include how the regime deals with, among others, the Tajik minority especially in the Panjshir Valley which the Taliban now claims to control completely.
With
international humanitarian aid (Including from Canada) already flowing into Afghanistan
through the UN and the Red Cross, the challenge is to arrive at an arrangement
that would allow international financial institutions to resume their work and, more
immediately, for the Taliban government to gain access to the country’s frozen financial
reserves. That of course would mean bringing the international community,
especially the US, to acknowledge in some way the Taliban as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan.
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RUSSIAN ELECTIONS 2021: NEW PEOPLE?
In Russia’s
managed democracy system, a highly predictable electoral outcome does not mean
that the process is not taken seriously by a large proportion of the
population. Parliamentary legislations such as the ones that concluded on
September 19th are an occasion for people to express their views. They also
offer legitimacy to the governing élites. The fact that non-systemic opposition
elements were excluded from participation does not seem to receive the same
attention inside Russia as it does outside, even with very active social
networks disseminating every possible information.
As noted
above, the results were as expected. At the national level, United Russia
settled for less than 50% of the popular vote but did very well at the local
level in single-mandate races and captured 324 of the 450 seats, thus keeping
its capacity to modify the Constitution, if necessary. The Communist Party
improved it performance. A new party, New People, crossed the threshold and
will enter the Duma with 13 seats. Zhirinovksy Liberal Democratic Party (21 seats) lost ground and
Mironov’s Just Russia Party (27 seats) essentially stagnated.
This
illustrates that the Communist Party has been and continues to be the only
party that could pretend to offer the beginning of an alternative to United
Russia. Preventing a return of the Communists to power was one of the reasons
for Yeltsin’s popularity at home and abroad. Initially, it was also a
preoccupation of Vladimir Putin. Many of his social policy actions are in fact
intended to cater to an electorate that could be attracted back to
communist-style ideas. The problem nowadays is not only that no one wants the
return to power of the Communists, but that the Communists themselves do not
seem to want it either. Managing the results of their relative success even
seems to be a challenge.
The
electoral process itself was marred by a collapse of the electronic voting
system in Moscow. This does not seem to have had an impact on the result, but
certainly created a negative impression. Overall, the administration of the
electoral law at the national level, under Ella Pamfilova’s vigorous leadership,
seems to continue moving in the right direction. A more serious problem seems
to be the use of dirty tricks at the local level in certain regions. There may not be short-term response to that
other than exposing the behaviour of some local stakeholders.
Looking at
the long-term, the arrival of a new party led by a successful businessman
offers a glimmer of hope that there will be more changes in the future.
Interest groups other than the security services or the Communists may envisage
the idea of having their own party. A real democratic transition is, however,
not yet in sight.
--o--
UKRAINE UPDATE
Following,
from the Ukrainian point of view, a string of rather unproductive meetings over
the last few months, President Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington did not produce
any new major achievement, but it at least confirmed the US government’s continuing
political, economic, and military support for Ukraine. As before, President
Biden while expressing support for Ukraine’s NATO membership seemed to have
stopped short of an unqualified commitment. Zelenskyy’s proposal for President
Biden to become personally involved in the Donbass peace negotiations still has
to be picked up.
Since his
visit to Washington, Zelenskyy seems to have focused less on the conflict in
Russia, but more on the issues where he can contribute to the modernisation of
the country and to political reforms. There may of course be a lot left to be done
in terms of eradicating corruption but cleaning up government procurement
practices seems to have significantly improved the use of government resources
in areas such as infrastructure Zelenskky’s “big construction” program may be
one more significant long-term achievements along with the improved business
climate that seems to afford local enterprises a more user-friendly
environment.
A major news
item was the Ukraine’s special forces spectacular rescue of some of the
individuals who were trying to flee Kabul after the return of the Taliban. This
included a former local employee of Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper. The
effectiveness and courage of the Ukrainian soldiers indeed deserved high praise
and were a moral booster for the country. The fact is that they seemed to have
done better in difficult circumstances than larger and more richly endowed similar
services.
Far less
good news was the assassination attempt against Serhiy Shefir a top aide to
Zelenskyy and one of his long-time associates. The attempt would seem to emanate
from those who oppose the de-oligarchizing of Ukraine. Whoever sponsored the
attach should however have known that this would only reinforce the determination
of Zelenskky and his team to pursue reforms.
The conclusion of a major gas supply contract between Hungary and Russia’s Gazprom also fell in the category of bad news, in that the 15-year deal excludes transit through Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister called it a major attack to which there would be an appropriate response. The gas is not expected to flow to Hungary through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline the Ukrainians so despise but through TurkStream that currently delivers Russian gas to Turkey and Bulgaria. The Ukrainian side has already expressed its deep displeasure to the Hungarians. It would be surprising for that to change the Hungarian decision. In the turmoil that currently affects the gas markets in Europe, the Hungarian decision to secure long-term supplies and to do so via a brand-new pipeline looks like a sound economic idea and one in line with long-term Hungarian interests. Ukraine’s suggestion that the Hungary-Russia contract be reviewed by the EU has already been termed by Hungary as an attack on its sovereignty.
Ukraine's geo-political arguments about Russian agressive intentions and in favour of the continuation of transit through its territory no more convince Hungary than they did Germany. Ukrainian indignation does not change the fundamentals of the relationship between Russia and its clients in the gas business.
On a separate but related issue, there are also noises in Kyiv about Hungary opposing Ukraine's accession to NATO because it does not like the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Western Ukraine, bringing the very sensitive issue of the general treatment of minorities in Ukraine into the mix.
--o--
