Wednesday, September 30, 2020

Issue 46

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

LOOKING FOR THE UNDECIDED

As one CNN analyst put it recently, it is difficult to imagine that most American voters would not have made their mind by now as to whom they will support on November 3rd.  Donald Trump has been such a polarising figure that voters would likely have made their mind about him. Joe Biden is not an ideal candidate, but represents a reasonable enough option. In that respect, public opinion polls, that predicted a popular vote victory for Hillary Clinton in 2016, are probably right again in foreseeing a Biden popular vote victory by a slightly larger margin than Clinton.



What polls cannot measure so easily is the level of commitment of decided voters and whether they will actually vote. Those voters who have not abandoned Donald Trump by now are unlikely to do so in the coming weeks. The revelations about Trump not paying much income tax, being a money-losing and personally indebted businessman will not change that. The level of commitment of Trump’s so-called base is very strong. The insistence on appointing quickly a new Supreme Court Justice to replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg is intended on cementing the support of that base, especially its pro-life and evangelical segments. It would not likely increase the number of Trump supporters as a majority of Americans would seem to have opposed this Republican rush job. In addition, ‘Trump’s repeated statements that he “would have to see” before he recognizes his possible defeat are not likely to attract any new supporters.

Biden’s perceived frailty as well as the fact that he must recruit voters from a much broader ideological spectrum than Trump would suggest the level of commitment of his supporters is less firm.  What can help him though is that there are so-called “never-Trumpers” who will vote for anybody but Donald Trump.

In a polarised environment and considering that debates more often than not do not change public opinion trends the face-to-face debates with Donald Trump were nevertheless a concern for Biden supporters as they could allow Trump to cast some doubts about Biden’s suitability and stamina. The first debate on September 29th turned out into a total mess. Biden may not have shined too brightly, but he certainly survived. As for Trump, his refusal to condemn white supremacists or to commit to a peaceful transition, as well as his bullying approach, constant interruptions and personal attacks may have confirmed hitherto lukewarm Biden supporters in their choice.

Some of the main issues that should concern American voters are the management of the pandemic, economic recovery plans, social equality, health care and climate change. These would seem to play in favour of the Democratic candidate. Trump’s attempts to score points on the law-and-order agenda seem to have had limited success.



All things considered, taking into account the monolithic nature of the support for Donald Trump, the distorting influence of the Electoral College and the possible judicial contestations over mail-in votes, it is still too early for the Biden campaign take anything for granted.

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NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Yerevan and Baku are still technically at war over Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh despite a 1994 cease-fire in a conflict that killed around 30,000 people. Since then, skirmishes have frequently broken out near the so-called Line of Contact that separates Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on the front line of Europe's longest-running conflict.



The situation has evolved in the wrong direction after Azerbaijan was allegedly very disappointed with the absence of any change after the accession to power in Armenia of reformist Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.  Pashinyan was not known to have the close association of his predecessors to the Karabakh faction but turned out to maintain the same approach as before.  There even emerged rumours that Armenia may want to recognize the independence of Karabakh. Azerbaijan leadership had most of the time managed to contain the pressure of its war party but had to conclude that the existing negotiating framework would produce no result. The fact that Turkey might be willing to provide a helping hand also created a new context. The usual tensions on the Line of Contact did the rest.

Armenia on September 29th said a Turkish F-16 shot down one of its warplanes (Sukhoi-25), a claim immediately denied by Ankara as "absolutely untrue." Armenian defence ministry said that the Turkish jet was deep in Armenian airspace. The pilot died. The Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry also denied that a Turkish fighter jet had shot down an Armenian plane.

Yerevan's claim came as fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh is continuing in a major flare-up of the decades-old conflict over the disputed territory. Armenian military losses stood at 89 dead with over a hundred wounded. Azerbaijan refuses to release its list of casualties, reporting only its civilian deaths which so far stand at around two dozen killed.

Both sides use heavy artillery, helicopters, drones, and air power.

Several key countries, including the US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom called on both sides to cease hostilities.

In a situation when Turkey, a powerful regional player, openly supports Azerbaijan and now very likely provides Baku with some direct military help, Russia which has friendly relations with Armenia and does a lot of business with Azerbaijan has a lot at stake here.

On September 29th, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on “all sides, especially partner countries such as Turkey, to do all they can for a cease-fire and get back to a peaceful settlement of this conflict using political and diplomatic means.” One sentence of this statement was an obvious message to Turkey:  "Any statements about some kind of support and military activity undoubtedly add fuel to the flames," Peskov told reporters. As before in Syria and Libya, Russia finds itself having to find a way to restrain Turkish President Erdogan.

Moscow sells weapons to both Azerbaijan and Armenia but has a military base in Armenia and favors that strategic partnership.

Another country which sells a lot of high-end military equipment to Azerbaijan is Israel. In fact, most drones that Azerbaijan possesses are made in Israel and the Azeri army prefers Israeli technology (especially drones) over Turkish arms. Armenia often decried Israeli sales of arms to Azerbaijan (a Muslim majority country) and reminded Israel about historic parallels between the two countries. Israel, however, pursues its own interests in the region.

The outcome of this conflict largely depends on Russia's (and the international community's) ability to rein in Turkey, a real military powerhouse in the region. One on one Armenia can hold its own against larger and economically stronger Azerbaijan. 

A resolution of the conflict at this time may imply a more direct Turkish involvement in so-called peace arrangements.

Armenia now faces the same enemy as it did beginning in 1915 when Turkey and its allies massacred more that a million Armenians, a genocide Turkey still refuses even to acknowledge. This fact casts a dark shadow over the conflict. In imperial times, Russia protected its Eastern Armenia territory. Today’s Russia, even more closely tied to Armenia and with its own large Armenian diaspora, would not allow Armenia to lose a war that would lead to massive Armenian civilian casualties. 

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THE NEW POLITIC GAMBIT IN BELARUS

President Alexander Lukashenko who officially had to be inaugurated on October 9th after he won the elections with a "fantastic" 80% majority of votes, suddenly decided to have his inauguration on September 23rd. He invited only highly loyal people including army officers and security personnel. Diplomats were represented only by the Chinese ambassador who declined to have translators present.

Lukashenko's inauguration ceremony
©President of Belarus website


The idea was charmingly simple: to become a legal president at the time when he is not being recognized by most European leaders. In fact, such a speedy and secret inauguration only underlined the lack of legitimacy that from now on will be the part and parcel of the European approach to the regime in Minsk. The massive demonstrations that took place immediately upon the inauguration highlighted the total rejection of Lukashenko with all his 26 years in power.

The official news agency BelTA reported "several hundred" senior officials had been invited to the inauguration ceremony, though it did not say who or how many actually attended

Following the ceremony, spontaneous demonstrations broke out in Minsk, the heart of more than six weeks of nationwide opposition to the results of the August 9th election that Lukashenka claims to have won.

The Belarusian rights organization Vyasna, which has documented the detention of thousands of protesters since the vote, said at least two demonstrators were detained near the Independence Palace, where the inauguration took place.

Interestingly enough, even Vladimir Putin did not send a congratulatory message to his Belorussian colleague on this occasion.

In the West, a growing list of countries said they would not recognize Lukashenko's presidency. Canada and a few others are also imposing personal sanctions on Lukashenko and his entourage.

According to Professor Valery Solovey, one of the most informed Kremlin observers, Putin is currently looking for a decent replacement to the Belarus leader with a tragic and comic behaviour. It looks like Russia and Belarus may down the road go ahead with some long-discussed kind of union that will be based on coordination in key economic, financial and security areas. The process might give Lukashenko a new job and title. This will take time though and the protests are continuing.

--o--

 

KREMLIN TAKES NAVALNY BACK

Kremlin critic and anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny posted on social media a picture of himself sitting on a park bench in the German capital after being discharged from the Berlin hospital where he was being treated for what Germany has said is a case of poisoning with a Soviet-style nerve agent.



At the time, the German government said that laboratories in France and Sweden had reconfirmed German tests showing that the poison used on Navalny was a Novichok agent.

The Kremlin has said there is no proof of that and has asked for evidence to be shared, to no avail.

It is clear thar Navalny was poisoned by a substance of the Novichok family, but not at the same level as the previous similar poisoning cases in the UK. It is also clear that he is on his way to a full recovery and wants to return home.

His wish was welcomed by Putin's press-secretary Dmitry Peskov who confirmed that nobody in the government would object to Navalny's return to Russia and that he was "free" to return to Moscow "at any moment".

The question however remains: the conditional house arrest and several unsubstantiated charges against the leading Russian opposition figure have not been dropped and consequently his stay in Moscow will not be trouble-free. There is another problem, the key problem, will the Russian government carry out a criminal investigation into Navalny's poisoning as it is demanded by the international community? Even if it does, will the investigation answer all the questions that have been raised around the circumstances of the incident. Will it also answer the nagging unresolved question: cui bono? Who is profiting from this story? Whatever the damage some allege has been done to Russia-Europe relations, there little evidence of a desire in the Kremlin to get to the bottom of the story, or even to appear to do so. 

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UKRAINE: PROGRESS AND GOOD INTENTIONS

One step forward

During a late September working trip to the Donetsk region, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting on the work of the Ukrainian side of the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE).

The quotes from the minutes of the meeting are eloquent: […] It was noted that the regime of comprehensive and permanent ceasefire is an undeniable success on the way to peace in Donbass. […] Indeed, we observe minimization of losses. Today, the silence mode (i.e. ceasefire) has been maintained for the 62nd day.  

President Zelenskyy visiting troops in the Donetsk region, September 26th
©President of Ukraine Website


There is no question that achieving a cease-fire and making it last is a significant accomplishment and a fulfillment of a key promise. In addition to negotiating a cease-fire with the opposing side, Zelenskyy had to bring his own side together. The gratitude he extended to the military establishment was not pro forma. After years of fighting, building an internal consensus with stakeholders holding entrenched positions was most unlikely not an easy task.

On the overall issue of implementing the Minsk I and II peace Agreements, the situation is showing very little sign of improvement.  Old-time politicians on Zelenskyy’s new negotiating team got into trouble over some of their controversial statements. Former President Kravchuk, now lead Ukrainian negotiator, nevertheless passed a clear and accurate diagnostic on the Minsk process, calling it impossible to fulfill: "We are now in a rather difficult situation: there are Minsk Agreements, but they cannot be implemented given the obvious reasons. Also, it is because when they were being signed, it was already clear that they would not be fulfilled.”  To be clear Kravchuk refers to the Ukrainian side’s problems with the Minsk Agreements: "Those led by [the then-President Petro] Poroshenko laid down one thing, and now they demand something else. And those who laid this down and signed it remind us that international agreements must be fulfilled.’’

Ultimately, Kravchuk sees a summit of the Normandy leaders as the only way out of the current deadlock, the underlying implication being that a modified arrangement must be negotiated

No way to run a railway

In putting an end to his membership of the Board of the State Railway Corporation well-known international consultant Anders Aslund delivered a damning indictment on the senior management of that corporation as well on members of President Zelenskyy’s ruling party (Servant of the People). Aslund’s complaints bear on the treatment of the members of the Board as well as the rejection of their improvement proposals. What Aslund’s complaints reveal is that the new political leadership is unwilling to proceed with market-driven reforms and that it takes a narrow populist view of the remuneration of senior officials. For a party intent of fighting corruption, the latter reveals a lack of understanding of the principle that adequate remuneration is one good way of preventing the need to engage in corrupt practices.

In addition, there is still an ongoing deadlock with the IMF and to some the extent the EU over Ukraine maintaining the independence of all anti-corruption bodies, this being a condition for further financial assistance. This, among other things, prompted the EU European High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell to state during his recent visit to Ukraine that the EU is not a charity or a cash machine.  Opinion polls suggest that Ukrainians are fully behind the anti-corruption fight, but that they are less keen having the IMF “manage” Ukraine.

President Zelenskyy is now strongly pushing for the adoption by the Rada (Parliament) of an Anticorruption Strategy for 2020-2024. It may seem like it took a lot of time to get the government to get its act together in the form a strategy. It was, however, a necessary process of reckoning that good intentions are not enough.

 COVID-19 problems

The COVID-19 situation in Ukraine is not improving, but even more concerning is the fact that the official reports may not reflect the real situation. During a conference call in early September it was brought to the attention of the President that the chief physicians of a number of medical institutions in Ukraine sometimes force staff to conceal COVID-19 infection at work as they are afraid of administrative penalties for hospitals. The President immediately called on the Ministry of Health to protect doctors.

It has been surmised since the beginning of the pandemic that the reporting of cases was not uniform between various countries and not uniform within certain countries. This was given as a possible explanation of reporting delays in China and inaccuracies elsewhere. Local authorities do not want to report what they fear might bring retribution. Ukraine would not be different than many other countries in this respect, but the problem was at least made public and it was addressed by the political authority.

--o--

 

PUTIN AT RISK, UNLIKELY

Some Western observers had voiced the hope that events in Belarus might have an impact on the round of regional and local elections that were held in Russia in early September. The idea was that the elections might be a test, even a challenge, for the Putin-supported party. There was no perceivable Belarus influence on the outcome. This is not because there was no coverage in Russia of the events in Belarus. The Russian public receives or has access to all the information that it needs to appreciate what is going on in Belarus.

Kremlin-supported candidates generally did very well at the level of gubernatorial elections, less well at the level of local legislatures and councils. A few associates of opposition leader Navalny even managed to get elected at the local level in Siberia. From the Kremlin’s point of view the outcome was almost optimal. From the point of view of genuine oppositionists, any victory is still a breakthrough as it feeds the hope that change is possible.

President Putin on-line conference with newly-elected regional leaders, September 24th
©President of Russia Website
Add caption


It was probably wishful thinking for some to expect that the Belarus crisis could contaminate Russian politics. At this stage, the Russian electorate would not seem to recognize the Belarus situation as offering a precedent for Russia. There would be a multitude of reasons for that, including the personality of the leaders and the way they manage their democracies. In Belarus Lukashenko’s claim that he won 80% of the popular vote was too implausible to be accepted at face value.

Beyond broader policy issues, sub-national elections in Russia are a different exercise: regional and local elections can be influenced by national issues and can present a risk for the ruling party if there is a major source of dissatisfaction. They, however, seem to be largely influenced by local factors as is evidenced by the large differences between the percentage of votes received by winning governors, some barely squeezing over 50%, others securing a landslide. The sub-national elections also afford the electorate the opportunity to express its views with the expectation that these views will be reasonably reflected in the outcome, despite the allegations of irregularities.

In Russia, at this time, the level of dissatisfaction with national leadership does not seem high enough to have caused serious difficulties for most ruling party candidates at the regional level.

This would also show that regional leaders who were running this time and that have been supported by the national leadership are performing relatively well. Recruiting competent managers has been a long-standing concern of the Presidential Administration.

In opening even a small door to a genuine opposition party, the local elections are also serving as a pressure valve in the managed democracy system by allowing the official recognition of a few divergent voices. 

--o-- 

 

ABRAHAM ACCORDS

This month president Donald Trump presided over a signing ceremony at the White House September 15th, that included Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdullatif al-Zayani, and the UAE’s Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

The officials signed two separate documents: the Israel-UAE peace treaty and a declaration of intent by Israel and Bahrain to make peace. There was not enough time to negotiate a final agreement on the second accord since the announcement of the second diplomatic breakthrough on September 11th.



The agreements between Israel and the two Gulf States are truly historic in a long and often treacherous road to broader Arab-Israeli peace. These are the first two Arab states to sign peace agreements with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

U.S. officials lauded the Abraham Accord between Israel and the UAE, named after the biblical forefather shared by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as a pivotal and historic hinge event.

The two peace accords are unquestionably dual achievements of the Trump administration negotiating strategy, as well as a testimony to Netanyahu’s long-standing strategy of engaging moderate Arab states that increasingly share many of the same interests and concerns as Israel.

Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all face threats from Shiite Iran as well as from Sunni Islamist extremist groups. All three also are concerned about Turkey’s increasingly destabilizing role in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in conflicts in Syria, Gaza, and Libya. There is also very little doubt that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stands right behind their smaller allies in the Gulf. Right after the ceremony the Saudis opened its vast airspace (Saudi Arabia is the world's 12th largest country by territory) to the Israeli commercial air traffic.

Not only does Iran need to beware of close military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and the two Arab kingdoms, but the accord also is expected to clear the way for the export of more sophisticated U.S. weapons to the two countries, possibly including F-35 stealth jets and armed drones that were denied in the past.

The peace accords also break the long-standing-and failed-Palestinian veto on any peace deals with Israel by Arab states. The thinking in Washington and most Arab capitals has shifted towards a more realistic reappraisal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It became apparent to most serious observers of the Middle East that the central issue in the area is not the absence of the Palestinian state but Shia-Sunni hostilities, terrorism, Iranian activism, civil wars in Syria and Libya and various manifestations of radical Islam. In fact, as was correctly pointed out by the rulers of the UAE, the Arab states can exert more meaningful pressure on Israel in respect to the Palestinian problem as a peace partner and not as an enemy. This was empirically proven by the Israeli u-turn on planned annexation of parts of the West Bank prior to the peace pact.

Morocco, Oman, and Sudan also are likely prospects to enter peace negotiations with Israel in the near future.

Eventually, the Bahrain and UAE diplomatic pacts could lead Palestinians to adopt a more realistic negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel. But regardless of how the Palestinians react, those two agreements represent a powerful diplomatic breakthrough that will cement a closer strategic cooperation against Iran.

--o--


PERSON OF THE MONTH: SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA



Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is a Belorusian human rights activist. She is 38 years old. Before her political career she was an English teacher. She is married to activist Sergei Tsikhanousky, who was a candidate for the same election until his arrest on May 29th of this year. She subsequently announced her intention to run in his place and became the main opposition candidate.

Tsikhanouskaya, who was forced into exile in Lithuania under pressure from autocratic Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko, said in Vilnius after talks with President Macron, the most prominent world leader she has met, that he had promised to help negotiate the release of those jailed in Belarus.

Election authorities gave Lukashenko 80% of the vote, but Tsikhanouskaya claims she received 60-70% if results were properly counted.

Belarus has been rocked by protests since Lukashenko claimed victory over Tsikhanouskaya in a deeply flawed election last month, and then unleashed a brutal crackdown on his opponents.

If Lukashenko is a European, gentler version of Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro, then Tsikhanouskaya is akin to Juan Guaido who accused Maduro of rigging the elections and proclaimed himself president. The similarities though have its limits. Guido remains in Venezuela being supported by a substantial number of the population. Tsikhanouskaya is in exile and her influence in Belarus opposition is rather symbolic. Most of the opposition in Belarus is not so much for Tsikhanouskaya as for forcing Lukashenko out.

Yet, for the time being, Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarus opposition in the diaspora.

--o--

 

US-RUSSIA

Russian officials say they have not given the US any new deadlines in talks over the New START treaty, the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms pact, but that there cannot be any pause in discussions as time is running out.

The US has said it wants any new nuclear arms control treaty to cover all types of warheads, contain stronger verification and transparency measures, and bring China on board, a move Beijing has rejected.

"The issue of primary importance that should and must be promptly dealt with is, of course, the extension of the Russia-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which will expire shortly, in February 2021," Russian President Vladimir Putin told the 75th UN General Assembly on September 22nd.

Russia has said it is ready to extend the New START without preconditions and warned there is not enough time to renegotiate a complicated new treaty.

New START, which caps the number of deployed long-range nuclear warheads each country can have, expires in February unless the two sides agree to extend it for five years.

In his UN speech, Putin also announced a plan to propose a "binding agreement" to ban space-based weapons.

 

CYBER SECURITY FOOTNOTE

President Putin recently reiterated to the US the “suggestion to agree on a comprehensive program of practical measures to reboot our relations in the field of (cyber) security”.

To the many in the US and elsewhere who have accused Russia of using cyber attacks to meddle in the affairs of other states, this will sound rather cynical and pointless. Putin may be cynical, but pointless not necessarily. He would know that his suggestion would be at best ignored, but obviously wanted it to be on the record prior to the US election so that it can be picked up, perhaps, after the election.

The fundamental question for the US is whether it thinks it can outsmart Russia in matters of cybersecurity or whether it would ever trust Russia enough to seek agreed limitations in this field as was the case with classic security and disarmament issues. The additional question in the case of cyber security is how to deal with powerful third parties and with sophisticated non-state actors. Unlike in traditional disarmament discussions, there are many more competitors active in the field.

 

CSTO, BUSINESS AS USUAL

Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry says military maneuvers scheduled to be held in Belarus in October by the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have nothing to do with ongoing protests against Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

The ministry's spokesman Ghani Nusipov said on September 16th that the exercises, called Unbreakable Brotherhood, by the military forces of CSTO member states Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan had been scheduled long before the disputed August 9th presidential poll in Belarus.

A day earlier, Russia's Defense Ministry said the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises will be held from  October 12 to 16 in Belarus.

 --o--

 

THE AUTHORS


Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, has become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.
 

 


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