THE BRETON/GEROLNEWSLETTER
RUSSIA AND TURKEY ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN IDLIB PROVINCE OF SYRIA
Brushing
aside, at least temporarily, the fact that Russia and Turkey support opposing
sides of the Syrian conflict, presidents Putin and Erdogan met in Sochi on
September 17th and agreed to establish a “demilitarized zone” in
part of Idlib province to avert a potentially deadly military confrontation.
Details of
the agreement between Russia and Turkey are sketchy at best. Not much has been
explained, and it was not immediately clear whether Syria was willing to go
along with their plan. In case this agreement will not be implemented in a
fundamental way it could just serve as a way of delaying the eventual assault
by Assad (with the usual backing of the Russian military) against the last
major stronghold of anti-Assad opposition.
Presidents Erdogan and Putin, Sochi, September 17th ©President of Russia Website |
It is
important to understand that Idlib province borders Turkey and that close to 3
million Syrian civilians and up to 80,000 insurgent fighters, including 10, 000
terrorists and, among others, Al Qaeda-linked jihadists, have been re-grouped
and cornered into this strip of land. This is the last significant piece of Syrian
territory, other than Kurdish areas, that Assad does not control.
The
agreement was welcomed by the United Nations. It clearly benefits Turkey since,
in case of a major military conflict, Turkey would be flooded by waves of
refugees and find itself bordering a zone of intense military action, including
fierce Russian bombardments from various platforms, as seen before during the
siege of Aleppo and other areas. The agreement also allows Turkey to retain a
presence in Idlib and protect its local allies. Turkey also seems to have
wrested the from the Russian side an end to all cooperation or coordination
with the Kurds inside or outside Syria, in exchange for other military
concessions to Russia and Syria in other regions of Syria.
It is less
clear what benefit from creating this demilitarized zone will accrue to Russia.
It is a well understood reality (for president Putin and his military) that
Idlib will continue to be a hotbed of anti-Assad insurgency and it is only a
matter of time (unless of course some major peace agreement involving all
parties, including the US, will be signed) before Sunni rebels rearm and go on the
offensive in one way or the other. One explanation maybe that in delaying the all-out
assault on Idlib, Russia could be showing itself to the world, for a change, as
not only a military power, but as a peacemaker capable of a more nuanced
approach. As well, some analysts say it may want to present Assad to the world
as the winner who should be supported as he rebuilds the country.
Another
explanation might be that Russians believe that the terrorist groups can
neither be convinced of giving up active combat nor trusted to abide by any
agreement to do so, as it is against their jihadist thinking. The eventual military
assault against them will thus look more justified to the outside world, after
an ultimate failed peace attempt.
For Russia,
there is also the outside chance that President Erdogan might be able to use
his troops and his influence to separate the rebel opposition from the
terrorists as well as to put an end to drone attacks on the Russian bases in Khmeimin
and Tartus. Erdogan would also be expected to have fighters leave the city of
Idlib and return it to Syrian government control.
Vladimir
Putin was quoted by Russia’s news agencies as saying that he and President
Erdogan had agreed to create a demilitarized buffer zone about nine to 12 miles
wide by October 15th to separate Assad’s forces from their opponents.
Putin
stated that all heavy weapons and “radical militants,” including the fighters
with the affiliate of Al Qaeda in Syria, formerly known as Al Nusra, must “be
withdrawn” from the demilitarized area by October 10th.
It is not
hard to imagine what Syria and Russia intend to do if such a withdrawal does
not take place. What is also certain is that there is a secret agreement
between Erdogan and Putin in this regard that will not be publicised, at least
not in the coming few months. On the main agreement itself, there may also
differing interpretations that will surface in the meantime.
Even if Erdogan
were to be successful in delivering on his commitment to Russia the question
remains as to what will happen in the long-term to jihadi elements gathered in
the narrow border area with Turkey. Keeping them there is not a viable
solution. Would they move elsewhere of their own will or be forcibly removed?
If so, where? Would that depend on their ethnicity or country of origin? Their
liquidation may even be envisaged in some quarters. For now, there is no easy answer
to that problem.
--o--
ISRAELI GAMBIT: DIFFERENT REACTIONS FROM PRESIDENT PUTIN AND HIS MILITARY
Major-General Igor Konashenkov, Russia's chief military spokesman, blamed Israel, namely the Israel Air Force (IAF), as the main culprit in the September 18th downing of a Russian electronic warfare aircraft IL-20, with 15 servicemen on board, by Syrian air defenses. According to the Russian military, one of the Israeli F-16 aircrafts used the Russian IL-20 as a cover during a bombing raid on targets near the Syrian city of Latakia.
IL-20 |
Another
Russian grievance was first that the Israeli side gave the warning of the
upcoming attack only one minute before it took place giving almost no time for
the slower aircraft to leave the danger zone and, second, that the Israelis
were not precise about the location of their attack, only referring to a
general area.
Jerusalem
immediately sent its Air Force Chief General Norkin and other high ranking
officers to Moscow. The Russian military, after hearing the Israeli side of the
story, rejected it, and put all blame on Israeli actions. President Putin
preferred to interpret the situation as "a tragic chain of events".
In his second telephone conversation in a week with PM Netanyahu, Putin
nevertheless confirmed that the more modern S-300 VM air defense system will be
delivered to Syria shortly, but emphasized that the main reason for this was to
protect the lives of Russian military servicemen in Syria.
Several
military analysts around the world pointed out that Russia's probe was not so
one-sided and that Israel, after hundreds of successful raids against targets
in Syria, had become reckless and less attentive to Russian concerns. Some
Israeli military people, even before this incident occurred, expressed concern
that Israel may accidentally or otherwise come across Russians during their
countless operations over Syria. This is exactly what happened.
S-300 VM System ©Wikipedia |
This
unfortunate incident will surely make Israel be more aware of the Russian
interests and assets in Syria and significantly change the Israeli approach to
future aerial operations in the area.
--o--
HEZBOLLAH FOOT-NOTE
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese-based armed group Hezbollah stated that it has acquired precision-guided missiles despite Israeli attempts to keep high-tech weapons out of its hands. Nasrallah made the comments during his traditional televised speech on September 20th, the first day of Ashoura, an important religious celebration for Muslims.
Some
Israeli experts interpreted Nasrallah's comments as a response to a series of
successful air raids by the IAF on targets belonging to Iran and Hezbollah in
Syria. Some of those raids were, as satellite footage showed, clearly
devastating and precise and, taking into account Israeli absolute air
superiority in the region, unanswered. There is no doubt, however, that some
precision weapons from Iran are being delivered to Hezbollah from Iran via
"other" routes, including civilian airliners.
--o--
PRESIDENT PUTIN LOSES ELECTIONS, TAKE 2
Recent gubernatorial elections in four regions of Russia produced an unusual result. In two regions (Khabarovsk and Vladimir) the opposition party candidate soundly defeated Putin’s United Russia candidate. In a third region Khakassia), the Putin-backed candidate withdrew, opening the door to the election of the leading opposition candidate who will face another opposition candidate in the upcoming runoff. In a fourth one (Primorye/Vladivostok), the election was cancelled because of widespread irregularities and such a close result that it was deemed impossible to determine a winner.
If, as the
Kremlin does for many years try to run a managed democracy, what is the
significance of losing an election? Is this because the current managers are
less competent than their predecessors or that their methodology needs to be
refined? Perhaps. Is this because the blessing of President no longer works
magic? This may be closer to the truth. The president’s popular rating has been
going down lately because of dissatisfaction over the controversial proposed
pension reform plans. In addition, there would be in some regions specific
local issues that have been feeding opposition to the federal center for a long
while. Seen in that light, the protest vote that got opposition candidates
elected could in some way be likened to the protest vote that can be witnessed
during partial elections in our own country: the voters can feel free to
express their frustration with the existing national leadership without getting
rid of it outright.
President Putin receiving new governors, Moscow, September 18th ©President of Russia Website |
It would be
premature to present the good results of opposition candidates in a few regions
as a "growing rejection of Putin” or the end of United Russia. It would
also be premature to present these results as a major step in the advancement
of democracy. They are, however, a small step in the direction of the creation
of a possible alternance in the selection of elected leaders. It is worth
noting that Ella Pamfilova, the head of the Central Election Commission has
emphasised the cleanliness of the electoral process especially in the
Khabarovsk region, by opposition to the neighbouring Vladivostok region where
official results were not credible. She was also directly involved in the
process of cancelling the flawed election in Vladivostok. The appointment of
Pamfilova, a more rigorous election manager, has clearly helped creating a more
transparent and reliable electoral system. It will have continuing impact on
the conduct of future elections.
United
Russia still controls virtually all other regional governments and was
successful in most other regions this year. For instance, the city of Moscow
elections just returned Mayor Sobyanin to his job with a 70% majority. For
United Russia, there will be a need to refine the methodology of running
elections in order to select more electable candidates. The temptation may yet
exist to try to turn the clock back so as to ensure that it does not lose
control of any more regions and to prevent a form of contagion. The problem is
that the measures currently envisaged (abolition of the second round or
altogether abolition of regional elections) could create even more discontent.
Regional
governors have to work closely with the President and his Administration. For
President Putin, the challenge will be to manage the co-habitation with
opposition governors who owe their election to opposing his policies and who,
by their relative political independence, could create a competing source of
power.
--o--
THE PATRIARCH HAS SPOKEN, THE OLIGARCHS NOT YET
All
indications are that the Patriarch of Constantinople will grant the tomos of
autocephaly to a Ukrainian national church. The Patriarch’s recent decision to
send his legates (exarchs) to Ukraine and his own statement leave little doubt
about this. The historic explanation for the Patriarch of Constantinople to
exercise his authority in Ukraine is, in very simplified terms, that the Moscow
Patriarchate only exercises temporary authority (since 1686) and only in some
parts of modern Ukraine, and that the fundamental authority in Ukraine remains
one way or another with Constantinople. A similar argument was already used in
Canada for some Ukrainian churches to join with Constantinople. There is also
little doubt that the church that would most benefit from this is that of the
Kyiv patriarchate, headed by 89-year old Filaret, a former metropolitan bishop
of the Russian Orthodox Church.
From a
religious point of view, the orthodox believers belonging to the Kyiv
patriarchate would thus rejoin the orthodox communion and see their status
regularised. This would be an occasion for that church to recruit clergy and
believers away from the church that recognizes the authority of the Moscow
patriarchate. From a religious point of view, the status of the orthodox
believers who would chose to remain associated with the Moscow patriarch would,
in principle, not be affected. There is another smaller independent Ukrainian
orthodox church whose status will probably be left unchanged. Fears have been
expressed by the followers of the Moscow patriarchate about the disposition of
the religious buildings that formally belong to the Ukrainian state. President
Poroshenko has so far offered assurances on the respect for the freedom of
religious choice. How the transition will unfold, how smooth it can be and what
impact it will have on Ukrainian society remains to be seen.
The process
of granting autocephaly to a Ukrainian church is also likely to create
considerable tension within the Orthodox world, with the Moscow patriarchate
already removing the mention of the Patriarch of Constantinople from its prayer
book as well as seeking support from other national orthodox churches.
President Poroshenko meeting Ukrainian-Americans, New York City, September 26th ©President of Ukraine Website |
President
Poroshenko’s goal of having a national Ukrainian church that is free from
Moscow influence and that has canonical status will be formally achieved. This
was one of his main messages to the Ukrainian diaspora during his recent visit
to the US. His reward for that may, however, not come immediately. As for his
political future back home, a greater form of divine intervention may be
necessary. Latest polls show him back among the top three contenders for next
year’s election, but still at a rating below 10%, with Former PM Tymoshenko
still leading at around 18%. Against all odds, rumours have begun to appear
about the emergence of a pro-Moscow candidate that would be supported by a
coalition of existing pro-Moscow factions. For Tymoshenko, who is seen by some
as too close to Moscow, it would be useful to have such a candidate against
whom she could stand up as the staunch defender of Ukrainian independence. In
the most likely event of a second round run-off election, the emergence of an
attractive new nationalist and pro-Europe candidate is probably that which is
feared the most by any of the current traditional candidates. A pro-Moscow
stand-in would be an ideal adversary. There are reports that some Ukrainian
oligarchs may be already working on this new project. The unintended effect of
giving new life to pro-Moscow political forces may not be enough to prevent
this development.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: PRESIDENT OF SOUTH KOREA: MOON JAE-IN
Like many
members of the South Korean political elite President Moon's ancestor hail from
the North. The current president of South Korea was born in 1953, 6 months
before the end of the Korean War. His parents were refugees from the North, who
fled the hostilities and finally settled in the city of Busan.
The war
ended 65 years ago. Nevertheless its consequences and fallout still resonate
heavily not only in the region but around the world where interests of major
powers intersect. Events around North and South Korea involve such players as
US, China, Japan, Russia to name a few. The Korean Peninsula remains one of the
most dangerous places in the world. The North already has scores of nuclear
weapons and no peace agreement with most of its neighbors. It is poor, paranoid
and totally closed to the world.
Three of
the 11 American aircraft carriers and naval battle groups are parked within
striking distance of North Korea with tens of thousands of American soldiers
stationed in the South and Japan. The all-out war is always around the corner
and seemed almost inevitable just a few months ago.
The South,
unlike the North, is a stable democracy and has one of the most robust
economies in the world. It has a lot to lose in case the war breaks out.
Moon
Jae-in, former political activist and a lawyer by profession was elected
president during 2017. It was his second attempt to win the presidency after he
narrowly lost as a Democratic Party nominee in 2012 to Park Geun-hye.
Moon is a
solidly left-of-center candidate on most (but not all) issues as he campaigned
on the political platform that included higher taxation of the rich in order to
create hundreds of thousands of public sector jobs and the pledge to end
monopolies of major South Korean conglomerates in order to give more power to
minority share-holders in electing corporate board members. President Moon also
spoke strongly for more transparency and modesty among political elites. As
soon as he got elected he moved from the “Blue House”, the sumptuous
presidential palace, to a more modest governmental building.
Moon's
foreign policy can be considered to be closely aligned with the so-called
Sunshine Policy which was pioneered by his liberal predecessors. The policy
consisted of openly carrying out detente with its bellicose and aggressive
neighbor to the North. His liberal foreign policy stance can be summarized in a
quote from his book: "I am pro-U.S., but now South Korea should adopt
diplomacy in which it can discuss a U.S. request and say no to the
Americans.".
President
Moon played an instrumental role in convincing President Trump, and to a
certain extent Japan (which is extremely skeptical of any North Korean peaceful
overtures) that the young Kim Jong un can be trusted. It is unlikely that
President Moon is an idealist (he knows the North well), but he played a
perfect matchmaker and seriously helped Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un to get
along. Dealing with Trump was probably even a harder task than talking to the Great
Leader.
When, after
the initial Trump-Kim summit, and all the talk about the speedy
denuclearization it was becoming obvious that North Korea was stalling,
President Moon again stepped in and invited Kim to South Korea where, after all
the ceremonial glitter and holding hands with Kim, he managed again to make the
North Korean Supremo utter promises of authentic denuclearization by 2021 and
closure of their main nuclear site. While in South Korea, Kim also extended
another invitation for a sit down with Mike Pompeo in Pyongyang for further
talks.
We can only
imagine what political skills and steely resolve, together with a deep
understanding of political realities, a politician must possess to perform this
balancing act with so much at stake.
--o--
BRIEFLY
NOTED
CHINA-MONGOLIA-RUSSIA
Chinese and Mongolian military units took part for the first time in the gigantic war games staged by the Russian Armed Forces, mainly around the Siberian training range of Tsugol, but also in various other locations around Russia. The official figures are staggering: 300,000 troops and 40,000 pieces of military equipment on land, sea and in the air with around 1.000 aircraft taking part. For the first time, Chinese and Mongolian armed forces are also taking part.
Some
observers have suggested the scale of the exercise might be an exaggeration, a
Potemkin show of military might. In addition to providing an impressive show of
military power, the Russian military command was evidently eager to emphasize
the lessons they had learned from recent active military operations in Syria.
This also serves to consolidate Russia’s position and reputation as a supplier
of military equipment.
UNGA: TRUMP AGAINST GLOBALISM
The 73rd
session of the United Nations General Assembly was the first one in history of
the organization where the US president emphasized that the post WW-2 world
order was wrong and brought about excessive globalism and unworkable alliances.
While stating that the US will not be part of agreements and alliances aimed at
using the US power and money for their own purposes or often even against
American interests, Trump sharply criticized even his allies and partners like
the EU and particularly Germany. He asserted that Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline
will put Germany in the state of dependence from Russia. The main target of his
criticism was Iran. He defended his decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal
with Iran and warned Iran against any aggression in the region.
Interestingly
enough Trump almost omitted any mentioning of Russia in his speech.
UKRAINE
Ukraine has
officially notified Russia on September 21 that it will not extend its
Friendship Agreement. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin said on
September 19 that Kiev will notify all relevant organizations, including the
United Nations, about the move. The 10-year treaty was originally signed in
1997, with an automatic extension clause. The treaty took effect in April 1999
and was extended for another 10 years in 2009. It should end in March 2019. The
treaty sets out the principle of strategic partnership, the inviolability of
existing borders, respect for territorial integrity, and an obligation not to
use one nation's territory to damage the other’s security.
CHINA
Human
Rights Watch’s latest report on China suggests that the Chinese government is
committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang province on a "scale unseen in
the country in decades”. This campaign of repression in Xinjiang is a key test
of whether the United Nations and concerned governments will sanction an
increasingly powerful China in order to end this abuse."
China is
carrying out a "mass, systematic campaign of human rights violations"
against its mostly Muslim Uyghur minority population, Human Rights Watch says.
The New York-based organization presented evidence of what it labeled the
"arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment, and the increasingly
pervasive controls on daily life" by the Chinese government in Xinjiang.
The report
echoes earlier remarks by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, that said ethnic Uyghurs in China were being held in
"counter extremism centers," with millions more forced into
re-education camps, turning China's Uyghur region into "something that
resembles a massive internment camp." Among the many inmates of the
so-called "re-education facilities" are also citizens of Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan (ethnic Uyghurs), some of whom managed to escape and could offer
their testimonies.
AZERBAIJAN
Baku has
criticized Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian over his latest statement
concerning the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the breakaway region disputed
by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesman said on
September 9th that Pashinian's remarks at a meeting with ethnic Armenian
businessmen in Moscow could damage international efforts to resolve the
decades-old dispute over the region. Pashinian said at the meeting a day
earlier that he saw Nagorno-Karabakh as "part of Armenia" in the
future. Azerbaijan accused Armenia's leadership of creating tensions ahead of a
scheduled meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers at the UN
General Assembly in New York in late September.
RUSSIA
Russia’s
Supreme Court has sharply narrowed the scope of the legal provisions under
which individuals can be charged under the country’s extremism laws, saying
that simply “liking” or reposting material on social media does not alone
constitute a crime. The September 20th ruling follows a series of recent cases
in which Russians have been charged for publishing materials, sometimes
satirical, on social-media platforms such as VKontakte and Facebook. This was
part of an ongoing crackdown on online speech by the government, a crackdown
that free-speech advocates say is being used to stifle dissent.
The deputy
chairman of the court explained to reporters that authorities must prove that
there was intent to foment hatred or ethnic hostility. “Judges…should check not
the actual fact of publication, not the ‘repost,’ not the ‘like,’ but they
should check the actual motives,” he said. He said the court would also review
earlier convictions on extremism-related charges.
A growing
number of Russians have been caught up by authorities’ strict-and some say
overly broad-interpretation of the country’s extremism laws. Last year, a
27-year-old man in the city of Cheboksary was found guilty of "mass
distribution of extremist materials" when he reposted a news item about
his earlier conviction for reposting "extremist" content.
THE AUTHORS
Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His particular area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.
During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.