THE BRETON GEROL NEWSLETTER
IMPEACHMENT, OPPORTUNITIES AND CASUALTIES
The outcome
of the impeachment proceedings against President Trump remains highly
predictable. Call it hypocrisy, disregard for constitutional duty or blind
partisanship, most of the Republicans in the US Senate are unwilling to look at
the case against the President. In that context there is some justification in
House Speaker Pelosi’s decision to delay the transmission of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate until there is some clarity about how the Senate will
handle its proceedings. Beyond having Majority Leader McConnell and President
Trump squirm, keeping impeachment alive has a minimal cost and may have political
advantages in the 2020 election year. Impeachment
in itself may not work, but dangling it before an irascible president has more
than entertainment value. Through the disruption that it causes, it may lead to even more
unhinged or impetuous behaviour on the part of the President. Besides, as we just saw in
late December, more evidence may become available that could further justify
impeachment, at least in public opinion. Some electors may not want Trump
impeached, but may eventually reckon that he is a cheat, in real life, as well
as when he plays golf, as has been observed by many of his sport partners.
There is no
deep political reason for a Ukraine-related incident now to be at the center of
the political debate in the US. Easy
money may, however, explain a lot. The permissive financial environment in
Ukraine, that US politicians so like to criticize, has resulted in hefty advantages
for some US citizens. Paul Manafort,
Trump’s ex-campaign manager did very well in Ukraine. Hunter Biden, the son of
the leading Democratic candidate Joe Biden, did also receive a lot of money for
little real work. One should not be surprised that Trump having lost his friend
Manafort to a Ukrainian denunciation wanted to use a Ukrainian denunciation to
go after his main opponent. Not a quid pro quo, more like tit-for-tat,
in line with the Trump character. Besides, for Trump, cheating is not a crime especially
if you feel that someone else has already cheated against you.
The Russian
intervention during the 2016 presidential campaign, even though it may have had
much less impact than generally alleged, the ensuing Mueller inquiry and, now,
the impeachment debate have meant that anything related to Russia and Ukraine
is viewed in Washington through ultra-partisan lenses. In light of his own questionable
statements and overall lack of credibility, Trump is not in a position to
develop a coherent policy vis-à-vis Russia. The result is an erratic approach that
can upset long-time allies and in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict a
marginalisation of the US role in the resolution of that conflict. Trump getting his briefing on the December 11h
Paris Normandy Format Summit from the Russian Foreign Minister rather than from
the German or the French should have raised eyebrows not the fact that he
appeared to do Foreign Minister Lavrov a special favour, which he was not, and that
they had their picture taken together. In the meantime, another casualty of the
situation is that important contentious issues such as, among others, disarmament
do not seem to get any sustained attention. Although it is NATO that President
Macron called brain-dead, his real target was arguably US policy leadership, or
the lack thereof.
--o--
PARIS SUMMIT, EXPECTATIONS AND RESULTS
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| Presidents Zelenskyy, Macron and Putin, Chancellor Merkel Paris, December 11th ©President of Ukraine Website |
As many
observers have noted, the results of the December 11 Paris Normandy format
summit were relatively modest. A few steps were agreed, including the
long-awaited exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and its rebel regions, as
well as the incremental continuation of the disengagement process along the
front line in Eastern Ukraine. More important was the general agreement to
continue the conversation and to have another such meeting within four months.
Although
President Zelenskyy voiced his frustration at the lack of more progress, the
result of the Summit probably met most of his expectations. He was able to protect
his position in relation to nationalists who had warned him not to cross any of
their red lines. The level of military
activity is slowly decreasing. The forthcoming exchange of prisoners has
allowed for some good news coverage over the Holiday Season. The criticism in Ukraine
about the inclusion of some special service policemen accused of shooting at protesters
during the February 2014 uprising did not seem to affect the popular success of
the operation.
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| President Zelenskyy greeting a freed prisoner Kyiv, December 29th ©President of Ukraine Website |
Decreasing
the number of casualties and freeing prisoners does not resolve the conflict,
but it affords President Zelenskyy the time that he needs to pursue a gradual
restoration of normality in the relations between Ukraine and its rebel regions
as between Ukraine and Russia. President Zelenskyy seems to have surprised his
French and German counterparts by suggesting that the existing peace arrangements
(the Minsk accords) need to be amended. This may not go anywhere, but it challenges
those who oppose his dispute settlement efforts to come up with something
better. At the same time, he is also moving along with the decentralisation of
power throughout Ukraine even in the regions not affected by the conflict, thus fulfilling one of the conditions of the Minsk agreements, but making it look like it is not a concession on his part, but a commitment made by his predecessor and now a broader policy decision.
William
Taylor, the outgoing chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy and now famous Trump
impeachment witness, has suggested that the conflict might be resolved by the
creation of a suitable peacekeeping arrangement. He may well be right,
especially if through Zelenskky’s efforts, a situation that is closer to peace
than war finally emerges. This could also lead to a long-term freezing of the
conflict. In the absence of foreseeable major political changes in Ukrainian
public opinion, this may well be if not the best the only solution.
Although
this is not directly the mandate of the Normandy Format meetings, more
important than all is probably the fact that the new atmosphere created by
Zelenskyy has allowed for the conclusion of a new agreement between Ukraine and
Russia over the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to European markets. For
Zelenskyy, the new deal is beyond reproach as it was essentially negotiated with
the direct participation of the EU and is based on European standards. The deal
includes the resolution of all legal disputes between the Ukrainian and Russian
gas companies. The transit deal will bring badly needed revenues to the
Ukrainian economy. The Ukrainian Prime Minister has already noted that this will allow to keep gas
prices in Ukraine at a lower level, a highly popular measure. Resolving the legal
disputes also means that the Ukrainian side has received the amounts owed by
Russian Gazprom, over 2.3 billion dollars. Ukraine was going to receive that
money at some point, but the legal dispute could have delayed this
significantly. The victory is in getting an immediate payment at a time when
Ukraine will be facing large financial obligations.
For Russia,
there is also a victory element in this. Russian gas will continue to flow
freely to European markets and bring expected revenues. The long legal battle
is over. The two gas companies will be working from a clean slate. This might
lead to even closer cooperation in the future. The agreement also foresees that
it is the Ukrainian company that will have to meet Ukrainian regulatory requirements
for gas transit through Ukraine, not Gazprom itself.
The
conclusion of a major gas transit deal and the settlement of legal disputes is
not consistent with the existing war rhetoric. That is interesting to observe,
but not the major issue. What matters more is that the gas transit deal was achieved
through the active intermediation of the European Union. The new deal also
challenges the idea that Russia cannot be a suitable long-term economic partner
for Ukraine. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, President Zelenskyy’s alleged political mentor,
has recently made a statement along the same lines, suggesting that Ukraine
would gain from reviving its economic relationship with Russia. It will take
more than one deal, no matter how substantial, to change public perceptions. With
the EU, Ukraine and Russia working together, the idea that gains credibility is that Ukraine
does not have to give up on its European aspirations to advance its business interests with Russia. That would also improve the atmosphere.
--o--
NORD STREAM
2 SANCTIONS: TOO BAD, TOO LATE
In late
December, President Trump approved sanctions on companies that might continue
their involvement in the construction of the 90 percent completed Nord Stream 2
pipeline. That pipeline is designed by Moscow and its European partners to
bypass Ukraine and increase gas supplies via the Baltic Sea directly to
Germany, Russia's biggest energy customer. The restrictive measures target
pipe-laying vessels and include asset freezes and the revocation of U.S. visas
for the contractors.
Swiss-Dutch
company Allseas, which was laying the pipeline, immediately suspended its
activity to avoid US sanctions.
The pipeline
will most likely be completed regardless of sanctions, but at a slower pace. The
Russian side was expecting this type of development. In 2016 the Russian energy
giant Gazprom bought a special pipe-laying vessel to be used as a last resort
if European companies stopped working on Nord Stream 2. Some experts think the
project could be delayed by several months since the Russian ship is slower and
is currently based in the Russian Pacific port of Nakhodka.
The delay
can probably be managed through the use of existing pipelines, including the
one crossing Ukraine, now that an EU-brokered gas transit deal has been
concluded between Ukraine and Russia, as noted above. Ever since the Obama
administration, Washington has opposed the Nord Stream 2 project on the grounds
it would strengthen Russia’s economic and political grip over Europe. That argument
has never much impressed European clients of Gasprom. In fact, the US decision
seems to have irked their German allies as much as their Russian adversaries. The
US sanctions and their extra-territorial reach have been perceived as an
attempt to dictate its energy policy to Europe, certainly not creating any
renewed interest in more expensive US gas. The US, itself a top producer of liquid
gas, would like to become a supplier and, eventually maybe not replace Russia
completely, but become a serious competitor in the gas business.
The US
sanctions have arrived late in the game. They are not likely to achieve their
stated purpose, other than inflicting a real, but manageable, financial loss on
the promoters of Nord Stream 2. They probably, however, will make Russia adopt countersanctions
that will add another complication to the Russia-US commercial relationship.
--o--
KAZAKHSTAN
REFORMS
President
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was elected in June 2019 as the second President of
Kazakhstan since the country gained independence in 1991. On December 20th,
during the second meeting of the National Council of Public Trust, he announced
a wide-ranging set of economic, social and political reforms.
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| President Tokayev |
The key element
of the proposed economic reforms is the further reduction of the share of state
enterprises in the economy. It is also planned to enhance the fight against the
shadow economy (the polite words for corruption), to discipline the foreign
debt process and to stabilise the national currency, essentially through better
transparency tools. To foreign investors and to international trade partners,
these measures can only be welcome. The proposed reduction of the foreign
labour quota may sound a discordant note but should be seen a direct response
to preoccupations recently expressed by Kazakh workers over discrimination
patterns and the exploitation of foreign workers (and its ensuing broader
impact on labour conditions).
The social
measures are aimed at simplifying and making more effective state assistance
directed to children. There are also specific measures to assist handicapped
individuals. Their impact should be to modernise the overall system of social
support.
A specific
measure is also being proposed to deal with the proper use of agricultural
land. In order to ensure an optimal use of arable lands, targeted remote
space-based observation will be initiated and will lead to greater taxation
rates for the owners of land who are not actually cultivating their land. To
foreigners, this may sound rather harsh. In a context where post-USSR land
distribution has not been optimal and where some farmers actually see their
activity constrained by the lack of available land, the measure would appear
justified.
The
political reforms are essentially aimed at furthering the democratisation of
Kazakh society. They are intended in particular to deal with issues such as the
organization of peaceful marches, the reduction of registration barriers for
the formation of a political party, quotas for the involvement of women and
youth, the possibility of enhancing the role of opposition parties in
Parliament, the decriminalization of
slanderous articles. It is also foreseen to abolish the death penalty by having
Kazakhstan ratify the relevant international convention.
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| Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan's capital |
In Western
eyes, Kazakhstan is still generally regarded as an authoritarian state although
one in which the political emphasis is on modernisation. The proposed reforms
are admittedly a top-down initiative, but one over which there has been public
consultation. The fundamental purpose of the political reforms is in fact to do
away with some of the authoritarian aspects of the current governance and to
achieve greater popular empowerment. If one thinks for a moment about what is
currently happening in the world, from Algiers to Hong Kong, it is difficult
not to see the merit of the presidential proposals whose purpose is to achieve
greater democracy without disruption.
The reforms are undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Some may
argue that more is needed. The President himself has acknowledged the
incremental nature of his approach. Considering the depth of changes that are
ultimately planned, an incremental approach would seem to have better chances
of success.
The reforms
are tackling one of the most difficult problems of democracy in some parts of
the post-USSR world. In advancing democracy in a context where for many years a
single party has been the rule, the greatest challenge is to facilitate the emergence
of genuine opposition political parties. No matter how good your constitution
and your national legislation may be, creating the entities that will make
democracy work properly cannot be legislated. Having a legislation that
facilitates the emergence of new political parties is, however, a
pre-requisite. This is what currently proposals are doing.
The next
challenge is then to create the other conditions where political parties can
thrive. This is where economic reforms aimed a democratisation of the economy
through, for instance, privatisation could become a significant factor in
supporting the political democratisation if they lead to less oligarchic
economy that could eventually lead to less oligarchic governance.
The
question that remains to be addressed is that of the funding of political
parties. This is where the challenges of younger democracies converge with the
challenges of older ones. Political parties and political campaigns are funded
differently the world over. Once the political field becomes more open and if
no public funding exists or popular funding is not facilitated through fiscal
measures, can parties align along political orientations or will not they
become instruments of financial or special interest groups?
The
President has done the first part of the job by offering an initial set of
tangible, significant political improvements. Although it is only at an early
stage, the course proposed by President Tokayev offers an opportunity that can
become a defining moment for the future of a democratic Kazakhstan.
--o--
TURKEY'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS
Turkey is
increasingly relying on military capabilities in its foreign policy, triggering
regional and international tensions the latest being with Egypt, France and Russia
over potential troop deployment in Libya.
Largely
isolated in Europe and the Middle East, with Qatar as its only staunch ally,
Ankara is flexing its muscles in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and now in Libya.
Ankara seems to be on a direct collision course with Moscow over Turkey’s plans to
deploy troops in support of the Islamist-backed Tripoli government. Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assailed the presence of the Russian private
military company Wagner in Libya on the side of Libyan National Army
Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
“Through
the group named Wagner, they are literally working as Haftar’s mercenaries in
Libya. You know who is paying them,” Erdogan was quoted December 20 by
broadcaster NTV. He added: “It would not be right for us to remain silent
against all of this.”
Russia
earlier said it was “very concerned” by the possible Turkish troop deployment
in Libya, the Interfax news agency reported.
Erdogan
recently stated Turkey was ready to send troops to Libya to back the
internationally recognized government in Tripoli, which is already a recipient
of Turkish military support.
“We will be
protecting the rights of Libya and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean,”
Erdogan told A Haber television channel on December 15th. “We are more than ready
to give whatever support necessary to Libya.”
The Turkish
government said it is trying to make its voice heard in a region where
conflicts pose threats on Turkey’s doorstep and where other players ignore
Turkish interests but the approach is not winning Turkey any friends and is a
far cry from the idea of having “zero problems with neighbors” that is the
official position promoted on the
website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
To some
extent, military power has always played a role in Turkey. Its fighter jets and
ground troops have been confronting militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
in northern Iraq since the 1990s but, in recent years, unilateral military
action has become a much more regular feature of Turkey’s foreign policy,
putting the country on a collision course with neighbors, regional powers and
other NATO members.
Turkey's
incursion into Syria in 2019 pitted Turkey against the US and basically forced
American administration to betray their Kurdish allies. Since then however the
situation had stabilized as Turkey slowed the pace of their advance and
partially reined in their Muslim Arab allies who already began committing
customary atrocities against the Kurdish population.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: POPE FRANCIS
Jorge Mario
Bergoglio was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on December 17, 1936, to Italian
immigrants. As a young man, Bergoglio underwent surgery to remove part of one
of his lungs due to serious infection.
On March
13, 2013, at the age of 76, Jorge Bergoglio was named the 266th pope of the
Roman Catholic Church—becoming the first citizen from the Americas, the first
non-European and first Jesuit priest to be named pope, adopting the name Pope
Francis after St. Francis of Assisi of Italy.
As a Pope
Francis instituted some important reforms in the financial sector of the
Vatican, liberalizing functions of the Curia and setting draconian laws on the
issue of sexual abuse by the clergy and stripping suspected priests of any kind of immunity.
Reform,
Francis said, is not simply seeking change for its own sake or to follow the
latest fashion, “but to have conviction that development and growth are
characteristic of earthly and human life, while, in the perspective of the believer,
at the heart of it all is the stability of God.”
Referring
to the changes he has made to the Roman Curia since taking office, the pope
insisted that “reform never had the presumption of acting as if nothing existed
before; on the contrary, it’s designed to give value to the good accomplished
in the complex history of the Curia.”
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On December
20th Pope Francis received in audience António Guterres, the Secretary General
of the United Nations. The following quote from the ensuing press release
illustrates the Vatican’s traditional role in international affairs as well as
the new orientations that have been advanced by Pope Francis: “The Holy See
expressed its consideration for the United Nations’ commitment to peace in the
world. The parties then focused on the process of implementing the Sustainable
Development Goals, and on the crisis of multilateralism, made particularly
evident by the difficulties of managing certain current problems such as
migration and human trafficking, climate change and disarmament.”
--o--
PUTIN’S ANNUAL PRESS CONFERENCE
During his annual
marathon press conference on December 19th, President Putin for the first time
in 20 years approved the general idea of the need for constitutional reform and
made a rather puzzling statement concerning presidential mandates suggesting that
the existing limitation to “two consecutive mandates” may be changed by
dropping the word “consecutive”. This has left observers to speculate widely,
but may only be a decoy. Whatever he wants to do at the end of his current
presidential mandate, Putin, as legalistic former KGB officer, will want the arrangement
to be cast in the appropriate legislation, probably even enshrined in the constitution.
This will require some preparation. If changes are also made to the status of
Parliament, they have to be done before the 2021 parliamentary elections. One
way or the other, it is not too early to start an informal discussion about the
process.
Putin has often said he did not want to become "president-for-life". His inclination would likely be announce his intentions for the future at the last possible date. In this case, the Parliamentary election calendar may force him to reveal some of his plans earlier than he would like.
--o--
THE AUTHORS
Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.
During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.
Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.
