BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

Friday, February 28, 2020

Issue 40

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

WHO WILL WIN THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION?

The simple answer to this question is that it is still too early to tell. However, as most reputable pollsters say, only Bernie Sanders has the most viable path to grab most pledged delegates before the Convention. His support is the most stable across the widest array of states and he has impressive support across age, ethnic and racial groups. Sanders also does very well in a lot of head-to-head polls vs Donald Trump. This is now, but will this be the case later is unclear and even more unclear if Sanders is electable. Although the impact of coronavirus remains unknown, the economy is doing well and the country might get seriously weary of Bernie's call to “revolution” and various radical changes. Michael Bloomberg with all his 60 billion dollars most likely will be able to mount a challenge and climb in the polls, but it is unlikely the party with so many progressives in it will have the stamina to nominate a Republican oligarch.

Let us not forget that Hillary Clinton out-raised Donald Trump 3-1 in 2016. It is true that Joe Biden is fading and Mayor Pete Buttigieg scores low with minorities, but things can change after Super Tuesday. Even Elizabeth Warren and Senator Klobuchar, the two women in the race, can make a comeback. Here we can take more examples from history. It was 1992 the last time Democratic candidate defeated a Republican incumbent. That candidate did not win a single state before the Super Tuesday and had to go on CBS ' 60-minutes to fight accusations of marital infidelity during the primary. His name was Bill Clinton and he won 370 electoral votes. Not so long ago a black man who admitted to using cocaine when he was young and who held rather radical views on race relations, clinched the nomination and went on to win the popular vote and 365 electoral votes. It was in 2008 and his name is Barack Obama.

One thing is for certain, both Clinton and Obama were dynamic performers and great speakers. Only one Democratic candidate can claim to be in this class, it is Bernie Sanders. The Democratic Party establishment may be concerned that he is too far to the left. They probably should be equally concerned that, should Sanders not be nominated, his enthusiastic supporters will most likely not actively line up behind a lackluster moderate candidate such as Joe Biden, thus replicating the Clinton-Trump 2016 scenario.

Yet, what makes American politics such a spectacle is uncertainty and a lot of surprises. One thing is for sure, we are up for both this time around.

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TURKISH-RUSSIAN ROMANCE IN JEOPARDY?

Presidents Erdogan and Putin had agreed in September 2018 in Sochi on the principles of what should happen in Syria's Idlib region. Yet, tensions have been mounting over the past few weeks over what Syria and Russia see as shortcomings and even open violation of the Sochi agreement by Turkey. As for Turkey it rejects the aggressive stance taken by Russia and Syria in response to these alleged violations of the Sochi agreement.

The 2018 Sochi agreement, it has to be recalled, was intended to avert the humanitarian crisis that was going to engulf Idlib should Syria (with Russian support) launch a military offensive to retake the city. In simple terms Turkey sought to secure a buffer zone on Syrian territory as well as to protect moderate opposition forces while bringing extreme terrorist group under some form of control so as to lead eventually to a return of Syrian government presence in the civilian areas of Idlib.

The Sochi agreement bought time for Idlib, but never led to the expected normalisation of the situation. Those that Syria and Russia sees as terrorists continued their activity against Syrian and Russian forces, with possible direct support, it seems, from Ankara. The Syrian and Russian response has been to re-launch their military offensive towards Idlib, with a focus on recovering the areas surrounding the main highways that link Aleppo, the large commercial centre, to Damascus, the capital. This is an important element in the potential economic recovery of Syria.

From the humanitarian point of view the situation is back to where it was prior to the Sochi agreement. The intensification of fighting, real and expected, is putting a large civilian population in a most difficult position.

After the most serious clash to date between Turkish and Syrian military forces at the very end of February, Erdogan and Putin still managed to have a “substantial” phone conversation during which they agreed to further activate consultation mechanisms between their military establishments with a view to “normalise” the situation. Further meetings between leaders may even be held with a week or so. If Syria is allowed to consolidate what it sees as vital territorial gains, it may be possible to negotiate a new pause in military activity.

Erdogan obviously does not see the fate of the last remaining rebel stronghold in the same manner as Russia and Syria. He has stated decisively that Turkey is determined to make Idlib a secure zone "no matter the cost". "We will not leave Idlib to the Syrian regime, which does not understand our country's determination, and to those encouraging it," said Erdogan.

Erdogan essentially knows that he cannot afford the risk of an open confrontation with Russia (which Russia also dreads) for obvious military reasons, but as well for fear of damaging Turkey’s vital economic relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, Erdogan still is hoping to achieve an arrangement in Idlib that will safeguard Turkey’s security interests and avoid a renewed flow of refugees into Turkey. The next question would be whether Turkey would fully keep its commitment of curbing the flow of migrants into the EU.

A similar problem arises with respect to Libya where Russia is seen as supporting the insurgency of Marshal Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” and Turkey is supporting the “Government of National Accord”. Here the alleged violation by Turkey of the recently-agreed international arms embargo has met with Turkish criticism that Russia has allowed a large contingent of Russian mercenaries to operate in support of Marshal Haftar. Paradoxically, the Libya conflict does not so much compound the disagreement between Ankara and Moscow as it creates another context where the two sides are condemned to cooperate in order to advance their own interests.

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CURSED BE THE PEACEMAKERS

Around the time of the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group, an independent and informal initiative, released a statement in which it outlines “Twelve Steps Toward Greater Security in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Region”. The roughly 40 signatories of the statement represent a broad selection of experienced international relations specialist from the Euro-Atlantic region, including some from Ukraine and Russia. One of them is Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Along with a few others, he was blacklisted as an enemy of Ukraine by an admittedly controversial Ukrainian website.

©Munich Security Conference Facebook

The Twelve Steps are a mix of predictable security, humanitarian, economic and political measures. What seems to have irked Ukrainians the most are steps 8 and 12. Step 8 suggests a road map for changes to sanctions in response to specific actions. This is not a big surprise either way. The committee that drafted the steps found it expedient to include an incentive for Russia to move along as well as for Europeans to get rid of sanctions they either dislike or find useless. Ukrainians see this as a give away to Russia. Step 12 is about the launching of an inclusive national dialogue across Ukraine about national identity in which Hungary, Poland and Russia might also be involved. Expectedly, the response in Ukraine and even in some US circles was very negative. The experts who signed off on the Twelve Steps would most likely have known that most Ukrainians would reject outright the implication that something is wrong with Ukraine’s national identity. What is telling is that the experts still found it useful to include that step.

By suggesting that the problems that Ukraine has with Russia and to a lesser extent with Hungary and Poland have to be the subject of a national dialogue, experts may have implicitly passed a diagnostic that is not entirely groundless. They, however, did not come up with the right remedy.

An illustration of the difficulties with Ukrainian identity was again just provided by President Putin himself who, in the context of a major policy interview, reiterated the view that the Russian and Ukrainian people are one nation. This is not exactly the best way of launching a dialogue.

Furthermore, the national dialogue that might more immediately facilitate the end of military confrontation would be one between the authorities in Kyiv and the leaders of the rebel regions in Eastern Ukraine. There is generally no appetite for that in Kyiv. President Zelensky is the only one to have observed that to regain its lost territories Ukraine would also have to regain the trust of the people living in those territories. Improving freedom of movement with and within the rebel regions (step 3 of the twelve steps) would seem a better and more necessary point of departure.

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LUKASHENKO'S FIRM "NO"!

Presidents Lukashenko and Putin
Sochi area, February 7th
©President of Belarus Website

After his seemingly friendly meeting with Putin in mid February in Sochi, Lukashenko came back home and during his speech to a gathering of Belarus industrialists, was very candid.

"I don't know how long I will be your president but as long as I am, Belarus will never accept re-unification with Russia despite what Russian media says", said Lukashenko. He also suggested that the process of re-integration of both economies could continue only if it does not become a takeover. He admitted that Putin had shot down his request to buy Russian oil without additional tariffs despite the fact that back in the Soviet days Belarus actively participated in the building of the Russian oil industry. Lukashenko has confirmed his decision to diversify his oil supply by buying it from Norway or other sources. Belarus is the only Russian ally in Europe. It is logical to assume that Putin will order his new PM Mikhail Mishustin to reach a compromise.

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UKRAINE’S RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS

In mid-February Ukrainian authorities agreed to repatriate 45 of their own citizens and 27 foreign nationals (at the request of their country of origin) from the coronavirus-affected areas of China. The group leaving China was sent to a sanatorium in the small village of Novi Sanzhary in the Poltava region.

What ensued has been equally referred to by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Zelensky as reminiscent of the Middle Ages. A group of protesters attacked the buses taking the evacuees to the Novi Sanzhary sanatorium, trying to prevent them from reaching their destination and asking they be taken elsewhere. Allegations have surfaced that some of the protesters were not acting spontaneously, but had been paid to participate in the protest. Similar protests erupted in other cities where it was rumoured evacuees might be taken.

Whether the protests were genuine or orchestrated by opposition politicians, Ukraine is for now the country where there has been the strongest negative reaction to the return home of evacuees because of the coronavirus situation in China. President Zelensky himself considered the matter serious enough to make a national televised address to set the record straight and reassure his people.

It would be inappropriate to see medieval obscurantism or even political opportunism as the main reason for the protests. What the series of coronavirus-related protests reveals though is that there is still in Ukraine a considerable challenge for the authorities, of any political colour, to achieve credibility when trying to communicate with the population on potentially sensitive issues. Public opinion polls have been suggesting this for a while. The coronavirus-related incidents confirm it. Lack of trust in government is not a problem limited to Ukraine, but the current state of affairs makes crisis management there a relatively more difficult task.

The origin of distrust of government has many root causes. It is difficult not to recall that

in Ukraine the Chernobyl disaster was initially met by deafening silence on the part of the local authorities.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: SERGEI LAVROV

Stephen Kotkin, a respected historian from Stanford University, a brilliant expert on Russia and the Soviet Union recently stated that the Russian Foreign Ministry headed by Sergei Lavrov is one if the most professional institutions of its kind in the world. Unlike the US State Department, especially nowadays, he said, it is run by consummate professionals and experts in every field of international diplomacy.

The 69-year old Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign Minister since 2004, and former Russian Ambassador to the UN, in many ways can be credited with this success. Modern Russia has some visible weaknesses in comparison to the economic might of the US and China, but what it lacks in economic soundness it compensates with hard military power and high-class diplomacy.

Russia's foreign policy stands in contrast to the chronic instability and apparent indecisiveness of many international actors. Even Moscow's critics cannot deny that Russia has pursued a consistent foreign policy over the past several years. Sergei Lavrov is undoubtedly a co-author (with Putin of course) of modern Russian foreign policy.

On the international stage many do not see Russia as a convenient partner. It, however, certainly cannot be accused of being unreliable or inconsistent in this capacity. This is an indisputable advantage that Russia enjoys over some major powers.

In order to appreciate the scope of the Russian foreign policy one can just listen to Sergei Lavrov's speech at recently completed Munich Security Conference. He is respected not only by the country's friends and allies, but also by its enemies and opponents. Emmanuel Macron, speaking at the same conference, gave high praise to some initiatives presented by the Russian Foreign Minister.

Russia's foreign policy, under the captaincy of Sergei Lavrov, plays a key role globally as it has not played in decades. Almost no major conflict can be seriously fixed without some Russian involvement in either Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, some African states and of course Ukraine. Russia is a diplomatic heavyweight that in this fractured world no one can ignore. Taking into account serious economic woes Russia has been experiencing for several years, it is quite an achievement.

Without having to agree with any of the Russian positions, Canadian diplomats who have had the occasion to observe from a close distance the work of the Russian Foreign Ministry would probably wholeheartedly agree with Professor Kotkin’s above-mentioned opinion.

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RUSSIA

Russia's foreign minister, speaking at the Munich Security Conference has accused NATO, and Europe more broadly, of stoking tensions on the continent, as he called on leaders to "abandon the phantom of the Russian threat."

Lavrov suggested NATO was to blame for tensions with Russia, including the increased deployment in recent years of more Western military hardware and forces in the Baltic states and Poland.

"The crisis of confidence is felt particularly acutely in European affairs," said Lavrov. "The stoking of tension, the advance of NATO's military infrastructure to the East, military exercises of unprecedented scale near Russia's borders, increase of defense budgets beyond every measure; this all generates uncertainty."

"Before it's too late, you should abandon the phantom of the Russian threat…remember what unites us," he added.

Lavrov’s call may not have convinced European leaders still reeling from Russian actions in Ukraine. They may however comfort the approach of some of the leaders such as President Macron who seek greater cooperation with Russia.

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KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyzstan says Russia plans to install new air- and missile-defense equipment and drones at its air base near the former Soviet republic's northern city of Kant. Nurlan Kirisheev, the deputy chief of the Kyrgyz armed forces General Staff, said in a statement on February 13 that Russia will renovate runways at the air base, in moves that will "improve security in the region."According to Kirisheev, the deployment of drones and air- and missile-defense systems will be conducted in accordance with agreements signed during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kyrgyzstan last summer.

It is noteworthy that Kyrgyzstan hosted a US military base just outside Bishkek from 2001 to 2014 when it was shut down due to intense pressure from Moscow.

Kirisheev's statement came the same day that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov told lawmakers in Moscow about plans to deploy air-defense equipment at the air base.

Russia's air base at Kant was opened in 2003 under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan.

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KAZAKHSTAN

The death toll in violent ethnic clashes last week between Kazakhs and ethnic Dungans in Kazakhstan's south, which shocked the Central Asian nation, has risen to 11.

Mr. Qulshymanov, an adviser to the governor of the Zhambyl region where the clashes took place, said on February 14 that the badly burned body of an unidentified person had been found two days earlier amid the debris of a commercial building destroyed during clashes in the village of Masanchi.

The violence erupted at several local villages on February 7 between local Kazakhs and ethnic Dungans, a Muslim group of Chinese origin.

Dozens were wounded, including 19 police officers, while more than 30 houses, 17 commercial buildings, and 47 vehicles were destroyed or damaged in the clashes.

Kazakh officials have said that the violence was sparked by a conflict on a highway, during which the occupants of two vehicles started a brawl following a road-rage incident. The deadly clashes followed the posting on the Internet of video footage taken from the brawl.

Thousands of people fled villages where the violence erupted, ending up in the neighboring Kyrgyz Chui region, where the majority of ethnic Dungans in Central Asia traditionally reside.

Brief historical information on the ethnic complexities of the region can be of interest: Dungans, also known as Hui, are Sunni Muslims who speak a dialect of Mandarin with many words and phrases borrowed from Arabic, Persian, and Turkic. Their ancestors came to Central Asia, which then was part of the Russian Empire, in the late-19th century after the Chinese government’s violent crackdown of the Dungan Revolt of 1862-1877.

The recent incidents are a reminder of the complex ethnic make-up of Central Asian countries and the continuing relevance of official policies that promote ethnic and religious tolerance.

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SYRIA

The Syrian parliament has recognized the mass killing of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire a century ago as genocide.

This recognition took place during heightened tensions with neighboring Turkey following deadly clashes in northwestern Syria.

Members of the People's Assembly have unanimously adopted a resolution condemning and recognizing "the genocide committed against the Armenians by the Ottoman state at the start of the 20th century.

Before Syria's civil war had began in 2011 about 100,000 ethnic Armenians lived in the country. Many of them have fled, including thousands to Armenia. Syria has historic ties with Armenia where this minority felt relatively safe.

In a predictable response Turkey decried Damascus's "hypocrisy" over the vote.

During and immediately after World War I, Ottoman Turks killed or deported as many as 1.5 million Armenians, a Christian minority in the predominately Muslim empire. Many of the Armenians who fled to Syria eventually ended up in France, the US and Canada.

Ankara claims the deaths were a result of civil strife rather than a planned Ottoman government effort to annihilate Armenians. Turkey also claims fewer Armenians died than has been reported.

At least 23 countries have officially recognized the mass slaughter and deportation as genocide, triggering the ire of Ankara.

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AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan's ruling Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan) party says it has won at least 72 seats in parliament in the February 9 elections to the 125 seats in the single-chamber legislature, while nearly all of the remaining mandates went to small parties and independents loyal to President Ilham Aliyev. Reviews are still going on in respect to a few seats.

International monitors have identified widespread procedural violations in the vote count, raising doubts about the fairness of the elections. Aliyev called the vote nine months early to consolidate his authority.

The opposition have alleged widespread violations, including ballot box stuffing, in the elections.

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SOBCHAK MEMORIAL

President Putin at Sobchak Memorial Concert
St. Petersburg, February 19th
©President of Russia Website

On the occasion of the 20^th anniversary of the passing of Anatoly Sobchak, Vladimir Putin arranged for a major commemoration of the life of his teacher, boss and political mentor to be organised in St.Petersburg. Sobchak was a leading legal scholar and a major political figure in the 80s and the 90s and served as mayor of St. Petersburg from 1991 to 1996. Putin was then one of his deputies. Beyond Putin’s strong personal friendship with Sobchak, what the commemoration reveals is Putin’s unmistakable attachment to Sobchak's ideas. More specifically, this confirms the sources of Putin’s thinking on political principles and the importance of legality and it explains the legalistic outlook of Putin.

This is relevant to the current exercise of reforming the Russian constitution, where legality is the foremost concern. Sobchak is considered as having had a major influence in the drafting of the current constitution. Although he had an authoritarian bent, Sobchak was also generally regarded as a democrat, probably more than his student.

Accessorily, for nostalgic kremlinologists, the attendance at Sobchak commemoration also confirms who truly belongs to Putin’s St. Petersburg inner team: Sberbank Chairman Gref, former Finance Minister Kudrin and Deputy Head of Presidential Administration Kozak.

CRIMEA: A FOOTNOTE

There were rumours that during Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Ukraine in late January, he would have told his Ukrainian interlocutors that “Crimea is lost. World players understand that. Russia is not the kind of country from which you can take something away.” Pompeo’s remarks would have been made in the context of a discussion about convening an international conference on Crimea, which the US representative, by all accounts, did not find it useful to support. In other words, official US statements will continue to reflect that Crimea belongs to Ukraine, but nothing will be done about it.

As for President Zelenskyy, he nevertheless convened and participated in a Forum on the Age of Crimea in Kyiv on February 26^th. The focus was on commemoration of the 2014 events that led to Ukraine losing control over Crimea as well as measures to maintain the contacts with Ukrainian citizens: continuation of Ukrainian broadcasts in the direction of Crimea and the facilitation of administrative formalities and of travel for Ukrainian citizens residing in Crimea.

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe. Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.

Wednesday, January 29, 2020

Issue 39

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

AFTER SOLEIMANI

The killing of Qasem Soleimani may no longer be in the news, but its consequences will continue to be felt for a while in a way that does not advance US security or US interests in the Middle East.

By going for the extreme option of eliminating Soleimani, Trump must have thought even briefly that he was following on the precedent set by his predecessor in ordering the elimination of Usama bin Laden and his own previous order to eliminate Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, the head of the Islamic State. Speculation about the domestic calculations behind the decision were relatively guarded. Trump would know that a "courageous" decision made in the comfort of the White House only produces a short spike in popularity. The real election is only in November. It might be more appropriate to find a motivation in Trump’s deep desire to appear decisive and the fact that there a few “adults” left around him.

Qasem Soleimani

Soleimani was a US enemy on account of his support for US-designated terrorist entities in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. The fact that he was a de facto ally in the fight against the Islamic State was not enough to counterbalance his other activity. It was not taken into account and afterwards largely ignored by commentators.

The initial justification for the extra-judicial killing of Soleimani was an imminent attack on US interests. From the outset, this was not terribly convincing. After the initial questioning wore off, that justification was gradually replaced by the argument that Soleimani was a bad guy anyway.

The results of the killing of Soleimani are the most serious problem.

First, the entity that Soleimani led is not internally weakened by his death. Some seasoned local observers have even noted that Quds, the external action group of Iran’s Revolution Guard Corps, may even be reinvigorated by the emergence of a new leadership.

The execution of Soleimani will make it more difficult for the US to resolve the issue of local opposition to US military presence in Iraq. Whereas Trump’s instincts would lead him to favour getting the boys out, proceeding with that course of action would be appearing to yield to Iranian pressure, something utterly unacceptable for him.

Esmail Ghaani, Soleimani's successor

For the Iranian regime, Soleimani's death was an occasion to recover popular support and promote national unity. The downing of the Ukrainian aircraft led to some popular protests, but nothing that would endanger the regime. Ultimately, a scapegoat will most likely be found. More damaging though is the fact that hard-liners have had their position strengthened by the direct vocal support they received from the Supreme Leader ayatollah Ali Khameini.

An error in judgment by the Iranian air defence clearly led to the downing of the Ukrainian airliner and the tragic death of innocent people. It is collateral damage, but the responsibility is primarily that of Iran.

This being said, one has to conclude that the killing of Soleimani has achieved none of the objectives that were invoked by the US administration (other than a now doubtful alleged attack on US interests). In fact, it has complicated the situation, especially in Iraq. With respect to Iran, it has virtually destroyed the already faint hope of any US involvement in a conflict resolution dialogue in the foreseeable future and made Europe’s dialogue with Iran all the more difficult.

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REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES OR PUTIN LOOKING FOR THE BEST WAY OUT?

President Putin's January 15^th relatively brief address to the Russian legislators from both chambers of parliament was unusually full of radical proposals and changes to the constitution. This address was immediately followed by the resignation of PM Medvedev and that of all his cabinet.

The set of controversial proposals included one that was positively received by the Russian public, including those in the opposition. Putin suggested an amendment to the constitution allowing the Duma (lower chamber of Russian parliament), not the president, to appoint the future PM and his government. In fact, according to Putin's suggestion, the president would not be able to veto the Duma's choice of PM and subsequent ministers.

President Putin dressing the Federal Assembly
Moscow, January 15th
©President of Russia website

This does not make Russia a parliamentary republic. It still remains a presidential one. In theory, the president and parliament may, however, start working as a more equal tandem.

Another major change to the constitution was in Putin's announcement to redefine the role of the State Council, which was initially created in 2000. According to Putin’s proposal, the Council will have the power to “set the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the priority areas of socio-economic development”. The body would be formed by the president, although the proposed amendments give no indication how that process would take place.

Many experts familiar with the Byzantine flavour of many Russian policies see this elevation of the State Council as a potential place from where, as Chairman, Vladimir Putin could still keep a grip on power even after he vacates the presidential post in 2024 or before. A somewhat similar approach was taken in China by Deng Xiaoping and, more recently by Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Closer examination would suggest that Putin is more directly influenced by the model of Lee Kuan Yew who served as PM of Singapore for more than 30 years and then successively as Senior Minister and Minister Mentor.

Amidst the speculation that was generated by Putin’s proposals, a few things are clear: there will a new president in Russia by 2024 and that individual will still have a lot of power. As for Putin, what we know from him would suggest he will not put himself in a lame-duck position and that, once he leaves the presidency, he will want to retain at least some real influence and enjoy personal immunity.

Putin's address to the parliament for the first time avoided long references to foreign policy and confrontational language. He concentrated on the fight against poverty, more financial help to families with more than one child, improvements in medical care and further development of high technology.

The appointment of Mikhail Mishustin as a PM in many ways supports the basic tone of Putin's message: Mishustin is an effective technocrat, highly educated in computer science with a record of revolutionizing Russian taxation system and making it one of the best in Europe.

--o--

THIS YEAR IN JERUSALEM

Heads of State from Europe, North America, Africa and Australia came to Israel on January 23^rd for the Fifth World Holocaust Forum. The event, entitled “Remembering the Holocaust: Fighting Antisemitism,” was organized by the World Holocaust Forum Foundation, headed by Dr. Moshe Kantor, in cooperation with Yad Vashem, under the auspices of the President of the State of Israel, Reuven Rivlin.

It, however, was not only about the Holocaust, but also about World War II in general and various conflicting narratives of that epic war.

75 years ago front-line Soviet troops liberated Auschwitz, the most notorious Nazi concentration camp where 1,1 million people, mainly Jews, were murdered.

Heads of Estonia, Lithuania and most notably Poland chose not to attend the Forum due to ongoing historical arguments over the Holocaust narrative. Auschwitz (Oswiecim) is in Poland and many non-Jewish Poles collaborated in one way or another with the Nazis. Many Poles also died in the hands of the Nazi regime or fighting it. The current leadership of Poland does not see the history of that period the same way as Russia and Israel do.

Mrs. Netanyahu, PM Netanyahu, President Putin
Jerusalem, January 23rd
©President of Russia Website

The most important guest in Jerusalem was probably Vladimir Putin. Israel remains one of the few “Western” countries that preserve and cherish the role the Soviet Union played in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Soviets fought Nazi Germany on the ground from June 1941 and had already an upper hand in the war by the time Americans landed in Normandy in August of 1944. Nine out of ten Nazi soldiers were killed by the Red Army. The Soviet peoples paid a high price: 26 million dead. Half a million Jews fought in the Soviet Army. Putin appreciates the Israeli stance on that issue and Israel never forgets the symbolism of the Soviet liberation of Auschwitz and capture of Berlin in May 1945.

Aside from remembering arguably one of the darkest pages of recent human history, some very important political issues had to be discussed as well. Netanyahu obviously discussed Iran’s nuclear program with Putin, as well as ways to reinforce the deconfliction system between Israel and Russia in Syria. Putin nevertheless also paid a visit to Mahmoud Abbas, the President of Palestine, to underscore the importance of the long-term relationship between Russia and Palestine.

President Putin, Palestinian leader Abbas
Bethleem, January 23rd
©President of Russia Website

The United States was represented by VP Pence who mainly kept a low profile, but finally shook hands with Vladimir Putin once he realised everybody else was doing so.

No doubt many other political issues were discussed by various leaders present in Jerusalem. Israeli public already had expressed their dismay at the fact that the mass murder of Jews 75 years ago had moved into the background, replaced by pressing issues of the day. In fact it was pointed out that no one even thought of inviting aging survivors at one dinner in Jerusalem until Ukrainian President Zelenskyy noticed their absence and decided to meet with them.

Overall it was an emotional occasion especially in light of growing anti-semitism around the world. Russian cosmonauts remembered the occasion by appearing with signs "we remember" at the space station and Israel had unveiled a memorial to victims of Leningrad blockade (Putin's hometown) where about 700.000 Russians starved to death between 1941 and 1944.

As much as participants tried to tell the world how much they valued lessons of the Holocaust, a lot of important diplomacy was conducted on the sidelines of this memorial. The past is important, but the present always wins the argument.

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WHO CARES ABOUT UKRAINE?

We alluded before to the fact that US politicians do not seem to care much about Ukraine, but we did not expect Secretary of State Pompeo to state so openly the view that American people do not care about Ukraine. In a recent incident that began as an interview with Mary Louise Kelly, a well-respected National Public Radio journalist, Pompeo seems to have blown off his top when he was reportedly asked whether an apology was owed to former Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Jovanovich. Pompeo, claiming that the interview was expected to be only about Iran, would have asked the NPR journalist “Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?” Pompeo would even have asked the journalist to locate Ukraine on an unmarked world map. Which, apparently, she did. Besides confirming the fact that Pompeo is not a diplomat either by profession or any other way, the incident probably reveals a widely-held view in the US administration that Ukraine is only of interest as a way to get to Russia, to get dirt on your political opponent or to get rich quickly if the occasion arises.

President Zelenskyy at Ukraine House
Davos, January 24th
©President of Ukraine Website

Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenskyy did not need this on the eve of an expected visit to Ukraine by Secretary Pompeo and in the aftermath of an apparently rather lackluster performance at the Davos Economic Forum. The President’s efforts to attract foreign investment seem to have met with indifference with the President’s speech reportedly attended mostly by his own delegation. Ukrainian PM Honcharuk seems to have had more success with his proposal to provide large investors with a so-called nanny service: large investors would be offered the services of a government manager as a guardian who would be available to handle all the issues that the investor might face. This is obviously intended to counter the fears related to the widespread perception of deep corruption in Ukraine.

Ukrainian PM Honcharuk at the Ukrainian breakfast
January 23rd, Davos
©PM of Ukraine Website

The relationship between the President and the PM had been somewhat strained by the release on January 15th of an audio recording in which PM Honcharuk is heard saying that President Zelenskyy does not understand much about how the economy works. Zelenskyy rejected Honcharuk’s offer to resign and decided to give him a second chance. Honcharuk’s indiscretion was not fatal at this time most likely for the fact that he seems to have performed well and that the President would be fully aware that his very young team has limited government experience.

Changing the minds of foreign investors may, as noted above, may not be the most difficult problem though. It was recently announced that the real population of Ukraine is now at 37. 3 million, down 23% from 2001. Although part of the population loss is directly related to the loss of territory (Crimea, Eastern Ukraine), it is estimated that more than 6 million Ukrainians have left the country in the past 15 years. The pattern is for a steady flow of working-age individuals to leave in search of more lucrative employment. Ukraine has gone through demographic problems before, be they caused by revolutions, wars or government-engineered famine. Absolute numbers probably matter less than the fact that there will likely be growing pressure on the working-age segment of the population to support social programs for the non-working segment. Some of our North American societies are already facing that issue as well, of course.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: MIKHAIL MISHUSTIN

The man who replaced Dmitry Medvedev flew mainly under the radar before his surprise appointment in mid-January. However Russia's business community was definitely well aware of Mikhail Mishustin.

The 53-year old, who has been credited with transforming Russia’s tax service over the last decade, had a reputation among business leaders as one of the country’s most effective, popular and smart bureaucrats, long before President Vladimir Putin picked him to head the Russian government. “I have the deepest respect for Mr. Mishustin,” German Gref, head of Sberbank and one of Russia’s business heavyweights told the BBC. “He is probably one of the most effective managers in the country, a person with the highest qualifications and managerial skills. He is rare, a talented person who is very versatile.”

Business people often praised Mishustin’s achievements during his 10 years at the Federal Tax Service. They say he cut tax avoidance and improved the rate of collection by transforming the organization into one of the most technically advanced tax services in the world.

He pushed for and had introduced massive new IT systems such as digital cash registers to track transactions in real time, and a new automatic tax registration system for small businesses and self-employed people to bring them in from the grey economy. At the same time, he overhauled the organization’s reputation as a meddling and corrupt bureaucracy to be feared and avoided.

However, some critics in the West believe that with the heavy introduction of digital technologies within the tax apparatus, the state can improve its surveillance techniques of corporations, business and individuals.

Mishustin has few political accolades among his compatriots. Gennady Gudkov, a former opposition lawmaker, called the new prime minister “a new faceless functionary without ambition,” while Gleb Pavlovsky, a political analyst and former Putin advisor, told the Russian news agency Interfax that Mishustin is “a splendid bureaucrat, in the best sense of the word.” Foreigners who have had the opportunity of meeting Mishustin tend to have a more positive view of his leadership potential. It also has been noted that through his father who was a KGB analyst he has a connection to the security establishment that, from the point of view of leadership potential in Russia, usefully complements his economic and technical background.

On a personal note, he has also been playing hockey with Vladimir Putin on at least a few occasions, certainly a way of getting into the inner circle.

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BRIEFLY NOTED

RUSSIA/ISRAEL

On January 23^rd in Virginia, a Russian citizen who was the subject of a three-year diplomatic row between Russia, Israel, and the US pleaded guilty to charges related to the massive cybertheft of credit cards. Burkov was initially arrested by Israel in 2015, on a US arrest warrant. Indictments unsealed later charged him in connection with allegedly operating two Russian-language chat forums where, according to U.S. officials, members traded stolen credit card numbers and other information worth millions of dollars.

The fight for custody of Burkov grew into a public diplomatic scandal last year, when Naama Issachar, an Israeli citizen was arrested at a Moscow airport in April with a small amount of marijuana as she was flying home from India. Issacher’s relatives, meanwhile, publicly accused Russian authorities of holding her as a bargaining chip to persuade Netanyahu to turn Burkov over to Russia. That did not work. Issachar was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

President Putin meeting with Mrs. Yaffa Issachar
Jerusalem, January 23rd
©President of Russia Website

Netanyahu, who has cultivated good relations with Putin, arranged for Issachar's mother to meet with Putin during the Russian leader’s stay in Jerusalem on January 23^rd. It is rather unusual for Putin to meet someone who is connected to a person found guilty by a Russian court. That he would let Netanyahu stage that kind of meeting shows that is at least as good a friend with Netanyahu as Donald Trump claims to be. Putin even offered to have a senior Russian official look into the matter and actually pardoned Issachar on January 29^th. Netanyahu was back in Moscow on March 30th, to brief Putin on his discussions in Washington and on Trump's proposed "deal of the century" for resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict. Putin seemed more interested in discussing a free trade arrangement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Israel.

Beyond the diplomatic intrigue, the case also confirms the persistent story about the fact that Russian hackers are among the most dangerous and effective, as well that there is a connection between hackers and the Russian government, with the hackers possibly having the upper hand.

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KAZAKHSTAN/CHINA

A court in Kazakhstan has ruled that two ethnic-Kazakh men from China's northwestern region of Xinjiang who are on trial for illegally crossing the border in October will not be deported to China. The court in the far eastern town of Zaisan announced its decision in the high-profile case on January 21st.

The presiding judge handed one-year prison sentences to the two individuals for illegally entering the country, but allowed them to stay in Kazakhstan, saying that they may face persecution back in Xinjiang. The judge added that each day the two men spent in pretrial detention since October counts as two prison days, making them eligible for release in less than six months.

One of the detainees testified that he had been detained in Xinjiang for questioning and faced incarceration at a Chinese "reeducation camp."

TAJIKISTAN

Tajik opposition groups outside the country claim that many dozens of people have either been detained or investigated by security officials during the series of raids in the country against suspected Muslim Brotherhood members.

Predominantly Muslim Tajikistan banned the Muslim Brotherhood as an extremist group in 2006 and it faces a similar ban in Central Asian neighbors Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It is considered a terrorist organization in Tajikistan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia, but not in the United States or other Western countries.

In the last 2-3 years about 20 imams were arrested for allegedly being members of the movement. They were accused of receiving funds from abroad and of spreading Muslim Brotherhood ideology in Tajikistan, ultimately seeking to overthrow the secular government in Dushanbe.

Critics accuse the Tajik authorities of exploiting the state's campaign against extremism and terrorism to clamp down on religious groups and individuals critical of government policies in the authoritarian state.

USA/ARMENIA

The U.S. State Department has issued a statement early this year that recent congressional action to recognize the Armenian genocide does not reflect the policy of U.S. President Donald Trump's administration. In a short statement, the department said the Trump administration's position on the matter is unchanged.

The Senate voted unanimously last week to recognize the mass killings of more than 1 million Armenians by Ottoman Turks a century ago as a genocide. The House had previously adopted a similar bill in the face of stark protests from NATO ally Turkey. "The position of the Administration has not changed," department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in a terse two-sentence statement. "Our views are reflected in the president’s definitive statement on this issue from last April."

On April 24th, President Donald Trump commemorated Armenian Remembrance Day in a statement that honored "the memory of those who suffered in one of the worst mass atrocities of the 20th century." In keeping with longstanding U.S. policy, the statement did not use the term “genocide."

AZERBAIJAN

As is allowed under the Azerbaijan constitution, President Ilham Aliyev has signed an order setting parliamentary elections for February 9th. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), approved a proposal to dissolve parliament and allow for the calling of snap general elections.

Officials have said an early vote would help modernize Azerbaijan's legislative branch and speed the course of economic reforms.

Despite its vast energy resources, the country has seen difficult economic conditions in recent years. Citizens have been hard-hit by rising inflation, unemployment, and the cost of many basic goods.

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THE AUTHORS

Tuesday, December 31, 2019

Issue 38

THE BRETON GEROL NEWSLETTER

IMPEACHMENT, OPPORTUNITIES AND CASUALTIES

The outcome of the impeachment proceedings against President Trump remains highly predictable. Call it hypocrisy, disregard for constitutional duty or blind partisanship, most of the Republicans in the US Senate are unwilling to look at the case against the President. In that context there is some justification in House Speaker Pelosi’s decision to delay the transmission of the articles of impeachment to the Senate until there is some clarity about how the Senate will handle its proceedings. Beyond having Majority Leader McConnell and President Trump squirm, keeping impeachment alive has a minimal cost and may have political advantages in the 2020 election year. Impeachment in itself may not work, but dangling it before an irascible president has more than entertainment value. Through the disruption that it causes, it may lead to even more unhinged or impetuous behaviour on the part of the President. Besides, as we just saw in late December, more evidence may become available that could further justify impeachment, at least in public opinion. Some electors may not want Trump impeached, but may eventually reckon that he is a cheat, in real life, as well as when he plays golf, as has been observed by many of his sport partners.

There is no deep political reason for a Ukraine-related incident now to be at the center of the political debate in the US. Easy money may, however, explain a lot. The permissive financial environment in Ukraine, that US politicians so like to criticize, has resulted in hefty advantages for some US citizens. Paul Manafort, Trump’s ex-campaign manager did very well in Ukraine. Hunter Biden, the son of the leading Democratic candidate Joe Biden, did also receive a lot of money for little real work. One should not be surprised that Trump having lost his friend Manafort to a Ukrainian denunciation wanted to use a Ukrainian denunciation to go after his main opponent. Not a quid pro quo, more like tit-for-tat, in line with the Trump character. Besides, for Trump, cheating is not a crime especially if you feel that someone else has already cheated against you.

The Russian intervention during the 2016 presidential campaign, even though it may have had much less impact than generally alleged, the ensuing Mueller inquiry and, now, the impeachment debate have meant that anything related to Russia and Ukraine is viewed in Washington through ultra-partisan lenses. In light of his own questionable statements and overall lack of credibility, Trump is not in a position to develop a coherent policy vis-à-vis Russia. The result is an erratic approach that can upset long-time allies and in connection with the Russia-Ukraine conflict a marginalisation of the US role in the resolution of that conflict. Trump getting his briefing on the December 11^h Paris Normandy Format Summit from the Russian Foreign Minister rather than from the German or the French should have raised eyebrows not the fact that he appeared to do Foreign Minister Lavrov a special favour, which he was not, and that they had their picture taken together. In the meantime, another casualty of the situation is that important contentious issues such as, among others, disarmament do not seem to get any sustained attention. Although it is NATO that President Macron called brain-dead, his real target was arguably US policy leadership, or the lack thereof.

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PARIS SUMMIT, EXPECTATIONS AND RESULTS

As many observers have noted, the results of the December 11 Paris Normandy format summit were relatively modest. A few steps were agreed, including the long-awaited exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and its rebel regions, as well as the incremental continuation of the disengagement process along the front line in Eastern Ukraine. More important was the general agreement to continue the conversation and to have another such meeting within four months.

Although President Zelenskyy voiced his frustration at the lack of more progress, the result of the Summit probably met most of his expectations. He was able to protect his position in relation to nationalists who had warned him not to cross any of their red lines. The level of military activity is slowly decreasing. The forthcoming exchange of prisoners has allowed for some good news coverage over the Holiday Season. The criticism in Ukraine about the inclusion of some special service policemen accused of shooting at protesters during the February 2014 uprising did not seem to affect the popular success of the operation.

Decreasing the number of casualties and freeing prisoners does not resolve the conflict, but it affords President Zelenskyy the time that he needs to pursue a gradual restoration of normality in the relations between Ukraine and its rebel regions as between Ukraine and Russia. President Zelenskyy seems to have surprised his French and German counterparts by suggesting that the existing peace arrangements (the Minsk accords) need to be amended. This may not go anywhere, but it challenges those who oppose his dispute settlement efforts to come up with something better. At the same time, he is also moving along with the decentralisation of power throughout Ukraine even in the regions not affected by the conflict, thus fulfilling one of the conditions of the Minsk agreements, but making it look like it is not a concession on his part, but a commitment made by his predecessor and now a broader policy decision.

William Taylor, the outgoing chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy and now famous Trump impeachment witness, has suggested that the conflict might be resolved by the creation of a suitable peacekeeping arrangement. He may well be right, especially if through Zelenskky’s efforts, a situation that is closer to peace than war finally emerges. This could also lead to a long-term freezing of the conflict. In the absence of foreseeable major political changes in Ukrainian public opinion, this may well be if not the best the only solution.

Although this is not directly the mandate of the Normandy Format meetings, more important than all is probably the fact that the new atmosphere created by Zelenskyy has allowed for the conclusion of a new agreement between Ukraine and Russia over the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine to European markets. For Zelenskyy, the new deal is beyond reproach as it was essentially negotiated with the direct participation of the EU and is based on European standards. The deal includes the resolution of all legal disputes between the Ukrainian and Russian gas companies. The transit deal will bring badly needed revenues to the Ukrainian economy. The Ukrainian Prime Minister has already noted that this will allow to keep gas prices in Ukraine at a lower level, a highly popular measure. Resolving the legal disputes also means that the Ukrainian side has received the amounts owed by Russian Gazprom, over 2.3 billion dollars. Ukraine was going to receive that money at some point, but the legal dispute could have delayed this significantly. The victory is in getting an immediate payment at a time when Ukraine will be facing large financial obligations.

For Russia, there is also a victory element in this. Russian gas will continue to flow freely to European markets and bring expected revenues. The long legal battle is over. The two gas companies will be working from a clean slate. This might lead to even closer cooperation in the future. The agreement also foresees that it is the Ukrainian company that will have to meet Ukrainian regulatory requirements for gas transit through Ukraine, not Gazprom itself.

The conclusion of a major gas transit deal and the settlement of legal disputes is not consistent with the existing war rhetoric. That is interesting to observe, but not the major issue. What matters more is that the gas transit deal was achieved through the active intermediation of the European Union. The new deal also challenges the idea that Russia cannot be a suitable long-term economic partner for Ukraine. Oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, President Zelenskyy’s alleged political mentor, has recently made a statement along the same lines, suggesting that Ukraine would gain from reviving its economic relationship with Russia. It will take more than one deal, no matter how substantial, to change public perceptions. With the EU, Ukraine and Russia working together, the idea that gains credibility is that Ukraine does not have to give up on its European aspirations to advance its business interests with Russia. That would also improve the atmosphere.

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NORD STREAM 2 SANCTIONS: TOO BAD, TOO LATE

In late December, President Trump approved sanctions on companies that might continue their involvement in the construction of the 90 percent completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline. That pipeline is designed by Moscow and its European partners to bypass Ukraine and increase gas supplies via the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, Russia's biggest energy customer. The restrictive measures target pipe-laying vessels and include asset freezes and the revocation of U.S. visas for the contractors.

Swiss-Dutch company Allseas, which was laying the pipeline, immediately suspended its activity to avoid US sanctions.

The pipeline will most likely be completed regardless of sanctions, but at a slower pace. The Russian side was expecting this type of development. In 2016 the Russian energy giant Gazprom bought a special pipe-laying vessel to be used as a last resort if European companies stopped working on Nord Stream 2. Some experts think the project could be delayed by several months since the Russian ship is slower and is currently based in the Russian Pacific port of Nakhodka.

The delay can probably be managed through the use of existing pipelines, including the one crossing Ukraine, now that an EU-brokered gas transit deal has been concluded between Ukraine and Russia, as noted above. Ever since the Obama administration, Washington has opposed the Nord Stream 2 project on the grounds it would strengthen Russia’s economic and political grip over Europe. That argument has never much impressed European clients of Gasprom. In fact, the US decision seems to have irked their German allies as much as their Russian adversaries. The US sanctions and their extra-territorial reach have been perceived as an attempt to dictate its energy policy to Europe, certainly not creating any renewed interest in more expensive US gas. The US, itself a top producer of liquid gas, would like to become a supplier and, eventually maybe not replace Russia completely, but become a serious competitor in the gas business.

The US sanctions have arrived late in the game. They are not likely to achieve their stated purpose, other than inflicting a real, but manageable, financial loss on the promoters of Nord Stream 2. They probably, however, will make Russia adopt countersanctions that will add another complication to the Russia-US commercial relationship.

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KAZAKHSTAN REFORMS

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was elected in June 2019 as the second President of Kazakhstan since the country gained independence in 1991. On December 20th, during the second meeting of the National Council of Public Trust, he announced a wide-ranging set of economic, social and political reforms.

President Tokayev

The key element of the proposed economic reforms is the further reduction of the share of state enterprises in the economy. It is also planned to enhance the fight against the shadow economy (the polite words for corruption), to discipline the foreign debt process and to stabilise the national currency, essentially through better transparency tools. To foreign investors and to international trade partners, these measures can only be welcome. The proposed reduction of the foreign labour quota may sound a discordant note but should be seen a direct response to preoccupations recently expressed by Kazakh workers over discrimination patterns and the exploitation of foreign workers (and its ensuing broader impact on labour conditions).

The social measures are aimed at simplifying and making more effective state assistance directed to children. There are also specific measures to assist handicapped individuals. Their impact should be to modernise the overall system of social support.

A specific measure is also being proposed to deal with the proper use of agricultural land. In order to ensure an optimal use of arable lands, targeted remote space-based observation will be initiated and will lead to greater taxation rates for the owners of land who are not actually cultivating their land. To foreigners, this may sound rather harsh. In a context where post-USSR land distribution has not been optimal and where some farmers actually see their activity constrained by the lack of available land, the measure would appear justified.

The political reforms are essentially aimed at furthering the democratisation of Kazakh society. They are intended in particular to deal with issues such as the organization of peaceful marches, the reduction of registration barriers for the formation of a political party, quotas for the involvement of women and youth, the possibility of enhancing the role of opposition parties in Parliament, the decriminalization of slanderous articles. It is also foreseen to abolish the death penalty by having Kazakhstan ratify the relevant international convention.

Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan's capital

In Western eyes, Kazakhstan is still generally regarded as an authoritarian state although one in which the political emphasis is on modernisation. The proposed reforms are admittedly a top-down initiative, but one over which there has been public consultation. The fundamental purpose of the political reforms is in fact to do away with some of the authoritarian aspects of the current governance and to achieve greater popular empowerment. If one thinks for a moment about what is currently happening in the world, from Algiers to Hong Kong, it is difficult not to see the merit of the presidential proposals whose purpose is to achieve greater democracy without disruption. The reforms are undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Some may argue that more is needed. The President himself has acknowledged the incremental nature of his approach. Considering the depth of changes that are ultimately planned, an incremental approach would seem to have better chances of success.

The reforms are tackling one of the most difficult problems of democracy in some parts of the post-USSR world. In advancing democracy in a context where for many years a single party has been the rule, the greatest challenge is to facilitate the emergence of genuine opposition political parties. No matter how good your constitution and your national legislation may be, creating the entities that will make democracy work properly cannot be legislated. Having a legislation that facilitates the emergence of new political parties is, however, a pre-requisite. This is what currently proposals are doing.

The next challenge is then to create the other conditions where political parties can thrive. This is where economic reforms aimed a democratisation of the economy through, for instance, privatisation could become a significant factor in supporting the political democratisation if they lead to less oligarchic economy that could eventually lead to less oligarchic governance.

The question that remains to be addressed is that of the funding of political parties. This is where the challenges of younger democracies converge with the challenges of older ones. Political parties and political campaigns are funded differently the world over. Once the political field becomes more open and if no public funding exists or popular funding is not facilitated through fiscal measures, can parties align along political orientations or will not they become instruments of financial or special interest groups?

The President has done the first part of the job by offering an initial set of tangible, significant political improvements. Although it is only at an early stage, the course proposed by President Tokayev offers an opportunity that can become a defining moment for the future of a democratic Kazakhstan.

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TURKEY'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS

Turkey is increasingly relying on military capabilities in its foreign policy, triggering regional and international tensions the latest being with Egypt, France and Russia over potential troop deployment in Libya.

Largely isolated in Europe and the Middle East, with Qatar as its only staunch ally, Ankara is flexing its muscles in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and now in Libya. Ankara seems to be on a direct collision course with Moscow over Turkey’s plans to deploy troops in support of the Islamist-backed Tripoli government. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assailed the presence of the Russian private military company Wagner in Libya on the side of Libyan National Army Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

“Through the group named Wagner, they are literally working as Haftar’s mercenaries in Libya. You know who is paying them,” Erdogan was quoted December 20 by broadcaster NTV. He added: “It would not be right for us to remain silent against all of this.”

Russia earlier said it was “very concerned” by the possible Turkish troop deployment in Libya, the Interfax news agency reported.

Erdogan recently stated Turkey was ready to send troops to Libya to back the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, which is already a recipient of Turkish military support.

“We will be protecting the rights of Libya and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean,” Erdogan told A Haber television channel on December 15th. “We are more than ready to give whatever support necessary to Libya.”

The Turkish government said it is trying to make its voice heard in a region where conflicts pose threats on Turkey’s doorstep and where other players ignore Turkish interests but the approach is not winning Turkey any friends and is a far cry from the idea of having “zero problems with neighbors” that is the official position promoted on the website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

To some extent, military power has always played a role in Turkey. Its fighter jets and ground troops have been confronting militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in northern Iraq since the 1990s but, in recent years, unilateral military action has become a much more regular feature of Turkey’s foreign policy, putting the country on a collision course with neighbors, regional powers and other NATO members.

Turkey's incursion into Syria in 2019 pitted Turkey against the US and basically forced American administration to betray their Kurdish allies. Since then however the situation had stabilized as Turkey slowed the pace of their advance and partially reined in their Muslim Arab allies who already began committing customary atrocities against the Kurdish population.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: POPE FRANCIS

Jorge Mario Bergoglio was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on December 17, 1936, to Italian immigrants. As a young man, Bergoglio underwent surgery to remove part of one of his lungs due to serious infection.

On March 13, 2013, at the age of 76, Jorge Bergoglio was named the 266th pope of the Roman Catholic Church—becoming the first citizen from the Americas, the first non-European and first Jesuit priest to be named pope, adopting the name Pope Francis after St. Francis of Assisi of Italy.

As a Pope Francis instituted some important reforms in the financial sector of the Vatican, liberalizing functions of the Curia and setting draconian laws on the issue of sexual abuse by the clergy and stripping suspected priests of any kind of immunity.

Reform, Francis said, is not simply seeking change for its own sake or to follow the latest fashion, “but to have conviction that development and growth are characteristic of earthly and human life, while, in the perspective of the believer, at the heart of it all is the stability of God.”

Referring to the changes he has made to the Roman Curia since taking office, the pope insisted that “reform never had the presumption of acting as if nothing existed before; on the contrary, it’s designed to give value to the good accomplished in the complex history of the Curia.”

On December 20th Pope Francis received in audience António Guterres, the Secretary General of the United Nations. The following quote from the ensuing press release illustrates the Vatican’s traditional role in international affairs as well as the new orientations that have been advanced by Pope Francis: “The Holy See expressed its consideration for the United Nations’ commitment to peace in the world. The parties then focused on the process of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, and on the crisis of multilateralism, made particularly evident by the difficulties of managing certain current problems such as migration and human trafficking, climate change and disarmament.”

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PUTIN’S ANNUAL PRESS CONFERENCE

During his annual marathon press conference on December 19th, President Putin for the first time in 20 years approved the general idea of the need for constitutional reform and made a rather puzzling statement concerning presidential mandates suggesting that the existing limitation to “two consecutive mandates” may be changed by dropping the word “consecutive”. This has left observers to speculate widely, but may only be a decoy. Whatever he wants to do at the end of his current presidential mandate, Putin, as legalistic former KGB officer, will want the arrangement to be cast in the appropriate legislation, probably even enshrined in the constitution. This will require some preparation. If changes are also made to the status of Parliament, they have to be done before the 2021 parliamentary elections. One way or the other, it is not too early to start an informal discussion about the process.

Putin has often said he did not want to become "president-for-life". His inclination would likely be announce his intentions for the future at the last possible date. In this case, the Parliamentary election calendar may force him to reveal some of his plans earlier than he would like.

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THE AUTHORS