Issue 40

THE BRETON/GEROL NEWSLETTER

WHO WILL WIN THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION?

The simple answer to this question is that it is still too early to tell. However, as most reputable pollsters say, only Bernie Sanders has the most viable path to grab most pledged delegates before the Convention. His support is the most stable across the widest array of states and he has impressive support across age, ethnic and racial groups. Sanders also does very well in a lot of head-to-head polls vs Donald Trump. This is now, but will this be the case later is unclear and even more unclear if Sanders is electable. Although the impact of coronavirus remains unknown, the economy is doing well and the country might get seriously weary of Bernie's call to “revolution” and various radical changes. Michael Bloomberg with all his 60 billion dollars most likely will be able to mount a challenge and climb in the polls, but it is unlikely the party with so many progressives in it will have the stamina to nominate a Republican oligarch.

Let us not forget that Hillary Clinton out-raised Donald Trump 3-1 in 2016. It is true that Joe Biden is fading and Mayor Pete Buttigieg scores low with minorities, but things can change after Super Tuesday. Even Elizabeth Warren and Senator Klobuchar, the two women in the race, can make a comeback.  Here we can take more examples from history. It was 1992 the last time Democratic candidate defeated a Republican incumbent. That candidate did not win a single state before the Super Tuesday and had to go on CBS ' 60-minutes to fight accusations of marital infidelity during the primary. His name was Bill Clinton and he won 370 electoral votes. Not so long ago a black man who admitted to using cocaine when he was young and who held rather radical views on race relations, clinched the nomination and went on to win the popular vote and 365 electoral votes. It was in 2008 and his name is Barack Obama.

One thing is for certain, both Clinton and Obama were dynamic performers and great speakers. Only one Democratic candidate can claim to be in this class, it is Bernie Sanders.  The Democratic Party establishment may be concerned that he is too far to the left. They probably should be equally concerned that, should Sanders not be nominated, his enthusiastic supporters will most likely not actively line up behind a lackluster moderate candidate such as Joe Biden, thus replicating the Clinton-Trump 2016 scenario.

Yet, what makes American politics such a spectacle is uncertainty and a lot of surprises. One thing is for sure, we are up for both this time around.

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TURKISH-RUSSIAN ROMANCE IN JEOPARDY?

Presidents Erdogan and Putin had agreed in September 2018 in Sochi on the principles of what should happen in Syria's Idlib region. Yet, tensions have been mounting over the past few weeks over what Syria and Russia see as shortcomings and even open violation of the Sochi agreement by Turkey. As for Turkey it rejects the aggressive stance taken by Russia and Syria in response to these alleged violations of the Sochi agreement.

The 2018 Sochi agreement, it has to be recalled, was intended to avert the humanitarian crisis that was going to engulf Idlib should Syria (with Russian support) launch a military offensive to retake the city. In simple terms Turkey sought to secure a buffer zone on Syrian territory as well as to protect moderate opposition forces while bringing extreme terrorist group under some form of control so as to lead eventually to a return of Syrian government presence in the civilian areas of Idlib.

The Sochi agreement bought time for Idlib, but never led to the expected normalisation of the situation. Those that Syria and Russia sees as terrorists continued their activity against Syrian and Russian forces, with possible direct support, it seems, from Ankara. The Syrian and Russian response has been to re-launch their military offensive towards Idlib, with a focus on recovering the areas surrounding the main highways that link Aleppo, the large commercial centre, to Damascus, the capital. This is an important element in the potential economic recovery of Syria.

From the humanitarian point of view the situation is back to where it was prior to the Sochi agreement. The intensification of fighting, real and expected, is putting a large civilian population in a most difficult position.  

After the most serious clash to date between Turkish and Syrian military forces at the very end of February, Erdogan and Putin still managed to have a “substantial” phone conversation during which they agreed to further activate consultation mechanisms between their military establishments with a view to “normalise” the situation. Further meetings between leaders may even be held with a week or so. If Syria is allowed to consolidate what it sees as vital territorial gains, it may be possible to negotiate a new pause in military activity. 

Erdogan obviously does not see the fate of the last remaining rebel stronghold in the same manner as Russia and Syria. He has stated decisively that Turkey is determined to make Idlib a secure zone "no matter the cost". "We will not leave Idlib to the Syrian regime, which does not understand our country's determination, and to those encouraging it," said Erdogan.

Erdogan essentially knows that he cannot afford the risk of an open confrontation with Russia (which Russia also dreads) for obvious military reasons, but as well for fear of damaging Turkey’s vital economic relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, Erdogan still is hoping to achieve an arrangement in Idlib that will safeguard Turkey’s security interests and avoid a renewed flow of refugees into Turkey.  The next question would be whether Turkey would fully keep its commitment of curbing the flow of migrants into the EU.

A similar problem arises with respect to Libya where Russia is seen as supporting the insurgency of Marshal Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” and Turkey is supporting the “Government of National Accord”. Here the alleged violation by Turkey of the recently-agreed international arms embargo has met with Turkish criticism that Russia has allowed a large contingent of Russian mercenaries to operate in support of Marshal Haftar. Paradoxically, the Libya conflict does not so much compound the disagreement between Ankara and Moscow as it creates another context where the two sides are condemned to cooperate in order to advance their own interests.   

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CURSED BE THE PEACEMAKERS

Around the time of the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group, an independent and informal initiative, released a statement in which it outlines “Twelve Steps Toward Greater Security in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Region”. The roughly 40 signatories of the statement represent a broad selection of experienced international relations specialist from the Euro-Atlantic region, including some from Ukraine and Russia. One of them is Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Along with a few others, he was blacklisted as an enemy of Ukraine by an admittedly controversial Ukrainian website.

©Munich Security Conference Facebook 

The Twelve Steps are a mix of predictable security, humanitarian, economic and political measures. What seems to have irked Ukrainians the most are steps 8 and 12. Step 8 suggests a road map for changes to sanctions in response to specific actions. This is not a big surprise either way. The committee that drafted the steps found it expedient to include an incentive for Russia to move along as well as for Europeans to get rid of sanctions they either dislike or find useless. Ukrainians see this as a give away to Russia. Step 12 is about the launching of an inclusive national dialogue across Ukraine about national identity in which Hungary, Poland and Russia might also be involved. Expectedly, the response in Ukraine and even in some US circles was very negative. The experts who signed off on the Twelve Steps would most likely have known that most Ukrainians would reject outright the implication that something is wrong with Ukraine’s national identity. What is telling is that the experts still found it useful to include that step.

By suggesting that the problems that Ukraine has with Russia and to a lesser extent with Hungary and Poland have to be the subject of a national dialogue, experts may have implicitly passed a diagnostic that is not entirely groundless. They, however, did not come up with the right remedy.

An illustration of the difficulties with Ukrainian identity was again just provided by President Putin himself who, in the context of a major policy interview, reiterated the view that the Russian and Ukrainian people are one nation. This is not exactly the best way of launching a dialogue.

Furthermore, the national dialogue that might more immediately facilitate the end of military confrontation would be one between the authorities in Kyiv and the leaders of the rebel regions in Eastern Ukraine. There is generally no appetite for that in Kyiv.  President Zelensky is the only one to have observed that to regain its lost territories Ukraine would also have to regain the trust of the people living in those territories. Improving freedom of movement with and within the rebel regions (step 3 of the twelve steps) would seem a better and more necessary point of departure.

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 LUKASHENKO'S FIRM "NO"!

Presidents Lukashenko and Putin
Sochi area, February 7th
©President of Belarus Website

After his seemingly friendly meeting with Putin in mid February in Sochi, Lukashenko came back home and during his speech to a gathering of Belarus industrialists, was very candid.

"I don't know how long I will be your president but as long as I am, Belarus will never accept re-unification with Russia despite what Russian media says", said Lukashenko. He also suggested that the process of re-integration of both economies could continue only if it does not become a takeover. He admitted that Putin had shot down his request to buy Russian oil without additional tariffs despite the fact that back in the Soviet days Belarus actively participated in the building of the Russian oil industry. Lukashenko has confirmed his decision to diversify his oil supply by buying it from Norway or other sources. Belarus is the only Russian ally in Europe. It is logical to assume that Putin will order his new PM Mikhail Mishustin to reach a compromise.   

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UKRAINE’S RESPONSE TO CORONAVIRUS

In mid-February Ukrainian authorities agreed to repatriate 45 of their own citizens and 27 foreign nationals (at the request of their country of origin) from the coronavirus-affected areas of China. The group leaving China was sent to a sanatorium in the small village of Novi Sanzhary in the Poltava region.

What ensued has been equally referred to by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Zelensky as reminiscent of the Middle Ages. A group of protesters attacked the buses taking the evacuees to the Novi Sanzhary sanatorium, trying to prevent them from reaching their destination and asking they be taken elsewhere. Allegations have surfaced that some of the protesters were not acting spontaneously, but had been paid to participate in the protest. Similar protests erupted in other cities where it was rumoured evacuees might be taken.

Whether the protests were genuine or orchestrated by opposition politicians, Ukraine is for now the country where there has been the strongest negative reaction to the return home of evacuees because of the coronavirus situation in China. President Zelensky himself considered the matter serious enough to make a national televised address to set the record straight and reassure his people.

It would be inappropriate to see medieval obscurantism or even political opportunism as the main reason for the protests. What the series of coronavirus-related protests reveals though is that there is still in Ukraine a considerable challenge for the authorities, of any political colour, to achieve credibility when trying to communicate with the population on potentially sensitive issues. Public opinion polls have been suggesting this for a while. The coronavirus-related incidents confirm it. Lack of trust in government is not a problem limited to Ukraine, but the current state of affairs makes crisis management there a relatively more difficult task.

The origin of distrust of government has many root causes. It is difficult not to recall that 

 in Ukraine the Chernobyl disaster was initially met by deafening silence on the part of the local authorities.

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PERSON OF THE MONTH: SERGEI LAVROV

Stephen Kotkin, a respected historian from Stanford University, a brilliant expert on Russia and the Soviet Union recently stated that the Russian Foreign Ministry headed by Sergei Lavrov is one if the most professional institutions of its kind in the world. Unlike the US State Department, especially nowadays, he said, it is run by consummate professionals and experts in every field of international diplomacy.

The 69-year old Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign Minister since 2004, and former Russian Ambassador to the UN, in many ways can be credited with this success. Modern Russia has some visible weaknesses in comparison to the economic might of the US and China, but what it lacks in economic soundness it compensates with hard military power and high-class diplomacy.  

Russia's foreign policy stands in contrast to the chronic instability and apparent indecisiveness of many international actors. Even Moscow's critics cannot deny that Russia has pursued a consistent foreign policy over the past several years. Sergei Lavrov is undoubtedly a co-author (with Putin of course) of modern Russian foreign policy.

On the international stage many do not see Russia as a convenient partner. It, however, certainly cannot be accused of being unreliable or inconsistent in this capacity. This is an indisputable advantage that Russia enjoys over some major powers.

In order to appreciate the scope of the Russian foreign policy one can just listen to Sergei Lavrov's speech at recently completed Munich Security Conference. He is respected not only by the country's friends and allies, but also by its enemies and opponents. Emmanuel Macron, speaking at the same conference, gave high praise to some initiatives presented by the Russian Foreign Minister.

Russia's foreign policy, under the captaincy of Sergei Lavrov, plays a key role globally as it has not played in decades. Almost no major conflict can be seriously fixed without some Russian involvement in either Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, some African states and of course Ukraine. Russia is a diplomatic heavyweight that in this fractured world no one can ignore. Taking into account serious economic woes Russia has been experiencing for several years, it is quite an achievement.

Without having to agree with any of the Russian positions, Canadian diplomats who have had the occasion to observe from a close distance the work of the Russian Foreign Ministry would probably wholeheartedly agree with Professor Kotkin’s above-mentioned opinion.   

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RUSSIA

Russia's foreign minister, speaking at the Munich Security Conference has accused NATO, and Europe more broadly, of stoking tensions on the continent, as he called on leaders to "abandon the phantom of the Russian threat."

Lavrov suggested NATO was to blame for tensions with Russia, including the increased deployment in recent years of more Western military hardware and forces in the Baltic states and Poland.

"The crisis of confidence is felt particularly acutely in European affairs," said Lavrov. "The stoking of tension, the advance of NATO's military infrastructure to the East, military exercises of unprecedented scale near Russia's borders, increase of defense budgets beyond every measure; this all generates uncertainty."

"Before it's too late, you should abandon the phantom of the Russian threat…remember what unites us," he added.

Lavrov’s call may not have convinced European leaders still reeling from Russian actions in Ukraine. They may however comfort the approach of some of the leaders such as President Macron who seek greater cooperation with Russia.

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KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyzstan says Russia plans to install new air- and missile-defense equipment and drones at its air base near the former Soviet republic's northern city of Kant. Nurlan Kirisheev, the deputy chief of the Kyrgyz armed forces General Staff, said in a statement on February 13 that Russia will renovate runways at the air base, in moves that will "improve security in the region."According to Kirisheev, the deployment of drones and air- and missile-defense systems will be conducted in accordance with agreements signed during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Kyrgyzstan last summer.

It is noteworthy that Kyrgyzstan hosted a US military base just outside Bishkek from 2001 to 2014 when it was shut down due to intense pressure from Moscow.

Kirisheev's statement came the same day that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov told lawmakers in Moscow about plans to deploy air-defense equipment at the air base.

Russia's air base at Kant was opened in 2003 under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan.

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KAZAKHSTAN

The death toll in violent ethnic clashes last week between Kazakhs and ethnic Dungans in Kazakhstan's south, which shocked the Central Asian nation, has risen to 11.

Mr. Qulshymanov, an adviser to the governor of the Zhambyl region where the clashes took place, said on February 14 that the badly burned body of an unidentified person had been found two days earlier amid the debris of a commercial building destroyed during clashes in the village of Masanchi.

The violence erupted at several local villages on February 7 between local Kazakhs and ethnic Dungans, a Muslim group of Chinese origin.

Dozens were wounded, including 19 police officers, while more than 30 houses, 17 commercial buildings, and 47 vehicles were destroyed or damaged in the clashes.

Kazakh officials have said that the violence was sparked by a conflict on a highway, during which the occupants of two vehicles started a brawl following a road-rage incident. The deadly clashes followed the posting on the Internet of video footage taken from the brawl.

Thousands of people fled villages where the violence erupted, ending up in the neighboring Kyrgyz Chui region, where the majority of ethnic Dungans in Central Asia traditionally reside.

Brief historical information on the ethnic complexities of the region can be of interest: Dungans, also known as Hui, are Sunni Muslims who speak a dialect of Mandarin with many words and phrases borrowed from Arabic, Persian, and Turkic. Their ancestors came to Central Asia, which then was part of the Russian Empire, in the late-19th century after the Chinese government’s violent crackdown of the Dungan Revolt of 1862-1877.

The recent incidents are a reminder of the complex ethnic make-up of Central Asian countries and the continuing relevance of official policies that promote ethnic and religious tolerance.

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SYRIA

The Syrian parliament has recognized the mass killing of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire a century ago as genocide.

This recognition took place during heightened tensions with neighboring Turkey following deadly clashes in northwestern Syria.

Members of the People's Assembly have unanimously adopted a resolution condemning and recognizing "the genocide committed against the Armenians by the Ottoman state at the start of the 20th century.

Before Syria's civil war had began in 2011 about 100,000 ethnic Armenians lived in the country. Many of them have fled, including thousands to Armenia. Syria has historic ties with Armenia where this minority felt relatively safe.

In a predictable response Turkey decried Damascus's "hypocrisy" over the vote.

During and immediately after World War I, Ottoman Turks killed or deported as many as 1.5 million Armenians, a Christian minority in the predominately Muslim empire. Many of the Armenians who fled to Syria eventually ended up in France, the US and Canada.

Ankara claims the deaths were a result of civil strife rather than a planned Ottoman government effort to annihilate Armenians. Turkey also claims fewer Armenians died than has been reported.

At least 23 countries have officially recognized the mass slaughter and deportation as genocide, triggering the ire of Ankara.

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AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan's ruling Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan) party says it has won at least 72 seats in parliament in the February 9 elections to the 125 seats in the single-chamber legislature, while nearly all of the remaining mandates went to small parties and independents loyal to President Ilham Aliyev. Reviews are still going on in respect to a few seats.

International monitors have identified widespread procedural violations in the vote count, raising doubts about the fairness of the elections. Aliyev called the vote nine months early to consolidate his authority.

The opposition have alleged widespread violations, including ballot box stuffing, in the elections.

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SOBCHAK MEMORIAL

President Putin at Sobchak Memorial Concert
St. Petersburg, February 19th
©President of Russia Website

On the occasion of the 20^th anniversary of the passing of Anatoly Sobchak, Vladimir Putin arranged for a major commemoration of the life of his teacher, boss and political mentor to be organised in St.Petersburg. Sobchak was a leading legal scholar and a major political figure in the 80s and the 90s and served as mayor of St. Petersburg from 1991 to 1996. Putin was then one of his deputies. Beyond Putin’s strong personal friendship with Sobchak, what the commemoration reveals is Putin’s unmistakable attachment to Sobchak's ideas. More specifically, this confirms the sources of Putin’s thinking on political principles and the importance of legality and it explains the legalistic outlook of Putin.

This is relevant to the current exercise of reforming the Russian constitution, where legality is the foremost concern. Sobchak is considered as having had a major influence in the drafting of the current constitution. Although he had an authoritarian bent, Sobchak was also generally regarded as a democrat, probably more than his student.

Accessorily, for nostalgic kremlinologists, the attendance at Sobchak commemoration also confirms who truly belongs to Putin’s St. Petersburg inner team: Sberbank Chairman Gref, former Finance Minister Kudrin and Deputy Head of Presidential Administration Kozak.

CRIMEA: A FOOTNOTE

There were rumours that during Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Ukraine in late January, he would have told his Ukrainian interlocutors that “Crimea is lost. World players understand that. Russia is not the kind of country from which you can take something away.” Pompeo’s remarks would have been made in the context of a discussion about convening an international conference on Crimea, which the US representative, by all accounts, did not find it useful to support. In other words, official US statements will continue to reflect that Crimea belongs to Ukraine, but nothing will be done about it.

As for President Zelenskyy, he nevertheless convened and participated in a Forum on the Age of Crimea in Kyiv on February 26^th. The focus was on commemoration of the 2014 events that led to Ukraine losing control over Crimea as well as measures to maintain the contacts with Ukrainian citizens: continuation of Ukrainian broadcasts in the direction of Crimea and the facilitation of administrative formalities and of travel for Ukrainian citizens residing in Crimea.  

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THE AUTHORS

Ilya Gerol, former foreign editor of the Citizen in Ottawa, syndicated columnist in Canadian, US and European media specializing in international affairs. His area of expertise includes Russia, Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern and Central Europe.  Ilya Gerol has written several books, one of them, The Manipulators, had become a textbook on relations of media and society.

During his career in the Canadian Foreign Service, Gilles Breton had three assignments at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. His first posting there began during the Soviet period, in 1983. His last was from 2008 to 2012 as Minister-Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission. He also served as Deputy Director responsible for Canada’s relations with Russia from 2000 to 2008. As an international civil servant, he was Deputy Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw from 1994 to 1997.

Gilles Breton also currently serves as Chairman of the National Board of the Canada-Eurasia-Russia Business Association. The views expressed in this newsletter exclusively reflect the opinion of the authors.