THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER
LOOKING FOR THE UNDECIDED
As one CNN
analyst put it recently, it is difficult to imagine that most American voters
would not have made their mind by now as to whom they will support on November
3rd. Donald Trump has been
such a polarising figure that voters would likely have made their mind about
him. Joe Biden is not an ideal candidate, but represents a reasonable enough option.
In that respect, public opinion polls, that predicted a popular vote victory
for Hillary Clinton in 2016, are probably right again in foreseeing a Biden
popular vote victory by a slightly larger margin than Clinton.
What polls
cannot measure so easily is the level of commitment of decided voters and
whether they will actually vote. Those voters who have not abandoned Donald
Trump by now are unlikely to do so in the coming weeks. The revelations about
Trump not paying much income tax, being a money-losing and personally indebted
businessman will not change that. The level of commitment of Trump’s so-called
base is very strong. The insistence on appointing quickly a new Supreme Court
Justice to replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg is intended on cementing the support of
that base, especially its pro-life and evangelical segments. It would not
likely increase the number of Trump supporters as a majority of Americans would
seem to have opposed this Republican rush job. In addition, ‘Trump’s repeated
statements that he “would have to see” before he recognizes his possible defeat
are not likely to attract any new supporters.
Biden’s perceived
frailty as well as the fact that he must recruit voters from a much broader
ideological spectrum than Trump would suggest the level of commitment of his
supporters is less firm. What can help
him though is that there are so-called “never-Trumpers” who will vote for
anybody but Donald Trump.
In a
polarised environment and considering that debates more often than not do not
change public opinion trends the face-to-face debates with Donald Trump were nevertheless
a concern for Biden supporters as they could allow Trump to cast some doubts
about Biden’s suitability and stamina. The first debate on September 29th turned
out into a total mess. Biden may not have shined too brightly, but he certainly
survived. As for Trump, his refusal to condemn white supremacists or to commit
to a peaceful transition, as well as his bullying approach, constant
interruptions and personal attacks may have confirmed hitherto lukewarm Biden
supporters in their choice.
Some of the
main issues that should concern American voters are the management of the
pandemic, economic recovery plans, social equality, health care and climate
change. These would seem to play in favour of the Democratic candidate. Trump’s
attempts to score points on the law-and-order agenda seem to have had limited
success.
All things
considered, taking into account the monolithic nature of the support for Donald
Trump, the distorting influence of the Electoral College and the possible judicial
contestations over mail-in votes, it is still too early for the Biden campaign
take anything for granted.
--o--
NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
Yerevan and
Baku are still technically at war over Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of
Nagorno-Karabakh despite a 1994 cease-fire in a conflict that killed around
30,000 people. Since then, skirmishes have frequently broken out near the
so-called Line of Contact that separates Armenian and Azerbaijani forces on the
front line of Europe's longest-running conflict.
The
situation has evolved in the wrong direction after Azerbaijan was allegedly
very disappointed with the absence of any change after the accession to power
in Armenia of reformist Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan was not known to have the close
association of his predecessors to the Karabakh faction but turned out to
maintain the same approach as before.
There even emerged rumours that Armenia may want to recognize the
independence of Karabakh. Azerbaijan leadership had most of the time managed to
contain the pressure of its war party but had to conclude that the existing
negotiating framework would produce no result. The fact that Turkey might be
willing to provide a helping hand also created a new context. The usual
tensions on the Line of Contact did the rest.
Armenia on
September 29th said a Turkish F-16 shot down one of its warplanes (Sukhoi-25),
a claim immediately denied by Ankara as "absolutely untrue." Armenian
defence ministry said that the Turkish jet was deep in Armenian airspace. The
pilot died. The Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry also denied that a Turkish
fighter jet had shot down an Armenian plane.
Yerevan's
claim came as fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region
of Nagorno-Karabakh is continuing in a major flare-up of the
decades-old conflict over the disputed territory. Armenian military losses
stood at 89 dead with over a hundred wounded. Azerbaijan refuses to release its
list of casualties, reporting only its civilian deaths which so far stand at
around two dozen killed.
Both sides
use heavy artillery, helicopters, drones, and air power.
Several key
countries, including the US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom
called on both sides to cease hostilities.
In a
situation when Turkey, a powerful regional player, openly supports Azerbaijan
and now very likely provides Baku with some direct military help, Russia which has
friendly relations with Armenia and does a lot of business with Azerbaijan has
a lot at stake here.
On
September 29th, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called on “all sides, especially
partner countries such as Turkey, to do all they can for a cease-fire and get
back to a peaceful settlement of this conflict using political and diplomatic
means.” One sentence of this statement was an obvious message to Turkey: "Any statements about some kind of
support and military activity undoubtedly add fuel to the flames," Peskov
told reporters. As before in Syria and Libya, Russia finds itself having to find a way to
restrain Turkish President Erdogan.
Moscow
sells weapons to both Azerbaijan and Armenia but has a military base in Armenia
and favors that strategic partnership.
Another
country which sells a lot of high-end military equipment to Azerbaijan is
Israel. In fact, most drones that Azerbaijan possesses are made in Israel and the Azeri army prefers Israeli technology (especially drones) over Turkish arms.
Armenia often decried Israeli sales of arms to Azerbaijan (a Muslim majority
country) and reminded Israel about historic parallels between the two countries.
Israel, however, pursues its own interests in the region.
The outcome
of this conflict largely depends on Russia's (and the international
community's) ability to rein in Turkey, a real military powerhouse in the
region. One on one Armenia can hold its own against larger and economically
stronger Azerbaijan.
A
resolution of the conflict at this time may imply a more direct Turkish
involvement in so-called peace arrangements.
Armenia now
faces the same enemy as it did beginning in 1915 when Turkey and its allies
massacred more that a million Armenians, a genocide Turkey still refuses even
to acknowledge. This fact casts a dark shadow over the conflict. In imperial
times, Russia protected its Eastern Armenia territory. Today’s Russia, even
more closely tied to Armenia and with its own large Armenian diaspora, would
not allow Armenia to lose a war that would lead to massive Armenian civilian
casualties.
--o--
THE NEW POLITIC GAMBIT IN BELARUS
President
Alexander Lukashenko who officially had to be inaugurated on October 9th after he
won the elections with a "fantastic" 80% majority of votes, suddenly decided
to have his inauguration on September 23rd. He invited only highly loyal people
including army officers and security personnel. Diplomats were represented only
by the Chinese ambassador who declined to have translators present.
 |
| Lukashenko's inauguration ceremony ©President of Belarus website |
The idea
was charmingly simple: to become a legal president at the time when he is not
being recognized by most European leaders. In fact, such a speedy and secret
inauguration only underlined the lack of legitimacy that from now on will be
the part and parcel of the European approach to the regime in Minsk. The
massive demonstrations that took place immediately upon the inauguration
highlighted the total rejection of Lukashenko with all his 26 years
in power.
The
official news agency BelTA reported "several hundred" senior
officials had been invited to the inauguration ceremony, though it did not say
who or how many actually attended
Following
the ceremony, spontaneous demonstrations broke out in Minsk, the heart of more
than six weeks of nationwide opposition to the results of the August 9th
election that Lukashenka claims to have won.
The
Belarusian rights organization Vyasna, which has documented the detention of
thousands of protesters since the vote, said at least two demonstrators were
detained near the Independence Palace, where the inauguration took place.
Interestingly
enough, even Vladimir Putin did not send a congratulatory message to his
Belorussian colleague on this occasion.
In the
West, a growing list of countries said they would not recognize Lukashenko's
presidency. Canada and a few others are also imposing personal sanctions on
Lukashenko and his entourage.
According
to Professor Valery Solovey, one of the most informed Kremlin observers, Putin
is currently looking for a decent replacement to the Belarus leader with a tragic and comic behaviour. It looks like Russia and Belarus may down the road
go ahead with some long-discussed kind of union that will be based on
coordination in key economic, financial and security areas. The process might
give Lukashenko a new job and title. This will take time though and the
protests are continuing.
--o--
KREMLIN TAKES NAVALNY BACK
Kremlin
critic and anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny posted on social media a
picture of himself sitting on a park bench in the German capital after being
discharged from the Berlin hospital where he was being treated for what Germany
has said is a case of poisoning with a Soviet-style nerve agent.
At the
time, the German government said that laboratories in France and Sweden had reconfirmed
German tests showing that the poison used on Navalny was a Novichok agent.
The Kremlin
has said there is no proof of that and has asked for evidence to be shared, to
no avail.
It is clear
thar Navalny was poisoned by a substance of the Novichok family, but not at the
same level as the previous similar poisoning cases in the UK. It is also clear
that he is on his way to a full recovery and wants to return home.
His wish
was welcomed by Putin's press-secretary Dmitry Peskov who confirmed that nobody
in the government would object to Navalny's return to Russia and that he was
"free" to return to Moscow "at any moment".
The
question however remains: the conditional house arrest and several
unsubstantiated charges against the leading Russian opposition figure have not
been dropped and consequently his stay in Moscow will not be trouble-free.
There is another problem, the key problem, will the Russian government carry
out a criminal investigation into Navalny's poisoning as it is demanded by the
international community? Even if it does, will the investigation answer all the
questions that have been raised around the circumstances of the incident. Will
it also answer the nagging unresolved question: cui bono? Who is profiting from
this story? Whatever the damage some allege has been done to Russia-Europe
relations, there little evidence of a desire in the Kremlin to get to the
bottom of the story, or even to appear to do so.
--o--
UKRAINE: PROGRESS AND GOOD INTENTIONS
One step
forward
During a
late September working trip to the Donetsk region, President of Ukraine
Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting on the work of the Ukrainian side of the Trilateral Contact Group
(Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE).
The quotes
from the minutes of the meeting are eloquent: […] It was noted that the regime
of comprehensive and permanent ceasefire is an undeniable success on the way to
peace in Donbass. […] Indeed, we observe minimization of losses. Today, the
silence mode (i.e. ceasefire) has been maintained for the 62nd day.
 |
| President Zelenskyy visiting troops in the Donetsk region, September 26th ©President of Ukraine Website |
There is no
question that achieving a cease-fire and making it last is a significant
accomplishment and a fulfillment of a key promise. In addition to negotiating a
cease-fire with the opposing side, Zelenskyy had to bring his own side together.
The gratitude he extended to the military establishment was not pro forma.
After years of fighting, building an internal consensus with stakeholders holding
entrenched positions was most unlikely not an easy task.
On the overall
issue of implementing the Minsk I and II peace Agreements, the situation is
showing very little sign of improvement. Old-time politicians on Zelenskyy’s new negotiating
team got into trouble over some of their controversial statements. Former President
Kravchuk, now lead Ukrainian negotiator, nevertheless passed a clear and
accurate diagnostic on the Minsk process, calling it impossible to fulfill: "We
are now in a rather difficult situation: there are Minsk Agreements, but they
cannot be implemented given the obvious reasons. Also, it is because when they
were being signed, it was already clear that they would not be fulfilled.” To be clear Kravchuk refers to the Ukrainian
side’s problems with the Minsk Agreements: "Those led by [the
then-President Petro] Poroshenko laid down one thing, and now they demand
something else. And those who laid this down and signed it remind us that
international agreements must be fulfilled.’’
Ultimately,
Kravchuk sees a summit of the Normandy leaders as the only way out of the
current deadlock, the underlying implication being that a modified arrangement must
be negotiated
No way to
run a railway
In putting an
end to his membership of the Board of the State Railway Corporation well-known international
consultant Anders Aslund delivered a damning indictment on the senior
management of that corporation as well on members of President Zelenskyy’s ruling
party (Servant of the People). Aslund’s complaints bear on the treatment of the
members of the Board as well as the rejection of their improvement proposals.
What Aslund’s complaints reveal is that the new political leadership is
unwilling to proceed with market-driven reforms and that it takes a narrow populist
view of the remuneration of senior officials. For a party intent of fighting
corruption, the latter reveals a lack of understanding of the principle that adequate
remuneration is one good way of preventing the need to engage in corrupt
practices.
In addition,
there is still an ongoing deadlock with the IMF and to some the extent the EU
over Ukraine maintaining the independence of all anti-corruption bodies, this
being a condition for further financial assistance. This, among other things, prompted
the EU European High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs Josep
Borrell to state during his recent visit to Ukraine that the EU is not a charity
or a cash machine. Opinion polls suggest
that Ukrainians are fully behind the anti-corruption fight, but that they are
less keen having the IMF “manage” Ukraine.
President
Zelenskyy is now strongly pushing for the adoption by the Rada (Parliament) of
an Anticorruption Strategy for 2020-2024. It may seem like it took a lot of
time to get the government to get its act together in the form a strategy. It
was, however, a necessary process of reckoning that good intentions are not
enough.
The COVID-19
situation in Ukraine is not improving, but even more concerning is the fact
that the official reports may not reflect the real situation. During a
conference call in early September it was brought to the attention of the
President that the chief physicians of a number of medical institutions in
Ukraine sometimes force staff to conceal COVID-19 infection at work as they are
afraid of administrative penalties for hospitals. The President immediately
called on the Ministry of Health to protect doctors.
It has been
surmised since the beginning of the pandemic that the reporting of cases was not
uniform between various countries and not uniform within certain countries. This
was given as a possible explanation of reporting delays in China and
inaccuracies elsewhere. Local authorities do not want to report what they fear
might bring retribution. Ukraine would not be different than many other
countries in this respect, but the problem was at least made public and it was addressed
by the political authority.
--o--
PUTIN AT RISK, UNLIKELY
Some Western
observers had voiced the hope that events in Belarus might have an impact on
the round of regional and local elections that were held in Russia in early September.
The idea was that the elections might be a test, even a challenge, for the
Putin-supported party. There was no perceivable Belarus influence on the
outcome. This is not because there was no coverage in Russia of the events in
Belarus. The Russian public receives or has access to all the information that
it needs to appreciate what is going on in Belarus.
Kremlin-supported
candidates generally did very well at the level of gubernatorial elections, less
well at the level of local legislatures and councils. A few associates of
opposition leader Navalny even managed to get elected at the local level in
Siberia. From the Kremlin’s point of view the outcome was almost optimal. From
the point of view of genuine oppositionists, any victory is still a breakthrough
as it feeds the hope that change is possible.
 |
| President Putin on-line conference with newly-elected regional leaders, September 24th ©President of Russia Website Add caption |
It was probably
wishful thinking for some to expect that the Belarus crisis could contaminate
Russian politics. At this stage, the Russian electorate would not seem to recognize
the Belarus situation as offering a precedent for Russia. There would be a multitude
of reasons for that, including the personality of the leaders and the way they
manage their democracies. In Belarus Lukashenko’s claim that he won 80% of the
popular vote was too implausible to be accepted at face value.
Beyond broader
policy issues, sub-national elections in Russia are a different exercise: regional
and local elections can be influenced by national issues and can present a risk
for the ruling party if there is a major source of dissatisfaction. They, however,
seem to be largely influenced by local factors as is evidenced by the large
differences between the percentage of votes received by winning governors, some
barely squeezing over 50%, others securing a landslide. The sub-national elections
also afford the electorate the opportunity to express its views with the
expectation that these views will be reasonably reflected in the outcome,
despite the allegations of irregularities.
In Russia, at this time, the level of dissatisfaction
with national leadership does not seem high enough to have caused serious
difficulties for most ruling party candidates at the regional level.
This would also show that regional leaders who were running this time and that have been supported by the
national leadership are performing relatively well. Recruiting competent managers has been
a long-standing concern of the Presidential Administration.
In opening even a small door to a genuine opposition party, the local elections are also serving as a pressure valve in the managed democracy system by allowing the official recognition of a few divergent voices.
--o--
ABRAHAM ACCORDS
This month
president Donald Trump presided over a signing ceremony at the White House September 15th, that included Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Bahrain’s
Foreign Minister Abdullatif al-Zayani, and the UAE’s Foreign Minister Abdullah
bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
The
officials signed two separate documents: the Israel-UAE peace treaty and a
declaration of intent by Israel and Bahrain to make peace. There was not enough
time to negotiate a final agreement on the second accord since the announcement
of the second diplomatic breakthrough on September 11th.
The
agreements between Israel and the two Gulf States are truly historic in a long
and often treacherous road to broader Arab-Israeli peace. These are the first
two Arab states to sign peace agreements with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and
Jordan in 1994.
U.S.
officials lauded the Abraham Accord between Israel and the UAE, named after the
biblical forefather shared by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as a pivotal
and historic hinge event.
The two
peace accords are unquestionably dual achievements of the Trump administration
negotiating strategy, as well as a testimony to Netanyahu’s long-standing
strategy of engaging moderate Arab states that increasingly share many of the
same interests and concerns as Israel.
Israel, the
United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all face threats from Shiite Iran as well as
from Sunni Islamist extremist groups. All three also are concerned about
Turkey’s increasingly destabilizing role in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood
and its offshoots in conflicts in Syria, Gaza, and Libya. There is also very
little doubt that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stands right behind their smaller
allies in the Gulf. Right after the ceremony the Saudis opened its vast
airspace (Saudi Arabia is the world's 12th largest country by territory) to the
Israeli commercial air traffic.
Not only
does Iran need to beware of close military and intelligence cooperation between
Israel and the two Arab kingdoms, but the accord also is expected to clear the
way for the export of more sophisticated U.S. weapons to the two countries,
possibly including F-35 stealth jets and armed drones that were denied in the
past.
The peace
accords also break the long-standing-and failed-Palestinian veto on any peace
deals with Israel by Arab states. The thinking in Washington and most Arab
capitals has shifted towards a more realistic reappraisal of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It became apparent to most serious observers of
the Middle East that the central issue in the area is not the absence of the Palestinian
state but Shia-Sunni hostilities, terrorism, Iranian activism, civil wars in
Syria and Libya and various manifestations of radical Islam. In fact, as
was correctly pointed out by the rulers of the UAE, the Arab states can exert
more meaningful pressure on Israel in respect to the Palestinian problem as a
peace partner and not as an enemy. This was empirically proven by the Israeli u-turn on planned annexation of parts of the West Bank prior to the peace pact.
Morocco,
Oman, and Sudan also are likely prospects to enter peace negotiations with
Israel in the near future.
Eventually, the Bahrain and UAE diplomatic pacts could lead Palestinians to adopt a more realistic negotiating position vis-à-vis Israel. But regardless of how the Palestinians react, those two agreements represent a powerful diplomatic breakthrough that will cement a closer strategic cooperation against Iran.
--o--
PERSON OF THE MONTH: SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is a Belorusian human rights activist. She is 38 years old. Before her political career she was an English teacher. She is married to activist Sergei Tsikhanousky, who was a candidate for the same election until his arrest on May 29th of this year. She subsequently announced her intention to run in his place and became the main opposition candidate.
Tsikhanouskaya,
who was forced into exile in Lithuania under pressure from autocratic Belarus
leader Alexander Lukashenko, said in Vilnius after talks with President Macron,
the most prominent world leader she has met, that he had promised to help
negotiate the release of those jailed in Belarus.
Election
authorities gave Lukashenko 80% of the vote, but Tsikhanouskaya claims she
received 60-70% if results were properly counted.
Belarus has
been rocked by protests since Lukashenko claimed victory over Tsikhanouskaya in
a deeply flawed election last month, and then unleashed a brutal crackdown on
his opponents.
If Lukashenko
is a European, gentler version of Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro, then Tsikhanouskaya
is akin to Juan Guaido who accused Maduro of rigging the elections and
proclaimed himself president. The similarities though have its limits. Guido
remains in Venezuela being supported by a substantial number of the population.
Tsikhanouskaya is in exile and her influence in Belarus opposition is rather
symbolic. Most of the opposition in Belarus is not so much for Tsikhanouskaya as
for forcing Lukashenko out.
Yet, for
the time being, Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarus opposition in the diaspora.
--o--
US-RUSSIA
Russian
officials say they have not given the US any new deadlines in talks
over the New START treaty, the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms pact, but
that there cannot be any pause in discussions as time is running out.
The US has said it wants any new nuclear arms control treaty to cover all types
of warheads, contain stronger verification and transparency measures, and bring
China on board, a move Beijing has rejected.
"The
issue of primary importance that should and must be promptly dealt with is, of
course, the extension of the Russia-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which
will expire shortly, in February 2021," Russian President Vladimir Putin
told the 75th UN General Assembly on September 22nd.
Russia has
said it is ready to extend the New START without preconditions and warned there
is not enough time to renegotiate a complicated new treaty.
New START,
which caps the number of deployed long-range nuclear warheads each country can
have, expires in February unless the two sides agree to extend it for five
years.
In his UN
speech, Putin also announced a plan to propose a "binding agreement" to
ban space-based weapons.
CYBER SECURITY FOOTNOTE
President
Putin recently reiterated to the US the “suggestion to agree on a comprehensive
program of practical measures to reboot our relations in the field of (cyber)
security”.
To the many
in the US and elsewhere who have accused Russia of using cyber attacks to
meddle in the affairs of other states, this will sound rather cynical and
pointless. Putin may be cynical, but pointless not necessarily. He would know
that his suggestion would be at best ignored, but obviously wanted it to be on
the record prior to the US election so that it can be picked up, perhaps, after
the election.
The fundamental
question for the US is whether it thinks it can outsmart Russia in matters of
cybersecurity or whether it would ever trust Russia enough to seek agreed
limitations in this field as was the case with classic security and disarmament
issues. The additional question in the case of cyber security is how to deal
with powerful third parties and with sophisticated non-state actors. Unlike in
traditional disarmament discussions, there are many more competitors active in the field.
CSTO, BUSINESS AS USUAL
Kazakhstan’s
Defense Ministry says military maneuvers scheduled to be held in Belarus in
October by the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) have nothing to do with ongoing protests against Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko.
The
ministry's spokesman Ghani Nusipov said on September 16th that the exercises,
called Unbreakable Brotherhood, by the military forces of CSTO member states
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan had been
scheduled long before the disputed August 9th presidential poll in Belarus.
A day
earlier, Russia's Defense Ministry said the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises
will be held from October 12 to 16 in Belarus.
THE AUTHORS
