THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
TRUMP vs UN
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| President Trump addresses the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Official White House Photo by D. Myles Cullen) |
The September
session of the UN General Assembly was undoubtedly one to remember. In the 72
years of the UN existence there were many dramatic moments, turbulent
discussions and inflammatory rhetoric. What made this session unique was Donald
Trump openly expressing disrespect for the UN itself, an extraordinary
pronouncement for the leader whose country was one the founders of the United
Nations.
Trump's
speech was not received well by the vast majority of world leaders in the
General Assembly hall. Judging by the immediate reaction it was the least
welcomed speech by a US President in that building ever. Objectively, however, the
speech contained some reasonable points in respect to the overblown bureaucracy
and inherited biases of the organization. Dmitry Simes, chief editor of the
prestigious American National Interest magazine remarked that Trump's speech
was put together by two conflicting groups: the Administration and the State
Department. Bellicose and threatening parts were obviously produced by the President's
inner circle and more conciliatory and diplomatic segments by the State
Department bureaucrats. A pure example of this duality was his explicit threat
to annihilate all of North Korea (a country of 24 million people) and right
after that expressing his strong belief in diplomacy.
His
blistering attack against the nuclear deal with Iran was unanimously rejected
not only by the 5 other co-signers of the agreement but also by the EU and other
major players except maybe for Israel.
The 72nd
session of the UN GA has not brought us closer to solving any of the world
immediate conflicts.
BGN conjecture: the Iran nuclear agreement will
stay in place with a possibility of changes in respect to the number of years
Iran is not allowed to enrich uranium.
Syria: limited coordination between the US led
coalition and Russian military command will continue.
--o--
PRESIDENT PUTIN LOST THE ELECTION, DID HE?
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President Putin at the Gagarinsky District Polling Station, September 10th
President of Russia Official Website |
It is
rather difficult for commentators to evaluate the significance of the results
achieved by some opposition parties on the occasion of the Moscow local council
elections held on September 10th. Is it a “new era for Russian politics”, as
one activist put it? Perhaps. The opposition, in this case the liberal Yabloko
party, indeed won all the seats in the district where the President himself
voted. This is symbolically significant. Yet, United Russia, the President’s
“pedestal” party won 76% of the Moscow seats overall and most of everything
else across the country. That is as clear a victory as one could expect.
To have a
better understanding of the situation it is important to take a more long-term
view.
In Russia’s
managed democracy conditions, the three opposition parties (Communists, Just
Russia and Liberal Democrats) that are labeled the “systemic” opposition are
expected to be just that, opposition. Their aim is not to gain power, but to
serve as faire-valoir for the party
that supports the President. This works very well in the context of national
elections, especially parliamentary ones. Systemic opposition parties get their
share of seats in the Duma. The perks that come with the Duma seats are a
non-negligible incentive not to disrupt the system. The opposition parties that
are not part of the system barely get any public recognition and seldom manage
to get seats at any level.
At the
national level, for a non-systemic opposition to emerge and to have some claim
to power, it would need a strong leader, a distinct and attractive platform
that could stand up to United Russia’s all-you-can-eat approach, as well as a
substantial membership. Thus far, this has been “mission impossible”.
Around the
time of the December 2011 national legislative elections, the prospect of
non-systemic opposition forces being in a position to gain power at the
municipal or regional level began to gain some credibility and attractiveness.
Some observers argued that if opposition forces could establish themselves
firmly at a lower level, they might be able to break out of the managed
democracy model and eventually move on to the national level. That, however,
did not materialize. A lot of energy was spent on the major public opposition
demonstrations in late 2011 and throughout 2012, but the interest for electoral
politics at the local level was not sustained.
In that
context, the September 10th Moscow local council elections are significant in
that they mark the fulfillment of the 2011-12 expectation: a non-systemic
opposition group will take over the local council of up to 15 Moscow districts
and will have a voice in many other councils. The unifying issue that seems to
have brought about this result is the opposition to the Moscow Administration’s
plan to renovate Khrushchev-era apartment blocks without taking into account
the wishes of their occupants. The opposition groups did not manage to gain
enough seats in enough districts to advance their own candidate for the next
mayoral election in 2018, but are not giving up on finding a way around that
problem. What matters is that the Yabloko opposition becomes relevant and, on
account of its central Moscow successes, highly visible. This success could
inspire others to try to do the same.
Of no less
interest is the fact that the Moscow gains of the non-systemic opposition were
accompanied by substantial losses for the systemic opposition parties: for
instance, the Communist Party went from a previous overall tally of 212 seats
to only 43.The non-systemic opposition may not be close to power, but may be in
a position to replace the systemic opposition, in itself a significant moment.
Managed
democracy is not dead. It still has a lot of staying power. Wishful thinking on
the part of its opponents could lead to major disappointment. The fact is,
however, that there is a real well-organised opposition that is finding its
voice again in a grass roots based endeavour. What is far more difficult is to
assess how long it might take for the revived opposition to alter the current
power structure. The first step we just witnessed took more than five years. It
could take a lot of time for the next one, in the absence of another major faux-pas by the current holders of
power.
--o--
RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS OUT OF RECESSION
It is not
the growth Russia dreamed about. Nevertheless 2.1% growth in 2016 and 2.6%
growth in the first two quarters of 2017 marks the end of the deepest recession
in years. It is particularly surprising in light of sanctions that have
squeezed the Russian financial system and deprived industry of some vital
imports. The so-called counter-sanctions that Moscow announced in response were
aimed at boosting an "import replacement" drive especially in
agriculture. For a short while the euphoria of import replacement was somewhat
justifiable: domestic production started to grow. However, in the absence of the
competition that imported goods provide, the quality of domestic agricultural
products in Russia has begun to drop. In technological and industrial sectors
Russia is also going through profound difficulties. The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development concluded that while the sanctions were not as
damaging for the Russian economy so far as it had been widely expected, they
will seriously undermine Russian economic performance in future. Without a 4%
annual growth Russia's economy will not be able to maintain the global
standards of a post-industrial nation. Only by improving relations with the
West, that is not easy due to complex political differences, can Russia meet
its economic objectives.
BGN conjecture: It is likely that Russia
will offer major compromises on Eastern Ukraine (but certainly not Crimea) in
order to remove all or large part of sanctions so it can improve its economy
and regain membership at the G8.
--o--
BETTER THAN HOME
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President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Trudeau, Toronto, September 22nd
President of Ukraine Official Website
|
There is
probably nothing sweeter for a President of Ukraine than to visit Canada. No
matter your latest single-digit poll rating or what difficulties you may have
at home, you will be very well received by governments at all levels and by the
Ukrainian community. You will also hear the right things, most of the time. No
matter also that the discussions are not as productive as you would want: there
is a definite answer neither on the provision of satellite images to monitor Russian
and rebel troop movements on the Ukraine border nor on Canada joining a UN
peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Yet, there is no definite no heard on the
first question and, on the second, you receive a general expression of support
for the Ukraine-proposed UN peacekeeping mission. Urgent issues do, however,
await you at home.
UN
peacekeeping may not be the most pressing issue that needs to be addressed upon
arrival in Kyiv, but it has now become less of a winner. For months, if not
years, Kyiv could advance the idea of a UN peacekeeping mission, knowing that
Moscow would reject it out of hand. Moscow has modified the terms of the
discussion by coming up with its own UN peacekeeping proposal. That Russian
proposal is unacceptable to Kyiv on at least one major account: UN peacekeepers
would be expected to support the work of the OSCE Monitoring Mission, that is they would have to be on the line separating the two sides to the conflict, not
on the Ukraine-Russia border. Under German pressure, Russia has allowed that it
might be willing to consider the presence of peacekeepers elsewhere in Donbass,
but not on the international border, which is a key condition for Kyiv to
support any peacekeeping proposal. Other issues, such as the prior removal of
heavy weapons, the composition of the peacekeeping contingent and the explicit
direct approval of the arrangement by the rebel authorities in Donbass might be
resolvable, but the dispute over the location of peacekeepers is likely to make
an agreement impossible. By making its own proposal, Russia has, however, not
only taken this free ride away from Kyiv, but, by eliciting some open interest
on the part of Germany, opened a small crack in the general European support
for Kyiv. One may even wonder whether the Germans might not have encouraged the
idea.
Mikheil
Saakashvili’s illegal presence in Ukraine will be another less than pleasant
matter for Poroshenko to address. Piqued by having had his Ukrainian
citizenship removed by Poroshenko, Saakashvili is unlikely to limit himself to
enjoying the hospitality of his supporters in the capital and throughout the
country. He has openly stated that, no longer being a citizen, he no longer
seeks an elected position in Ukraine. Instead he seems intent on becoming a
political agitator that will seek to regroup and energize opposition activists who
share his anti-corruption platform. The outcome of his altruistic efforts is
unpredictable, but will not make things any easier for the current Ukrainian
leadership whose general political standing is on a downward trend.
Having just
signed the new law on Education, Poroshenko will now have to address the
controversy arising from the fact that the legislation’s promotion of education
in Ukrainian is perceived by some of Ukraine’s EU neighbours (Hungary,
Romania)as an infringement of the education rights of “their” ethnic minorities
in Ukraine. The matter has been referred by Ukraine to the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (also known as Venice Commission) of the Council of
Europe”. Poroshenko agreed to take into account the opinion of European
experts, but emphasised that Ukraine would make decisions by itself. A most negative
reaction had already come from Hungary that described the new legislation as “a
stab in the back” and threatened to block Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with
the European Union. Many Canadians, being familiar with the education language
debate, will have an impression of déjà vu, but with an additional international
touch.
BRICS AND VLADIVOSTOK ECONOMIC FORUM
--o--
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| BRICS leaders |
The
September 4th Summit meeting in Xiamen (China) of the leaders of the world
emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) under the BRICS
moniker did not get a lot of attention
in our media. There is a tendency to think of such summits as the poor relative
of the G7 ones. If anything, there are even commentators arguing that the BRICS
as an entity has outlived its usefulness. The BRICS s pledge to work together
toward a more just, equitable, fair, democratic and representative
international political and economic order is appealing, but does not have the
same credibility when two of its leaders, President Temer in Brazil and
President Zuma in South Africa are facing or have faced corruption charges. The
attempts led by China and Russia to “de-dollarize” their commercial exchanges
as a way of reducing US influence and insulating the economies from US-inspired
sanctions may appear futile.
Yet,
despite the mixed reviews BRICS meetings go on. As a mechanism of consultations
among the leaders of the world emerging economies, it may fulfill a rather
useful mission as a forum to promote greater economic integration (especially
between Russia and China) as well as a conflict prevention mechanism
(especially between China and India). When compared to what might be achieved
by a G8 Summit with Donald Trump on board, the BRICS Summits might even begin
to look good.
The Chinese
insistence on “the need to seek practical results in our economic cooperation”
and on the” need to strengthen the integration of our development strategies”
illustrates rather well how BRICS mechanisms are in the long-term expected to
create more robust economies better connected with one another. The BRICS’
creation and active promotion of its own New Development Bank is one example of
the mechanisms that can lead to tangible accomplishments.
From the
BRICS Summit in China, Vladimir Putin travelled to Vladivostok for the third
edition of that city’s Economic Forum. This served, if necessary, to highlight
the special relevance of BRICS’ and of China in the economic development of
Russia’s Far Eastern regions.
Even though
the economy is not regarded as Putin’s first strength, it is worthwhile to
observe that his interest in modernizing the Russian Far East is a significant
departure from past Soviet and Russian policies and that he pursues this
regional economic development interest in a sustained manner year in year out.
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| Japanese Prime Minister Abe, President Putin, September 7th, Vladivostok President of Russia Official Website |
The
Presidents of South Korea and of Mongolia as well as the Prime Minister of
Japan also attended the Vladivostok Forum. What is striking is the enthusiasm
displayed by Japan, followed closely by South Korea, for the fullest possible
development of economic cooperation with Russia. The contrast with the
attitude of some countries of the Euro-Atlantic region is staggering.
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South Korean President Moon Jae-in, President Putin, September 6th, Vladivostok
President of Russia Official Website
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Japan, even
though it still has not resolved its territorial dispute with Russia, is
reportedly in “serious discussions” to link the two countries with a railway
bridge that would connect Hokkaido and Sakahlin islands. Russia would build its
own link from the continent to Sakhalin. This project may be seen as
far-fetched, but the very fact that it is discussed is revealing of the state
of mind in the region. Seen in connection with China’s One Belt One Road plans
(especially the New Eurasian Land Bridge) the project could lead to a
substantial increase in trade flows. It is also not lost on the countries
belonging to the Eurasian Economic Union that they would be among the first to
benefit from the expansion of rail links in Asia and their connection to the
European network.
--o--
GERMANY: JAMAICA COALITION?
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The Bundestag, Berlin
|
The Christian
Democratic party of Germany together with its Bavarian cousin Christian Social
Union received the biggest slice of the electorate's pie and will again form
the Government of the Federal Republic. With only 33% of votes they, however,
have to form a coalition. The Social Democrats, after suffering their worst
defeat in the post-World War II history, announced their decision to stay in the
opposition. Frau Merkel will most probably opt for the so-called Jamaica
coalition (party colours of Christian Democrats, Free Democrats and Greens in
combination form the Jamaican national flag).
It was a
bittersweet victory for the Christian Democrats because of the rejection by
many Germans of the government's decision to let one million Muslim refugees
into Germany in 2015-2016. The right-wing Alternative for Germany party won
12.6% of the vote and for the first time got into the Bundestag.
The initial
analysis of the election results showed that all 6 regions of the former East
Germany together with millions of German citizens of Russian and other Eastern
European extraction voted for the AfG. Most of the world media immediately
labelled this right-wing party as "neo-Nazi". This is a bit of a
stretch. Yet, Angela Merkel admitted that her party has to work hard to bring
back those who voted for AfG and that her party will address the root causes of
the out of control immigration.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: ANGELA MERKEL
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| Angela Merkel, Facebook Profile |
After
winning the September elections Angela Merkel, became the third longest-serving
German chancellor, following Otto von Bismarck and Helmut Kohl.
The
daughter of a protestant pastor, Merkel as born in West Germany yet moved to
the DDR when she was a child as her father was transferred there by the church.
Like Margaret Thatcher, Merkel has a Ph.D. in chemistry. Unlike Thatcher she is
not called an "Iron Lady". German politicians prefer to call her
"Teflon Lady" for her ability to compromise, build coalitions and
take into consideration the views of her bitter political opponents. That is
why her cabinets could include right-of-center Free Democrats and
left-of-center Social Democrats.
Angela
Merkel is a unique politician for Germany and the continent as a whole; her
East German upbringing, education, fluency in Russian ( Merkel speaks Putin's
language fluently) provides her with a unique understanding of complex
political processes underway in Europe and the rest of the world. Merkel is not
alone in disliking Donald Trump, but she is the only politician of caliber who
openly states so. Her closeness to Israel has a lot do with her deep
understanding of history, especially of the 20th century and the tragedies that
unfolded. Germany under Merkel provided Israel with unprecedented level of
political and military assistance, including the sale of advanced submarines
and even annual joint sessions of German and Israeli cabinets. Angela Merkel's
radical decision to open her country's doors to one million refugees is in direct
line with her feeling of the responsibility Germany carries for the Jewish
genocide and other multiple tragedies of World War II.
Despite an
evidently eroding support Merkel still commands the strongest ever national
economy. She continues to symbolize the stability and prosperity of Germany.
She starts
her fourth term as the unquestionable leader of United Europe, as usual with
the exception of the United Kingdom.
NORTH KOREAN ROULETTE
--o--
NORTH KOREAN ROULETTE
There is a certain system to Kim Jong-un's irrationality. He believes - and he would not be wrong to do so - that the US and South Korea will never mount an attack against him. There are reasons for this. First, up to 10.000 Soviet-made artillery pieces that are embedded into North Korean mountains can open up a barrage against Seoul from 30 miles away and kill tens of thousands of people within hours. They are difficult if not impossible to destroy immediately. Second, North Korea, as it is well known, possesses a deadly arsenal of chemical and biological weapons to be loaded into artillery pieces which unlike rockets are impossible to intercept. Third, there is a high degree of probability that Kim could launch nuclear devices towards South Korea, Japan and even reach American bases as far as Guam. Basically we can find ourselves in all out nuclear exchange with totally unpredictable consequences and scale.
Therefore constantly escalating threats towards Pyongyang are not the most effective way to deal with this problem.
Kim will not give up his pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. He knows all too well what happened to Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein after they either had given up or were forced to end their nuclear programs. Kim and his generals also know what the international experts confirm: the North Korean army, for all its fire power, can conduct war for a maximum of three weeks after which they will start running out of spare parts, fuel and ammunition.
It seems that the Chinese approach of applying economic pressure together with allowing some wiggle room for reflection (for Kim and his inner circle) is a more sensible and safer way to deal with the North Korean menace.
--o--
THE CANADA RUSSIA EURASIA BUSINESS ASSOCIATION
The Canada Eurasia Russia Business Association (CERBA) held its Annual General Meeting on September 12th in Montreal. Gilles Breton, the co-editor of the Breton/Gerol Newsletter was elected as the Chairman of the National Board of CERBA. For more detailed information on CERBA and its activities you may visit its web site at www.cerba.org
--o--
BRIEFLY NOTED
RUSSIA
Twelve
governors of the most industrial regions of Russia lost their jobs. Reasons
given were age and poor performance. In reality Putin, who fired them, began
his pre-election campaign by bringing to his side younger generation of
managers. The new governor of Kaliningrad region (Western enclave of Russia) is
only 29. By doing so Putin addressed something that had been perceived as his
weakness: a lack of connection with younger voters.
KYRGYZSTAN
Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan swapped accusations and diplomatic protests after Kazakhstan's
president met with Omurbek Babanov, a Kyrgyz presidential candidate. Kyrgyzstan
accused Kazakhstan of meddling in its internal affairs. Relations between the two
former Soviet republics were never too friendly, but now mighty and industrial
Kazakhstan is perceived by Bishkek as a serious threat.
UZBEKISTAN
For the
first time since 1991 Uzbekistan will allow its citizens to buy and sell
foreign currency. The law will go into effect on October 1st. This will boost export/import activities and
help the process of privatization.
MOLDOVA
The Socialist
party of Moldova proposed a law that is designed to strengthen presidential
powers. This law, if adopted, will help to solve almost permanent state of
gridlock between the parliament and president. Regional experts believe that
such a law could provide president Dodon with an opportunity to dissolve
parliament and call new elections.
BELARUS
President
Lukashenko threw a royal welcome for the visiting leader of the Chechen
Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. It is highly unusual for a head of state to offer
such level of welcome to a regional leader (Chechnya officially is a part of
Russian Federation). Yet, Kadyrov's role in the Muslim world and his special
relations with Putin are the reasons for Lukashenko to be so friendly.
--o--
THE AUTHORS
Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His particular area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.
During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.
